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Abstract
CROSSROADS: NEW YORK'S BLACK INTELLECTUALS AND THE ROLE OF
IDEOLOGY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1954-1965
By
Kristopher Burrell

Adviser: Dr. Clarence Taylor

This dissertation studies the importance of New York City, and the black intellectuals
who gathered there, to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The figures discussed
here merit the term “intellectual” because they were makers and purveyors of many ideas that
sustained and broadened the movement. Studying key activist-intellectuals from across the
ideological spectrum allows for a more complete understanding of the importance of ideas in
propelling the movement. Looking at the ways in which black intellectuals evolved and used
different ideologies in pursuit of racial equality is another way of demonstrating African
American agency. This study writes against the characterization of the civil rights movement as
primarily fueled by emotionalism and impulsive. Black intellectuals actively sought to plot out
the course that the movement would take.
This dissertation continues to move civil rights historiography away from the notion that
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X provided the only two approaches for achieving racial
equality by demonstrating that there was a broader spectrum of ideologies that African
Americans used and adapted in trying to successfully prosecute their struggle to secure racial
equality. Instead of merely two approaches—liberal integrationism and black nationalism—I
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argue that there were four main ideologies in conversation and contention with one another
during this period—racial liberalism, conservatism, leftism, and black nationalism.
This dissertation also contributes to the growing literature on the civil rights movement
outside of the South. I make two main arguments about the significance of New York City to the
movement. First, New York was important because institutions of every political and
ideological stripe sank roots into and influenced the intellectual and cultural milieu of black New
York and black America. Second, black intellectuals who were drawn to the city flourished
because they sampled the extraordinary variety of ideas on display as they matured intellectually
and developed their own strategies for growing and sustaining a national movement for social,
political, and economic justice. For these reasons, New York is deserving of further study in
relation to civil rights agitation and activism.
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Introduction
Waves and Rainbows

Negroes did actually think things and did actually agree
and disagree and did actually have allegiance to or hostility
towards each other on the basis of what classes they were
from and what parts of the country they were from and
whether or not they were actually natives or came into this
country with all the prejudices that black colonials could have
toward the black descendants of people who had been central
to the making of American culture.
Stanley Crouch 1

The renowned musical and cultural critic, Stanley Crouch, made the observation that
“Negroes did actually think things and did actually agree and disagree” in discussing Harold
Cruse’s intellectual contributions to African American life and culture. He made this somewhat
sarcastic statement for multiple reasons. Most narrowly, Crouch was lauding what he argued
was Cruse’s willingness to seriously engage all of the viewpoints coming from the far-flung
corners of the black community in his attempt to create an authentic, indigenous black cultural
aesthetic. Crouch’s comment, however, has a larger significance than just discussing Harold
Cruse’s intellectual production. The idea that African Americans—like every other racial or
ethnic group—were not, and have never been, an ideological monolith is stunningly obvious and
yet, still audacious.
That there was considerable ideological diversity among African American thinkers and
leaders becomes a provocative idea because of the ways in which black intellectual production
has been understudied in histories of the civil rights era with the movement toward social history
in the last thirty years. 2 The effect of this shift, however, is that there is much more that can be

1

Stanley Crouch, “Blues for Brother Cruse,” in William Jelani Cobb, The Essential Harold Cruse: A Reader
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), xii.
2
This is not to minimize the importance of social history to the study of the civil rights movement. Social
historians and sociologists have largely been responsible for the shifts toward local studies of the movement, as well
as for the increase in studies that chronicle the existence of a simultaneous civil rights movement outside of the
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said about the influence of ideology on African American culture and protest. 3 Recent studies on
African American intellectuals, even those that use Harold Cruse’s The Crisis of the Negro
Intellectual as a touchstone, such as W. D. Wright’s Crisis of the Black Intellectual, tend not to
examine the civil rights movement between 1954 and 1965 in much depth. Wright is more
concerned with how contemporary “Black and black” intellectuals are writing about the history
and current status of African Americans in the United States in order to critique the current state
of Black intellectual thought. Kevin Gaines’s Uplifting the Race ends in 1954, Anthony
Bogues’s Black Heretics, Black Prophets adopts a transnational approach in writing about how
“black radical intellectuals” during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries developed various
strategies to resist oppression and improve the condition of black people in different parts of the
world. But his figures are not primarily involved with the African American civil rights
movement during the 1950s and 1960s. William Banks’s important study of African American
intellectuals spends only two chapters out of twelve discussing the period between 1954 and
1965. The same can be said of Nikhil Singh in his study of African American intellectual
production, Black Is a Country. 4

South between 1940 and 1980. Both trends have been extremely illuminating to our general understanding of the
civil rights era. Important southern local studies include: William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro,
North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); John Dittmer,
Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994); and Charles
Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995). Important local histories on the civil rights movement outside of the South
include: Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); Brian Purnell, “A Movement Grows in Brooklyn: The Brooklyn Chapter of
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Northern Civil Rights Movement During the Early 1960s” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, New York University, 2006); Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and
the Struggle to Integrate New York City Schools (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Jeanne F. Theoharis
and Komozi Woodard, eds., Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 (New York:
Palgrave McMillan, 2003); and Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds., Groundbreaking: Local Black
Freedom Movements in America (New York: New York University, 2005).
3
Steven Conn, “Who You Callin’ an Intellectual?” Reviews in American History, vol. 33, no. 1 (2005), 64-5, 69.
4
W. D. Wright, Crisis of the Black Intellectual (Chicago: Third World Press, 2007); Kevin Kelley Gaines,
Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996); Anthony Bogues, Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New
York: Routledge, 2003); William M. Banks, Black Intellectuals: Race and Responsibility in American Life (New
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This study, by contrast, uses the civil rights movement as a lens through which to
examine the major ideological currents that existed among African American intellectuals during
the middle of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the dominant narrative of the civil rights
struggle still rests, in part, on the premise that the integrationist racial liberalism of Martin Luther
King, Jr. and the separatist black nationalism of Malcolm X were the only strands of black
thought between 1954 and 1965. 5 This dissertation continues to pull away from the notion that
black thought during the civil rights era began and ended with the liberal/militant ideological
binary represented by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X. 6 This false binary, which still
shapes popular understandings of the era, obscures the myriad perspectives African American
intellectuals held at midcentury. Thus, it is more useful to speak of a “spectrum” of African
American intellectual thought because it allows scholars to more easily encompass the range of
ideological perspectives among blacks—from conservative to communist—like the blended, yet
distinct colors of a rainbow. Historically, black intellectuals have never thought in a singular
fashion. Neither have blacks confined themselves to only two ways of seeing the world.
Constructing black thought in this bipolar way also perpetuates other false binaries that
recent scholarship has been working to break down. Namely, that the civil rights movement
suddenly moved northward and became more urban, angry, and less-deserving of public support
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1996); Nikhil Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for
Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
5
Theoharis and Woodard, Freedom North, 2.
6
Some scholars attack this false binary by complicating the traditional portrayals of one or both men. Nikhil
Singh, for example, demonstrates the intellectual evolution of Martin Luther King, Jr. after 1963 in order to make
the claim that there were two Martin Luther Kings. The liberal-integrationist King that is widely celebrated today
and eulogized yearly, and also the more radical, peace activist, that is largely forgotten today. George Breitman uses
Malcolm X’s speeches and interviews in order to chart his intellectual development in the year between his
excommunication from the Nation of Islam and his assassination in 1965 in order to show that Malcolm was
increasingly being influenced by other ideologies and coming to new understandings about the current state and
future needs of the Afro-American fight for equality; including endeavoring to redefine black nationalism. George
Breitman, By Any Means Necessary: Speeches, Interviews and a Letter by Malcolm X (New York: Pathfinder Press,
Inc., 1970). Martha Biondi emphasizes the importance of activism by members of the Communist Party and the
Party’s ideology in furthering the African American civil rights movement in To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for
Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

3

after 1965, and that this represented a distinct break from the rural, southern, more moral
movement of the previous decade. 7 Scholars that have written about the civil rights movement
in the South have often characterized the movement as springing entirely from the types of
social, political, and economic structures considered to be present in the South. Therefore,
Aldon Morris asserts that the civil rights movement “emerged in the South because of the
tradition of protest there” without acknowledging the traditions of protest that existed throughout
the country. Jack Bloom argues that “the racial practices that the civil rights movement
confronted . . . were [exclusively] embedded within the class, economic, and political systems of
the South.” And James R. Ralph, Jr. does not recognize a homegrown, northern, urban, freedom
struggle before 1965 in his study of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Chicago.
Conceptualizing the movement as a solely southern phenomenon introduces severe limits for
effectively analyzing the trajectory of the black freedom struggle for other regions of the
country. It becomes much easier to dismiss the existence of civil rights activism in the North and
more difficult to produce an accurate historical narrative of the black freedom struggle. 8
The assumption that Bloom was operating from depicted the African American civil
rights struggle as only taking place in and, therefore, only relevant for the South. His argument
also implies that these racial practices were not “embedded” within the various structural
systems of the North. While southern states may have mandated racial segregation, racial
discrimination was by no means confined to a single region of the country. None of these works
conceive of the black freedom struggle as truly national and interrelated (except for northern
activists going South to help southerners further their movement).
7

Theoharis and Woodard, Freedom North, 5-7; Singh, Black Is a Country, 5-11.
Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New
York: The Free Press, 1984), x-xi; Jack Bloom, Class, Race, and the Civil Rights Movement (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987), 1; and James R. Ralph, Jr., Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the
Civil Rights Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
8
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In the last twenty years scholars have been hammering away at the argument that there
was no northern civil rights movement before 1965 and, therefore, there was no significant
relationship between what was happening in the South and in the North. 9 Books such as
Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980, edited by Jeanne F.
Theoharis and Komozi Woodard (2003), for example, explicitly desire to dispel the “southern
paradigm” in civil rights movement scholarship. According to Theoharis and Woodard, our
typical ways of thinking “miss the systems of racial caste and power—pervasive and entrenched
across the North—that denied people of color equitable education, safe policing, real job
opportunities, a responsive city government, regular sanitation services, quality health care, and
due process under the law.” 10
New York’s black intellectuals often made connections between what was happening in
the South and what was going on in New York City. They worked to conceive of the problems
that African Americans were battling against as national phenomena, even as they fought against
problems such as school segregation, separate public accommodations, housing discrimination,
and job discrimination in local contexts. What made them intellectuals was that they selfconsciously attempted to “devise concepts, analytical categories, critiques and bodies of thought
for Blacks to help themselves.” 11 As William Banks writes, intellectuals actively worked to
“transmit, modify, and create ideas and culture.” 12 New York’s black intellectuals made use of
the ideologies available to them, modified those ideologies in order to make them applicable for
the time, place, and goals they intended to accomplish, articulated those ideologies for black and
9

In addition to the earlier works that study the civil rights struggle outside of the South can be added: Matthew
J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten
Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008).
10
Theoharis and Woodard, Freedom North, 3.
11
Wright, Crisis of the Black Intellectual, 26.
12
Banks, Black Intellectuals, xvi.
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white Americans, and in the process evolved those ideologies so as to create new ideas and ways
of seeing race relations, racism, civil rights, and the condition of black people in the United
States.
New York’s black intellectuals did not divorce their intellectual production from on-theground activism, however. Their writings and speeches were one dimension of their
involvement in the civil rights movement. New York’s black intellectuals also participated in
demonstrations, boycotts, and were even arrested for their efforts to win political, social, and
economic equality for blacks. New York’s black intellectuals strove to bring about change at the
local and national levels. In some instances, they sought to change local circumstances by
affecting national policy—such as, in the case of Kenneth Clark’s research for the Brown v.
Board of Education case. In other instances, New York’s black intellectuals sought to improve
the lives of black New Yorkers and, thereby, perhaps set precedents for more extensive changes
throughout the nation. An example of this trend was Reverend Milton Galamison’s attempts to
coordinate a multi-city boycott of the public school systems in the winter of 1964 in order to
dramatize the perpetuation of racial segregation outside the South. All of the cities that
Galamison hoped to enlist in the boycott were northeastern and Midwestern. Whatever
differences there were between the North and South did not make the racism that blacks were
subjected to any less enduring. Discrimination needed to be struck down wherever it was found.
Black intellectuals agreed on the ultimate goal of bringing about a more equitable society
in the United States, but they differed on the best ways to achieve that largest of goals. I argue,
however, that there were more than two major strands of black thought between 1954 and 1965.
Rather, I posit that there were four major political ideologies in conversation and conflict with
one another during this decade: racial liberalism, conservatism, black nationalism, and
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socialism/communism. The intellectuals who evolved and applied these ideologies to the
question of how to achieve black equality in the United States sometimes found their ways of
seeing the struggle for freedom compatible with each other, and in other cases antithetical.
Nevertheless, black leaders and intellectuals often were influenced by—or continued to pull from
more than one of—these ideologies over the course of their careers. Whether the issue was the
efficacy of pursuing racial integration throughout American society, the value of working within
governmental groups or committees to achieve substantial social change, or the future direction
of the civil rights movement by the mid-1960s, New York’s black intellectuals such as Kenneth
Clark, A. Philip Randolph, Malcolm X, and George Schuyler, among others thought deeply and
differently about each one.
The figures discussed throughout this dissertation resided in New York City for all or
most of the years between 1954 and 1965. They were also dedicated to producing scholarship,
social commentary, or a philosophy related to activism and leadership over the course of this
decade. The particular black intellectuals included in this dissertation were involved in civil
rights protests both in New York City and around the nation, so their influence on the philosophy
and tactics of the movement was broader than affecting only the movement in New York City.
These figures, although by no means an exhaustive list, also represented many of the
characteristics associated with each of the four major ideological categories well. This is not to
argue that they were “pure” in the sense that they did not draw from any other ideological
category. However, each of the figures are used to demonstrate how each of the four ideologies
were employed in the pursuit of African American civil rights.
Racial liberals of the mid-twentieth century believed in the fundamental principles
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and that became associated with the emergence of
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a meritocracy following the American Revolution; that all human beings were created equal and
were entitled to ascend the social and economic ladder to whatever heights their talent, intellect,
and hard work could take them. While liberals believed that democracy was being degraded in
America, the fault did not lie with the “American creed” or with governmental institutions.
Rather, the problem was that the people administering these institutions were twisting their
purposes to serve the prerogatives of white supremacy. Racial liberals believed that liberal
democracy could be reformed. 13 As a result, liberals were typically willing to work for racial
equality through existing democratic institutions: exercising the suffrage, pushing to obtain the
vote for more blacks, fighting for civil rights in the courts and through legislation.
Critics characterized the reformist orientation of racial liberals as “conservative,” because
as Alfred Kelly commented about Thurgood Marshall and the lawyers of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, “[t]here was a very conservative element in these men in the sense that they really
believed in the American dream and that it could be made to work for black men, too. . . . They
felt the social order was fundamentally good.” 14 But the idea that democracy could be
transformed in such ways to serve all the people can also be seen as revolutionary. The problem
with democracy, as far as racial liberals were concerned, was that it had not really been tried in
the entire history of the country. The American creed could be redeemed, however. The
survival of the country depended on it. And racial liberals believed, by the 1950s, that they were
the ones to bring about true democracy.
Many black nationalists, by contrast, were convinced that America was beyond
redemption, and that rather than engage in this inevitably futile project, African Americans

13

Peter C. Myers, Frederick Douglass: Race and the Rebirth of American Liberalism (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2008), 1-2.
14
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle
for Equality (New York: Vintage Books, 1975; reprint 2004), 642.
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should extricate themselves as completely as possible from this country. 15 Elijah Muhammad
and Malcolm X taught members of the Nation of Islam that African Americans and whites would
never be able to live together harmoniously in the United States because whites had no genuine
interest in integrating with blacks. 16 As far as the Nation of Islam was concerned, the solution,
therefore, was territorial separation. 17 The calls for territorial sovereignty harkened back to the
Garvey movement of the 1920s and the emigrationist movement of Martin Delany during the
mid-nineteenth century.
Not all nationalists advocated territorial separation, however. Harold Cruse, for instance,
argued that the calls for an independent black nation were not viable and “pessimistic.” Rather,
Cruse worked for cultural and political autonomy for blacks within the United States through his
advocacy for the creation of an indigenous African American cultural aesthetic and his attempt to
cultivate the Freedom Now Party in Harlem in 1964. 18 Nationalists did, however, push for
blacks to cultivate black-owned institutions that could adequately serve their own communities
and for blacks to develop a strong sense of pride in their African history and culture. Those
institutions could be retail establishments and restaurants, schools, or cultural and artistic venues,
but they needed to further the goal of black independence.
Leftist intellectuals and activists argued that capitalism disadvantaged blacks by
privileging the white elite in the United States and subordinated people of color to whites.
Therefore, capitalism needed to be replaced by socialist or communist economic and political
structures. Socialist intellectuals such as A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin were also

15

Elijah Muhammad, “Mr. Muhammad Speaks,” Pittsburgh Courier, 13 April 1957, B2.
Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Ballantine Books, 1964), 186, 217; Karl Evanzz,
The Messenger: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad (New York: Pantheon Books, 1999), 167.
17
“Black Muslim Aide Berates Whites,” Chicago Daily News, 27 February 1963.
18
Harold Cruse, “Why We Need a Freedom Now Party,” September 1963, Box 7, Folder 1, Harold Cruse
Papers, Archives of the Tamiment Library, Robert F. Wagner Archives, New York University, New York.
16
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distinguished by their perpetual efforts to establish substantive partnerships between African
Americans and the organized labor movement. Since the 1910s, Randolph preached the benefits
not only of organizing black workers—as he did in forming the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters in 1925—but also in trying to get blacks included within white labor unions in order to
build an interracial, class conscious struggle for racial and economic equality.
African American leftists had to balance, and reconcile, allegiances to race and ideology
that were fraught with tension within their respective political parties (the American Socialist
Party and the American Communist Party), as well as in the larger society. Even though the
influence of leftist activists may have been stronger in New York City for a longer period of time
than in other parts of the country, as Martha Biondi argues, leftist activists and organizations
were actively marginalized in the 1950s. Nevertheless, their beliefs remained important for the
dwindling memberships of the Communist or Socialist parties, as well as for many who no
longer formally affiliated themselves with either party, as an alternative vision for organizing
American society. 19
As a result, for example, according to historian Gerald Horne, the Communist Party in
the United States was of at least two minds when it came to racial integration. “[O]n the one
hand they questioned being co-opted by imperialism but on the other hand they welcomed the
entry of blacks at all levels of U.S. society.” 20 Leftists struggled to implement a radically
different social structure here in the United States, trying to operate both within and against the
predominant American liberal-democratic tradition simultaneously.
Finally, there were also black conservatives who believed that blacks must take more
responsibility for bettering their own condition in this country. Conservatives acknowledged that
19

Biondi, To Stand and Fight, 182-3.
Gerald Horne, Black Liberation, Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party (Newark, Del.: University of
Delaware Press, 1993), 249.
20
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racial discrimination existed in America, but did not endorse mass action and other
confrontational tactics as effective methods for bringing about significant and lasting social
change. By the middle of the 1950s black conservatives, such as George Schuyler, argued that
frontal assaults on racial segregation only engendered increased hostility from whites and
retarded the natural progress in race relations that would inevitably occur over time. Schuyler,
for example, chided the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
for “battling against” whites all the time for racial discrimination. He would have preferred the
NAACP demonstrate a greater willingness to educate whites about the evils of racial
discrimination. 21 He also argued that blacks needed to fully “acculturate” themselves into
American society in order to close the cultural (behavioral) gap between themselves and
whites. 22 According to proponents of this view, blacks needed to think of themselves as
individuals and continue to work to better themselves. 23 If enough blacks succeeded, they would
then begin reaping collective benefits, as whites would be compelled to grant blacks the rights
they sought. This had largely been Booker T. Washington’s position regarding the most
efficacious path for black advancement prior to his death in 1915.
Besides looking at these major strands of black thought during the 1950s and 1960s, I
also argue that by examining the movement from an ideological perspective it is possible to
better understand why and how Black Power ideology gained more traction throughout the
country by the mid-1960s. Indeed, “black power” did not merely spring fully formed into the
consciousness of black people in 1966. By the mid-1960s, however, the movement’s legislative

21

“Reminiscences of George S. Schuyler,” (1962), 563, in the Oral History Research Office Collection of the
Columbia University Libraries (OHRO/CUL).
22
“Reminiscences of George S. Schuyler,” (1962), 622, in the Oral History Research Office Collection of the
Columbia University Libraries (OHRO/CUL).
23
Oscar R. Williams, George S. Schuyler: Portrait of a Black Conservative (Knoxville, Tenn.: The University of
Tennessee Press, 2007), 69.
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successes, the increasing difficulty that liberals were having plotting the future direction of the
movement, the continuation of grinding poverty and systematic discrimination in African
American ghettoes throughout the country, and the external political challenges to liberalism in
the wider society combined to allow for Black Power to gain more adherents in urban areas
throughout the country. 24
Another of this dissertation’s aims is to demonstrate that New York City is an important
location to be studied in relation to the civil rights movement. New York City has been home to
the largest black population in the United States since the 1920s, making it a center of African
American cultural, political, and ideological ferment through the 1960s. New York City became
home to black publications, educational groups, and rights organizations of every ideological
stripe very early in the century, which created the necessary spaces for the development of a
political, physical, and intellectual community by World War I.
New York City’s importance had not decreased by the 1950s as evidenced by the
organizations that were headquartered there and the group of prominent intellectuals who called
the city home. In the last fifteen years several scholars have challenged the traditional manner in
which the black freedom struggle has been conceived by showing that New York City also had a
vibrant civil rights movement of its own during the 1950s and 1960s that dovetailed with the
civil rights agitation occurring throughout the country at the same. In To Stand and Fight: The
Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (2004), Martha Biondi argues that in the
decade after World War II a Communist-led diverse coalition of blacks emerged to battle for
equality in New York and that blacks were attracted to this movement by the tendency toward
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concrete action as opposed to mere rhetoric. 25 She demonstrates that by 1954, when the
Supreme Court handed down the Brown v. Board of Education decision, African Americans had
developed a comprehensive movement for racial equality in New York, which could boast of
several significant successes. Although activists were not always successful, the collective
movements for equality serve as an important “backdrop to the Black Power era in the North.” 26
Clarence Taylor’s, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to
Integrate New York City Schools (1997) and “Up South in New York: The 1950s School
Desegregation Struggles” by Adina Back (NYU, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1997) also illustrate that
important battles in the fight for racial equality were taking place in New York City during the
1950 and 1960s by examining the campaign to desegregate the public schools. Taylor uses the
life of militant Presbyterian pastor, Milton A. Galamison, in order to narrate the fight against the
racially discriminatory policies of the city’s Board of Education. Back’s study is not
biographical, but also gives a detailed account of the interactions between African American and
Puerto Rican parents and the Board. Both works place a great deal of emphasis on the efforts at
grassroots organization and the mobilization of poor parents. Taylor and Back demonstrate the
agency of parents in their quest to improve the quality of their children’s educations, in addition
to showing that the civil rights movement was also occurring in New York City as in the South.
Another work worth mentioning here in the growing literature on civil rights in New
York is Brian Purnell’s study of the Brooklyn branch of the Congress of Racial Equality in the
1960s, “A Movement Grows in Brooklyn: The Brooklyn Chapter of the Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE) and the Northern Civil Rights Movement during the early 1960s (NYU, Ph.D.
Dissertation, 2006). Purnell shows the importance of local people in the struggle for equality in

25
26

Biondi, To Stand and Fight, 6.
Ibid., 2.

13

New York City. By chronicling the formation and protest campaigns of Brooklyn CORE,
Purnell demonstrates the ability of a small group of activists to mobilize a local community
around specific issues that were personally relevant and bring about significant change—even if
the group was ultimately unable to change the fundamental structures the perpetuated racial
equality in the city. Brooklyn CORE used innovative protest strategies in order to dramatize the
inequities of city life endured by poor blacks and Puerto Ricans during the early 1960s. 27 Even
with these several important works, however, the New York City movement is worthy of
continued study.
These works on the African American civil rights movement are, for the most part,
concerned about uncovering the agency of ordinary people. Clearly, this is necessary.
Historians have made it plain that social change does not occur solely from the top-down.
Nonetheless, this search for black agency should not preclude paying serious attention to the role
of ideas and ideology in the civil rights movement. New York’s black leaders and intellectuals
served two important functions in the movement: 1) as developers of the strategies that would
propel the successes of the movement and as communicators who would inspire others to action;
and 2) as the people who would sit at the bargaining table (figuratively and literally) with the
representatives of entrenched white power and express the race’s demands for equality.
These intellectuals were not merely engaging in intellectual exercises by writing about
the condition of blacks in America and how to bring about racial equality. Rather, black
intellectuals were using their intellectual production as a method of social protest against secondclass citizenship. As historian William Banks argues about black intellectuals, historically, “the
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lives and works of black intellectuals have always been strongly linked to the position of African
Americans in the United States.” 28 This was absolutely the case for these black New Yorkers.
African American intellectuals during the middle of the twentieth century applied their
intellectual talents in efforts to confront real problems. Kenneth Clark wrote and spoke in depth
about the effects of segregation on the psyches of black and white children because he believed
that segregation was harmful to the functioning of American society. Malcolm X advocated
territorial separation and Harold Cruse pushed for cultural autonomy because they believed in
the capacity of blacks to build and maintain political, economic, and cultural institutions of their
own that were reflective of a collective pride in African and African American history and
culture. A. Philip Randolph continued to push for the American Federation of Labor to bar
racially discriminatory unions, and partnerships between organized labor and civil rights groups
because he recognized that workers—black and white—had more interests in common than
separately. A biracial movement for racial and economic equality was the best way to facilitate
an egalitarian society. And George Schuyler spoke out against the black leadership of the civil
rights movement because he believed that all Americans had to deal with the present society as it
was—warts and all—and not operate from the vantage point of how society ought to be. 29
Blacks had to be just as responsible as whites in terms of taking care not to destroy America in
the name of improving it. These varied ideological perspectives are often not considered
together in the ways that they interacted in studies of the “classical” civil rights period. 30 This is
partly because of the continued reliance on the false dichotomy of integrationism versus
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nationalism, and partly because of the continued desire to want to characterize Black Power as
emerging suddenly, as an overreaction to continued ghettoization rather than as an ideology
having much deeper historical roots in the black experience.
Therefore, this dissertation takes ideology seriously. Studying how black intellectuals
employed various ideologies in the pursuit of black equality is another way of discussing African
American agency. Writing about the role of ideology in the civil rights movement continues to
move our perceptions of African Americans, and of the movement, away from the idea that the
movement was fueled only by emotionalism and only reactive to the brutality of whites. The
movement could be dramatic, and black intellectuals did respond to the injustices blacks faced.
But these people were also proactive, working to plot a course for African American equality
that worked to move the levers of power as much as be moved by them. That dialectical
relationship is in need of further study.

Chapter 1 provides an historical overview of how the four major ideological threads that
were present during the civil rights era emerged and evolved over the first half of the twentieth
century. Beginning with the debates between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois at
the opening of the century, this chapter demonstrates how the prescriptions black intellectuals
offered for the elevation of the black masses were foundational for the growth of black
intellectual thought through the first half of the twentieth century. Subsequent generations of
black thinkers and leaders including A. Philip Randolph, Harold Cruse, and George Schuyler
agreed with, took issue with, and further developed the ideas of earlier black intellectuals over
the course of their activist careers as they adapted them to fit the current social, political, and
economic conditions of the African American population. By the mid-1950s, black intellectuals
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had a rich intellectual tradition to draw from that helped provide insight into how to address the
contemporary problems facing black people.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that over the course of the first half of the twentieth century
Harlem grew into a physical, political, cultural, and intellectual community. This process began
at the turn of the twentieth century as blacks began to migrate to northern Manhattan and
establish organizations to support community growth and protection. The number and diversity
of rights organizations, political and cultural groups, newspapers, and magazines that were
created in New York during the early twentieth century and remained into the 1950s made it a
fount of black cultural and intellectual production. The four ideologies that were prevalent in
determining the strategic agenda of the movement in New York and nationally were able to grow
deep organizational roots there from early in the century. The plethora of activities occurring in
New York also drew tens of thousands of blacks to the city during the 1910s and even more,
thereafter. Some of the prominent intellectuals and activists that would call New York City
home between 1954 and 1965 included James Baldwin, A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin,
Malcolm X, Harold Cruse, Ella Baker, Milton Galamison, Kenneth Clark, and George Schuyler.
Many of these figures were migrants to New York. A few arrived as children, but the majority
came to New York in their young adulthood and were either attracted to New York by the bright
lights in the big city or were captivated them once they got here. 31
Chapter 3 examines two issues by looking at battles over school desegregation during the
1950s. The first is how figures from different ideological persuasions felt about the goal of
racial integration. The second is the willingness or unwillingness of black leaders to push for
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social equality through established governmental institutions. The Brown v. Board of Education
decision of 1954 sparked important debates among black intellectuals because of the case’s
implications for eventually producing a racially integrated society and its potential affect on
black institutions.
Even among those who supported the Supreme Court ruling, and worked to see it fully
implemented in New York City, black leaders employed different strategies in order to compel
the Board of Education to make good on its promises. While Kenneth Clark tried to influence
the Board of Education from within by participating in the Board-created Commission on
Integration, which existed from 1955 to 1960, Reverend Milton A. Galamison refused to work
within government-affiliated agencies, choosing instead to remain independent. While he was
president of the Education Committee and then president of the Brooklyn NAACP from 1956 to
1960, he and like-minded members led local parents to challenge Board of Education policies in
their own, more confrontational ways. By the end of the 1950s, both leaders would become
increasingly frustrated by the recalcitrance of the New York City Board of Education for its
unwillingness to embrace the far-reaching programs suggested by its own committees or respond
to the pressure put on it by outside organizations. On a larger scale, the slow pace of school
desegregation around the country as a result of the tactics of bureaucratic delay and massive
resistance, led to questioning the efficacy of liberal methods of achieving racial equality.
Liberals would need to respond to the challenges of activists of other ideological bents in order
to retain their ideological predominance going into the next decade.
Chapter 4 examines the efforts of the nation’s oldest and largest liberal civil rights
organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, to re-brand itself
during the early 1960s in order to respond to the challenges posed by newer organizations such
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as Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and even local NAACP branches that wanted to
take a more confrontational tack toward addressing the concerns of blacks than the national
headquarters was comfortable with. In his addresses to the NAACP national conventions
between 1960 and 1962, Roy Wilkins espoused more militant rhetoric about the goals of the civil
rights movement to achieve equality now, and asserted that the NAACP needed to have the
leading role in bringing about this great change to American society. By appealing to the
increasing militancy of younger members of the NAACP, particularly the youth chapters,
Wilkins and the national NAACP would be successful in maintaining its place at the preeminent
civil rights organization in the country.
Chapter 5 looks at 1963 and into the early months of 1964 as a defining year in the civil
rights movement. It examines three important episodes that took place that year: the protests in
Birmingham, Alabama during the spring, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom during
the summer, and the one-day boycott of New York City’s public schools that occurred in
February 1964. Intellectuals such as Bayard Rustin and James Baldwin argued the either
character of blacks or the character of whites had changed in fundamental ways during 1963.
The civil rights movement and the larger American society were also significantly affected as a
result. Many who had participated in bringing these protests to fruition viewed each as a
success, but the successes of 1963 demonstrated that the movement was at a crossroads. The
powers-that-be in each place continued to be resistant to the larger demands of the movement,
even as blacks won concessions either from local, state, or the federal government.
The final chapter looks at the question that many black intellectuals and leaders were
asking by the end of 1963: where should the movement go next? This was not necessarily a
question of location, but what were the most effective ways to capitalize on the recent legislative
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successes of the movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Different leaders proposed different answers to this question based on their ideological
proclivities, articulating different levels of federal government involvement, and varying political
proposals. What was evident, however, was racial liberalism was on the decline as the
orthodoxy of the civil rights movement as liberalism was being challenged from numerous
quarters by the end of 1965. If liberals had been able to withstand a significant challenge to their
ideological preeminence at the beginning of the decade, they could no longer by 1966 as the
undulations of black intellectual thought lifted the tide of nationalist and Black Power thinking to
the forefront of the struggle for black equality for the next decade to come.
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Chapter 1
“These are the Interconnections of History”:
Four Ideologies in Historical Perspective

We are creatures of history, for every historical epoch has
its roots in a preceding epoch. The black militants of today
are standing upon the shoulders of the New Negro radicals of
my day, the twenties, thirties, and forties. We stood upon the
shoulders of the civil rights fighters of the Reconstruction era,
and they stood upon the shoulders of the black abolitionists.
These are the interconnections of history, and they play their
role in the course of development.
A. Philip Randolph 1

Thousands of people attended Frederick Douglass’ funeral in Washington, D.C. on
February 25, 1895. The old and young, distinguished and common, came from far and wide to
get one last glimpse of the “Sage of Anacostia” who had worked so hard to secure the rights of
African Americans. 2 He had been the victim of a massive heart attack five days earlier at his
estate, Cedar Hill, after having attended a National Council of Women meeting earlier in the
afternoon. 3 Douglass’ contemporary, Alexander Crummell, a prominent minister, Christian
missionary to Africa, and activist for African American rights, gave one of the many eulogies.
His death signified the passing of an earlier age of black reform and thought. Douglass was one
of the last connections to the antebellum period of African American intellectual thought.
Crummell would perhaps be the final link when he passed away on September 10, 1898. Both
Douglass and Crummell, in different ways, would act as bridges between the pre- and postReconstruction periods of African American thought.
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Prior to his death, Douglass collaborated with the journalist and anti-lynching activist, Ida
B. Wells, to produce a pamphlet entitled The Reason Why the Colored American Is Not in the
World’s Columbian Exposition in advance of the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago. 4 Douglass and
Wells wrote and edited this pamphlet to protest the fact that African Americans were almost
entirely excluded from participating in the Fair. 5 Except for one exhibit in the Women’s
building, blacks were not permitted to frame their own exhibits at the Exposition. 6 Douglass
worked with Wells because he admired Wells’ anti-lynching activism, having himself delivered
scathing rebukes of the practice in the last decade of his life. 7 Though their relationship was
tense at times, Wells was “overcome with grief” for months after learning of Douglass’ passing. 8
Theirs was a mutual respect; Wells to Douglass for the lifetime of service to the race he had
offered, Douglass to Wells for the zeal with which she was serving the interests of the race.
Wells was thankful to Douglass for the wisdom that he had imparted to her during their
relationship. 9
Crummell, in the last year of his life, joined with the upcoming generation of black male
thinkers when he helped to found—and was elected the first president of—the American Negro
Academy (ANA) in 1897. It was the first black institution in the world dedicated to black
intellectual production. 10 The ANA, headquartered in Washington, D.C., was, according to its
constitution, “an organization of authors, artists, and those distinguished in other walks of life,
4
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men of African descent, for the promotion of Letters, Science, and Art.” 11 Comprised of some of
the most accomplished black men in the country at the time, the initial membership included
author Paul Lawrence Dunbar, philosophy professor Alain Locke, historian Carter G. Woodson,
and both Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois, among others. Crummell and other
members believed that racism could be destroyed through the promotion of “scientific truth.” 12
This belief in the truth of science had flowered by the 1890s and was connected in many
ways to the burgeoning American Progressive reform impulse of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Progressive reformers tended to be middle-class, college-educated, and
come from devout Protestant backgrounds. They were interested in reforming American society
in such ways to ameliorate the problems they associated with large-scale immigration, rapid
urbanization, and the excesses of industrial capitalism. Progressive reformers believed they were
witnessing the degeneration of American society as religiosity was on the decline, the cities were
teeming with newcomers who needed to be assimilated into American society, and the costs of
starting a business had become prohibitive for most Americans. Therefore, many reformers were
concerned that American would soon no longer be a meritocracy.
Progressive reformers advocated professionalization throughout American society and
led to important changes within academia and politics. They also tended to try and use science
and empirical research in attempts to solve societal problems. Consequently, Progressive reform
efforts had both beneficial and harmful affects on African American life and thought. During the
last third of the nineteenth century white scientists in the United States and Western Europe had
been providing “scientific” evidence that African Americans were biologically inferior to—if not
an entirely different species of being than—Aryans. Men such as Arthur de Gobineau, the
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French aristocrat, novelist, and diplomat; and Sir Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s cousin,
injected these racist ideas with “proof” from biology during the 1850s and 1860s.
The concept of Aryan racial superiority traveled well across the Atlantic to the United
States because it added the credibility of “scientific truth” to already widely accepted beliefs
about the “natural” order of the races. 13 Many white intellectuals, rather than argue against racial
theory, threw their full support behind it. 14 “Elitists, utopians and so-called ‘progressives’ fused
their smoldering race fears and class bias with their desire to make a better world. They
reinvented Galton’s eugenics into a repressive and racist ideology.” 15 Scientific racism was so
damaging to African Americans for several reasons. There were the moral implications of
valuing one human life more than another. Scientific racists were also asserting that there were
innate and unchangeable inequalities among human beings and this directly contradicted the
central idea of the Declaration of Independence. Most importantly, however, these new
“scientific truths” were being used to justify an avalanche of legislation that disfranchised
African Americans and constructed an entirely separate society for blacks to inhabit.
Crummell, Du Bois, and the other members of the American Negro Academy were
struggling against the notion of black inferiority at a moment of increasingly popularity.
Members believed that their most effective weapon in combating these racist concepts was, in
fact, “scientific truth.” As Crummell argued, “‘We have got to meet the minds of this country. . .
. It is only . . . scientific truth, in every department, that is going to do anything for us.’” 16 Very
much in the Progressive mold, the ANA sought to use scholarship in order to diagnose problems
13

Patricia Sullivan, Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement (New York:
The New Press, 2009), 8; Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, Negro New York, 1890-1930 (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1996, Second Edition), 26-7.
14
Ann Douglas, Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux,
1995), 306-7.
15
Edwin Black, “The Horrifying American Roots of Nazi Eugenics,” The History News Network, 24 November
2003, http://hnn.us/articles/1796.html, 15 May 2009.
16
Blaxton, “The American Negro Academy: Black Excellence 100 Years Ago,” 1, 11.

24

and promote solutions to the social, economic, and political problems affecting African
Americans. The Academy also affirmed an abiding belief in the ability of a liberal arts education
to elevate the race and was very much concerned with aiding future generations of talented
intellects. 17 According to the Academy’s constitution, “members were committed to aiding
youngsters ‘of genius in the attainment of the higher culture, here and abroad.’” 18 The beliefs in
the elevating power of a liberal arts education and that there needed to be a small vanguard of
elite, highly educated, African Americans charged with the responsibility and duty to lead the
race guided the program of the American Negro Academy. 19 Du Bois, in his influential Souls of
Black Folk in 1903, would include these principles in his program for black racial uplift. He
argued that there was, perhaps, a small group of African Americans that would be charged with
elevating the race to the sufficient levels to bring about racial equality. The “talented tenth”
concept—although the phrase was not used in Souls—would help shape racial liberal ideology
through the mid-1960s. In fact, it would be during the 1890s and 1900s that four ideologies:
racial liberalism, black conservatism, black nationalism, and socialism—threads of which had
been present in a nascent form prior to the end of Reconstruction—began to appear in forms that
would be recognizable to the intellectuals and leaders that would be evolving them in the 1950s
and 1960s.

The deaths of Douglass in 1895 and Crummell three years later meant that there were no
more prominent leaders alive who had seen the race through enslavement and into freedom. A
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torch would almost be literally passed from earlier generations of black thinkers such as Henry
Highland Garnet, Martin Delany, and Sojourner Truth who helped guide the race out of slavery
and through Reconstruction, to Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, William Monroe
Trotter, Ida B. Wells, and others. In fact, Du Bois would become the second president of the
American Negro Academy after Crummell’s passing. The 1890s, therefore, was a transitory
period for black intellectual thought as a younger generation of African American intellectuals,
who—for the most part—had not been born in slavery, was coming of age in a country that was
changing dramatically at the same time. But more important than their collective youth was that
even though leaders such as Du Bois, Wells, and Trotter drew on earlier thinkers, they were
working to devise strategies for achieving racial equality that would combat the new, modern
political and economic structures that were emerging at the turn of the twentieth century.
Younger thinkers were establishing themselves as viable agitators for African American
rights in this decade. In 1895, Du Bois earned his doctorate in history from Harvard. In 1896,
he began his sociological study of blacks in Philadelphia through the University of Pennsylvania.
And in 1897 he took over the directorship of the annual Atlanta Conferences where scholars
presented research on every facet of black life in America at the time. Booker T. Washington,
who was the principal of Tuskegee Institute, a black industrial college in Alabama, was emerging
as the most important black leader in the country. Within seven months of Douglass’ death,
Washington replaced Douglass as the most influential African American in the United States
after he delivered his most famous address at the Cotton States Exposition in Atlanta. William
Monroe Trotter had just completed his undergraduate degree from Harvard in 1895, graduating
magna cum laude, and earned his master’s degree in 1896. And by 1895 Ida B. Wells was
already a prominent journalist and anti-lynching activist, having published two pamphlets,
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Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All its Phases and A Red Record in 1892 detailing “the
deterioration of American race relations by tabulating the rising toll of lynch mobs.” 20
The emergence of the Progressive reform movement, the growth of large-scale industrial
capitalism, and the construction of Jim Crow, would shape the institutions that blacks would
create and cooperate with for the next sixty-plus years. The black thinkers who were coming of
age during the age during the 1890s were working through, within, and against forces and
structures that were quite different than earlier generations prior to Reconstruction. The
appearance of these new social, economic, and political structures helped mark the 1890s as the
beginning of a distinct period of African American intellectual thought and leadership.
While the Progressives were an incredibly varied group of reformers, one uniting
principle for many was the belief they could bring about positive social change through their
individual actions. Many Progressive reformers, black and white, had connections to the militant
abolition movement of the 1830s and 1840s through familial ties; and had been taught since
childhood to believe in racial equality. Mary White Ovington, for example, who became a
founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was born
into a family of abolitionists in New England. Her parents had been involved in the movement
and she grew up listening to stories about the activities of William Lloyd Garrison, who was a
friend of her grandmother’s. Ovington had been enthralled while listening to Frederick Douglass
in her youth and Garrison was, in her words, her “childhood’s greatest hero.” 21 She continued
this familial tradition of advocacy for black civil rights as an adult when she became involved
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with the Committee for Improving the Industrial Condition of the Negro in New York (CIICN)
in 1906.
The principal founder of the CIICN was an African American educator, Dr. William L.
Bulkley. Bulkley’s organization was established to help broaden employment opportunities for
black New Yorkers. 22 The Progressive movement provided African American leaders with ways
to connect with liberal whites who might support their efforts to build biracial coalitions in
pursuit of racial equality. It would be an interracial committee of sixty New Yorkers, including
Bulkley, Ovington, and William Jay Shieffelin, a “philanthropist, urban reformer, [and] heir to
the Jay family abolitionist tradition” that ultimately launched the CIICN. Jay became the
CIICN’s first president. 23
The emergence of a second industrial revolution and large-scale industrial capitalism
after Reconstruction roused the concern of many Progressive reformers who saw themselves as
combating the vagaries of industrial capitalism. The economic depression of the mid-1890s
vividly illustrated the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and convinced many
Americans that industrialism had caused the dire economic crisis. 24 According to historian Paul
D. Moreno, though black leaders clung to their “classical liberal principles,” which included the
“free labor idea,” after the depression of the mid-1890s, this principle could no longer prevail
unchallenged. 25 Reformers and others began to question whether social mobility was still
possible in America. 26
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The political landscape that African Americans were forced to operate within had also
shifted significantly since Reconstruction. Black leaders during and after the 1890s worked
within a political universe in which the federal government had intervened on their behalf to
guarantee equality under the law during the 1860s and 1870s, only to see those rights eroded
within a generation. State legislatures, with the support of the Supreme Court, virtually rendered
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution moot over the course of the 1880s.
They effectively went in for the kill after the mid 1890s. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), in which the
Court mandated that states could maintain racially segregated public accommodations and other
facilities as long as they were equal, and the laws disfranchising African Americans in the South
between 1898 and 1902, in effect, codified a version of white American nationalism that
recreated a country in which blacks were politically and socially invisible.
Black intellectuals and leaders in this period, Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du
Bois the most prominent among them, articulated two different approaches for achieving black
equality. The common term of the time was “racial uplift.” According to historian Kevin
Gaines, “[f]or many black elites, uplift came to mean an emphasis on self-help, racial solidarity,
temperance, thrift, chastity, social purity, patriarchal authority, and the accumulation of
wealth.” 27 In his book, Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the
Twentieth Century, Gaines characterizes racial uplift ideology as inherently conservative due to
the upper-class biases of many of its advocates. As a result of Gaines’ focus on the class
dynamics of racial uplift ideology, however, he tends to flatten the political and ideological
differences between Washington and Du Bois so that they merely become two different sides of
the same socially conservative coin. However, the differences between Washington and Du
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Bois’ ideologies—and by implication, the differences between racial liberalism and black
conservatism—though perhaps sharing some common origins and rhetoric, were real and
significant, and should not be understated. The essence of Du Bois and Washington’s
disagreement about how to implement racial uplift came down to different definitions of
“civilization” and “progress.” Their conflicting perspectives manifested themselves, in more
practical terms, in their educational and social philosophies.
Washington espoused a conservative political ideology. Conservative, not because he
spoke in terms that were significantly different from Du Bois. Both spoke of their desire to uplift
or elevate the race and both also claimed some of the same thinkers as intellectual progenitors,
namely Frederick Douglass. 28 Conservative, not because he advocated for blacks to be excluded
from the mainstream of American society. Washington did, in his own quiet ways, work against
lynching and Jim Crow. 29 Conservative, not because he operated within ideological, political,
and economic parameters determined by whites. Most African American leaders did as a result
of the stark imbalances in political, economic, and social power that whites wielded as opposed
to blacks. Rather, Washington was conservative because he was willing to surrender the
timetable for black liberation to whites. And conservative because he put forth the view that
blacks not look for federal intervention on their behalf even though he lived in a time when there
was a precedent for it; even though the Constitution guaranteed blacks equality under the law. 30
Many whites believed—and so did Washington—that civilization was a literal,
mechanical process that races engaged in. Civilization was used as shorthand to connote both
28
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larger contributions to world culture in terms of art, literature, and thought; and was also a
commentary on one’s fitness of character, deportment, hygiene, and biological development.
Most whites believed, and seemingly so did Washington, that African Americans were at the
bottom of the ladder when it came to their level of civilization. 31 It is important to note that
Washington did not necessarily see blacks’ inferior level of civilization as irremediable. 32
Nevertheless, Washington accepted whites’ characterization of his race as less civilized and used
it to argue against literary education. In light of what Washington observed of African American
life in preparation to open Tuskegee Institute, he commented that giving poor black children a
“mere book education” would be “almost a waste of time.” 33 As a result, Washington was
willing to concede that blacks were not yet ready to exercise political responsibility, and that as
they achieved higher levels of civilization as a group, whites would be willing to grant African
Americans more rights. Washington argued that whites would be keen to reward true merit,
regardless of the color of the person’s skin: “there is something in human nature which always
makes an individual recognize and reward merit, no matter under what color of skin the merit
was found. I have found, too, that it is the visible, the tangible, that goes a long way to softening
prejudices.” 34
Therefore, Washington, and later black conservatives, such as George S. Schuyler and
Zora Neale Hurston, advocated what scholar Deborah Plant has termed an “individualist personal
philosophy.” 35 Washington emphasized that blacks needed to focus on achieving economic
autonomy and that the onus for racial uplift had to be on African Americans alone. Until blacks
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reached and then surpassed white benchmarks of civilization, Washington preached that it was
“the extremest folly” to agitate for the vote and social equality. Blacks did not need to integrate
with whites, but rather to focus their energies internally in order to rise to the standards of
civilization imposed by southern whites. 36 He told blacks that “the time [would] come when the
Negro in the South will be accorded all the political rights which his ability, character, and
material possessions entitle them to. I think, though, that the opportunity to freely exercise such
political rights will not come in any large degree through outside or artificial forcing, but will be
accorded to the Negro by the Southern white people themselves, and they will protect him in the
exercise of those rights.” 37 Washington told blacks to accept these standards and, in effect, told
blacks that these standards were fair and legitimate. Washington did not appear to acknowledge
that virtually all southern whites (and northern whites, too) would never consider a black person
to be their equal. Washington, then, was essentially asking African Americans to aspire towards
the impossible. This gave whites license to continue oppressing blacks without guilt, and
allowed whites to set the timetable for black liberation; a timetable they would not even be
pressured to disclose.
Booker T. Washington (and black conservatives more generally) was motivated by a
genuine desire to improve the status of blacks in American society. Washington was also
motivated by a desire to protect his personal status within the black community and among
influential whites. Washington fiercely protected his standing by advocating that others follow
his example. According to historian, W. Fitzhugh Brundage, “Washington understood that his
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life, if properly presented, provided confirmation of the practicality of the program of racial
uplift that he had outlined in his speech at the 1895 Cotton States Exposition in Atlanta.” 38
After he delivered his address at the Atlanta Exposition in 1895, Washington became the
most influential black man in America. Washington had been building a coterie of followers
over the course of the 1890s to promote the cause of industrial education and his “pull yourself
up by your own bootstraps” personal philosophy. Rather than an intellectual, racial liberal group
in the vanguard of African American leadership, Washington worked to place himself and a
group of black entrepreneurs at the head of the race. In 1900 he established the Negro Business
League for that purpose and to help further institutionalize the conservative ideology (Tuskegee
being the premier institution, of course).
Particularly after Atlanta, white people in very high places anointed Washington the
spokesperson for African Americans. Harvard University awarded Washington an honorary
degree in 1896. And in 1901 even president Theodore Roosevelt was willing to open the White
House to him; the first black man since Frederick Douglass to have that privilege bestowed.
White philanthropists were more willing to open their pocketbooks to support Tuskegee Institute,
in particular, and the industrial education movement, more broadly. Washington could count
John D. Rockefeller and President Grover Cleveland among the donors to the school, and the
president as someone who secured donations for Tuskegee. 39 Ida B. Wells pointedly
demonstrated that black liberal-arts colleges lost potential donations as a result. 40 In this
conservative time, Washington’s accommodationist message appealed to many whites because
they interpreted it as unthreatening to the status quo.
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But just as in earlier historical eras, African American leaders never espoused a singular
ideology. And even in the mid-1890s when Washington was near the height of his power, not
only was there a competing ideology, but African American leaders were his fiercest critics.
Racial liberal leaders such as Ida B. Wells, William Monroe Trotter, and W. E. B. Du Bois
expressed biting criticisms of Booker T. Washington’s program by the first decade of the
twentieth century. Wells connected Washington’s repeated condemnations of liberal arts
education for blacks to the increasing hostility towards blacks being admitted to northern
colleges, “a contracting of the number and influence of the schools of higher learning so
judiciously scattered through all the southern states . . . for the Negro’s benefit,” as well as the
curtailing of educational opportunities, even at the elementary level, in parts of the South. 41
Wells was not only dismayed by the implications of Washington’s conservative message, but
also his timidity in refuting some of the more tortured interpretations his message inspired. As
Wells put it in a 1904 editorial:
Mr. Washington’s reply to his critics is that he does not oppose the higher
education, and offers in proof of his statement his Negro faculty. But the critics observe
that nowhere does he speak for it, and they can remember dozens of instances when he
has condemned every system of education save that which teaches the Negro how to
work. They feel that the educational opportunities of the masses, always limited enough,
are being threatened by this retrogression. And it is this feeling which prompts the
criticism. They are beginning to feel that if they longer keep silent, Negro educational
advantages will be even more restricted in more directions. 42
Wells’ editorial was not just directed at education, however. She was criticizing
Washington’s entire ideology. Wells argued that his justification for forgoing civil equality—
that he understood the political, social, and economic lay of the land in the South—was not a
proper one. She contended that blacks knew from “sad experience that industrial education will
not stand him in place of political, civil and intellectual liberty, and [they] object to being
41
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deprived of fundamental rights of American citizenship. . . .” 43 For her—and many other racial
liberals—it was “indeed a bitter pill to feel that much of the unanimity with which the nation
today agrees to Negro disfranchisement comes from the general acceptance of Mr. Washington’s
theories.” 44
One of those other racial liberals was William Monroe Trotter. From his newspaper in
Boston, Trotter also voiced dissatisfaction with Washington’s ideology of accommodation to an
indeterminate length of second-class citizenship. Trotter was a militant integrationist in this
period and demanded that African Americans be protected in their right to vote. Trotter’s dislike
of Washington was ideological. He placed much of the responsibility for the erosion of black
rights on Washington’s accommodationist views. 45 When Washington visited Boston in 1903 to
give a speech, Trotter heckled Washington so relentlessly that the meeting descended into
bedlam. Washington was temporarily prevented from delivering his oration. 46 A fight broke
out that had to be broken up by police, and Trotter was subsequently arrested and sentenced to
thirty days in jail. This was one of the reasons Washington inveighed so heavily against the
Niagara Movement after it had been established in 1905. 47
Trotter and, Washington’s most trenchant ideological foe, Du Bois, were among the
principle founders of the Niagara Movement. Niagara represented the next attempt after the
ANA at institution-building by racial liberals, and was predicated on the belief that African
Americans deserved all the rights of American citizens and needed the vote. 48 Du Bois had
argued blacks absolutely required the suffrage as the only real way they might be able to defend
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themselves against the forces that continually sought to subordinate them as second-class
citizens. 49 Du Bois also argued that every aspect of American society needed to be racially
integrated.
“The Niagara Movement Declaration of Principles” sounded these themes and others as
they described the numerous facets of society in which blacks in the United States were
discriminated against. Although acknowledging at the outset that African Americans had indeed
progressed as a people to a degree since the Civil War, the members of the Niagara Movement
went on to resolve that in terms of political participation, the exercise of civil liberties, economic
and educational opportunities, legal justice, employment, and in other areas of society. The
rights of blacks were severely circumscribed primarily on the basis of racial designation. The
members of Niagara thought this unjust. Therefore, they called on the Congress to pass
necessary legislation to promote the enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution and called on African Americans, themselves, to be paragons of
civic virtue. Blacks were told that it was their “duty” to vote, work, follow the laws of the
United States, be “clean and orderly,” send their children to school, and respect themselves as
well as others. 50 The Niagara Program was a mixture of liberal militancy and the self-help
philosophy of racial uplift that middle-class African Americans frequently expressed.
Washington actively worked to discredit the Niagara Movement by mobilizing his ample
network of influential and wealthy black and white associates against it. 51
The Niagara Movement fizzled after only a few years in existence, not only because of
Washington’s efforts, but its most important legacy is as precursor to the National Association
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for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The NAACP was founded in 1909 in New
York City by black and white reformers. Du Bois would initially be the new organization’s lone
black officer, but would exert an incredible amount of influence over the group as editor of its
monthly journal, The Crisis. Du Bois’ participation within the NAACP and his advocacy for its
growth demonstrated his belief in the efficacy of a biracial movement for social equality; another
important tenet of racial liberal ideology. The NAACP’s founding would signal the moment
when New York City began to assume its place as the center of intellectual and political life for
black America.
The founding of the NAACP catalyzed the gathering of prominent black and white
leaders in New York City to discuss how to ameliorate the problems facing African Americans.
The National Negro Conference at the end of May in 1909 brought together nearly 300 black and
white, women and men, from various organizations and fields, including scholars, social
reformers, religious leaders, civil rights activists, and public officials. 52 Attendees gave
presentations that attacked Social Darwinism, spoke out against African American
disfranchisement, lynching, and characterized racial discrimination as a national problem, rather
than merely a southern phenomenon. Du Bois, Trotter, and Wells were all there. 53 The fledgling
NAACP held another conference a year later in New York, and set up an office from which to
operate. 54 The NAACP used Progressive Era techniques including conducting academic studies
of issues concerning race and poverty in attempts to influence legislation, as well as fighting Jim
Crow through the courts, which would ultimately become the most distinct facet of the
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NAACP’s organizational approach. As the decade wore on, the NAACP began developing its
legal strategy for attacking racial discrimination. 55
Two years after the NAACP was established another organization brought together black
and white reformers for the purpose of helping black New Yorkers, particularly those migrating
from the South, find the goods and services they needed, and combat discrimination in
employment, business, housing, and education. The organization was the National Urban
League (NUL). 56 The Urban League program was multi-faceted. Reflecting the Progressive
principle that social scientific research should be employed in addressing social ills, leaders
designed and implemented field research in cities in order to document the conditions African
Americans lived under. The NUL also made training professional social workers a top priority
during its early decades. 57
In addition to the academic component of its program, the National Urban League also
focused on educating poorer southern migrants; providing them with marketable skills to help
them obtain gainful employment and schooling in the necessary deportment to acculturate into
northern urban society. 58 The NUL hoped to dispel harmful stereotypes about African
Americans and convince whites that blacks were worthy of equal treatment by getting poor
blacks to inculcate middle-class behaviors. 59 League leaders also worked directly with real
estate agents and landlords in an effort to get them to make more properties available to blacks
and to renovate those that already existed. 60 Although having slightly different focuses during
their early years, both the NAACP and NUL were influenced by the ideas of Progressive reform.
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Together, the two organizations institutionalized the racial liberal approach to achieving racial
equality for the rest of the twentieth century.
When these groups began they were at the vanguard of the struggle for racial equality.
By the second decade of the twentieth century Booker T. Washington’s vaunted “Tuskegee
machine,” which pursued the political and economic agenda of black conservatives, was slowing
down. Having whites in the leadership positions and on the Board of Directors gave the NAACP
access to white philanthropic organizations that would be willing to support its liberal vision of
racial equality. The racial liberal approach to achieving equal rights for African Americans—
founded on interracial cooperation, a steadfast faith in the principles of equality and meritocracy,
and a willingness to work through established channels of authority—was in the ascendancy
throughout the first decade of the century. The NAACP and the NUL, while representing the
beginning of institutionalized racial liberalism in the twentieth century, also signified the
culmination of a two decades long struggle to unseat Booker T. Washington and the “Tuskegee
machine.”

Social conservatism, of the Washington mold, did not entirely disappear from the scene
after 1911 and, within less than a decade, there would also be substantial challenges to liberal
ideological hegemony coming from the left. As has been the case within African American
intellectual thought since the early nineteenth century, other viewpoints came to the fore that
were at odds in some ways with racial liberalism and black conservatism. Racial liberals had
established the NAACP and the NUL to perpetuate their agenda during the 1890s and 1900s and
black conservatives had founded Tuskegee Institute, the Negro Business League, and used the
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New York Age newspaper, edited by T. Thomas Fortune, as a mouthpiece for its messages.
During the 1910s black nationalists and leftists would begin to do the same from New York City.
In 1916 a Jamaican immigrant came to New York City looking for counsel on how he
could construct industrial schools back in Jamaica similar to Tuskegee. Garvey believed in
Washington’s philosophy of self-help and working towards economic autonomy. The two men
corresponded during 1914 and 1915 about the potential for Garvey to come and view Tuskegee
first-hand. 61 Washington’s death that year did not dampen Garvey’s desire to build his fledgling
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) back in Jamaica or discourage him from
traveling to the United States in search of funding. Garvey’s arrival in the United States
demonstrated that the influence of Booker T. Washington’s ideas had leapt beyond this country’s
borders. His decision to go to Harlem to fundraise is evidence of the community’s rapid
emergence as the new mecca of black politics and intellect by World War I.
Garvey established a branch of the UNIA in Harlem and shifted the focus of his
organization over the next several years from advocating industrial education to working for
blacks to have a stronger, more unified, political voice. He was not abandoning Booker
Washington’s philosophy, however, but rather adapting it for the times—a time of global warfare
and rising industrial capitalism. 62 Both Washington and Garvey were strong adherents of
capitalism. They believed in the power of economic success to ameliorate racial prejudice. The
difference between Washington and Garvey, however, was that Washington’s economic
philosophy was based on nineteenth century notions of racial uplift. Blacks would be able to
achieve economic success by exercising and embodying diligence, industry, and thrift.
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Washington was training his students at Tuskegee—and encouraging southern blacks
generally—to become the economic competitors of whites, but in such a way that appeared
unassuming and modest. 63 Garvey’s program for racial uplift, however, did not embrace the
reserved values that characterized the nineteenth century version of racial uplift ideology.
Instead, it was characterized by the much more “aggressive virtues . . . of personal dominance”
and looked at racial success as a battle against other groups. 64
Marcus Garvey also differentiated his approach to racial uplift from Washington’s by
pairing Washington’s social philosophy with “a fiery polemical attack on white racism and white
colonial rule.” 65 For Garvey was not only influenced by the “Wizard of Tuskegee,” as
Washington was known in some circles, but also by the events of his times. Garvey would
incorporate what he saw as the lessons to be learned both from international events and incidents
in the US. Both the Irish nationalist struggle of 1916 and the East St. Louis massacre in 1917
radicalized Garvey’s approach toward achieving racial equality for blacks in the United States
and around the world. 66 The transformation of the Irish resistance movement into a violent
contest, as well as the violence inflicted upon African Americans during the war years, made
Garvey rearticulate his goals for the UNIA. He modified the objectives of the UNIA, making it a
more explicitly nationalist organization. But Garvey’s nation was Africa; Africa had to be “for
the Africans, and them exclusively” by whatever means were necessary, according to him. 67
As the UNIA grew in membership, Garvey would attempt to pursue both his economic
objectives for his people through the Black Star Line shipping fleet and his ideological objectives
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by asserting that maintaining racial purity and aspiring toward European markers of cultural and
national/racial achievement was the path for blacks to return to greatness. Garvey railed against
European colonization in Africa and argued for global racial separation, but paradoxically “held
up to blacks the system of European civilization as a mirror of racial success.” 68 Garvey wanted
blacks to do in Africa what Europeans had done previously, and told UNIA members that recolonizing Africa would be both possible because of, and also an illustration of, black racial
superiority.
Garvey’s desire for blacks around the world to emigrate to Africa in order to “civilize”
the continent reflected his belief that Africa was the rightful place for black people. His
unsuccessful business ventures—most famously the Black Star Line—reflected his belief that
blacks needed to aspire to economic autonomy in order to claim their rightful place as a race on
the world stage and in the pantheon of world civilizations. Garvey did not find industrial
capitalism problematic in the way that black leftists did. He wanted blacks to profit from the
system in the same ways that whites did.
The UNIA would quickly come apart at the seams after Garvey was deported from the
United States in 1926 after serving jail time for mail fraud. Much of Garvey’s version of black
nationalism, however, would be carried forward by Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam
(NOI), and most articulately by Muhammad’s number one minister during the 1950s and early
1960s, Malcolm X. The Nation espoused that African Americans needed to aspire towards both
territorial and economic autonomy. Muhammad seemed to agree with Garvey that the United
States was a “white man’s country,” but rather than take that to mean that blacks necessarily
needed to leave for Africa, he argued to the NOI membership that they needed to detach
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themselves from the American political system as the leadership worked to pressure the federal
government into granting black Americans territory in the southern US. 69 The NOI also
established its own businesses and schools in order to present its own model for economic and
educational progress for African Americans.
Not only did the Nation of Islam perpetuate Garvey’s nationalist program in terms of
promoting black capitalism and pushing for territorial autonomy, but Muhammad and the Nation
also created its own narrative for black racial superiority. Muhammad and Malcolm X taught
NOI members that blacks were genetically superior to whites and that whites were inherently
evil. 70 As with Garvey, Muhammad and Malcolm were endeavoring to inspire cultural and
racial pride among African Americans. But in doing so, Garvey—and later the Nation of
Islam—defined African American or black cultural/racial achievement by their particular
interpretations of how white Americans and Europeans achieved racial and national
predominance over peoples of color.
Over the course of the early 1920s Garvey would be subjected to more and more
criticism as racial liberals such as W. E. B. Du Bois, leftists including A. Philip Randolph, coeditor of the Messenger magazine Chandler Owen, and even nationalists such as Hubert
Harrison, who had established his own nationalist group and newspaper in the Liberty League
and The Voice during the war, saw both his methods and his principles as highly problematic. 71
As Garvey worked to build his nationalist organization during the First World War, black leftists
were building their own organizations.
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World War I was really a catalyst for black mobilization on several fronts. The war
unified black leftists and created a sense of urgency among black leaders and intellectuals to
discuss what should be the role of African Americans in making the world “safe for democracy.”
The disputes amongst black leaders revealed both generational and ideological divides. This
latest generation of young thinkers, including Randolph, Owen, Harrison, and, communist and
leader of the radical African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), Cyril Briggs, voiced trenchant critiques
of both Du Bois and the late-Washington’s acolytes.
They worked to distinguish themselves from their more senior counterparts in several
ways. First, they characterized Du Bois and followers of Washington, such as Tuskegee
principal R. Russa Moton and New York Age editor T. Thomas Fortune, as sharing the same
ideological ground. Neither side was forward-thinking enough, according to Randolph and his
ilk, because they voiced support for the war effort and endorsed industrial capitalism (whether
more or less aggressively). These younger activist-intellectuals took vocal stands against the war
on the grounds that it had been engineered for the sake of serving industrial capitalism. 72
Second, Randolph, Harrison, and Briggs, in particular, began to call themselves “New Crowd
Negroes” as a proactive step in distancing themselves from their older counterparts. 73 And third,
they began building their own institutions in order to disseminate their views about how to
achieve racial equality and create social movements.
Randolph and Owen, who had met during the brief stint they each spent as college
students in New York—Randolph at the City College of New York (CCNY) and Owen at
Columbia University—, joined the Socialist Party in 1916. In 1917 they established the socialist
magazine, Messenger, in order to press African Americans to organize as workers and bring
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about a new economic system in the United States. Randolph had been introduced to Marx
while at CCNY by one of his history professors, J. Salwyn Shapiro, and his discovery of Marx
and other socialist literature was revelatory. 74 Randolph read these works both for his courses
and on his own, spending many hours at the New York Public Library. He was also heavily
influenced by socialist orators in New York City, including Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, “Big Bill”
Haywood, Eugene Debs, and Hubert Harrison. 75
Reading Marx and other socialist writers, as well as listening to the arguments put forth
by Debs and Harrison convinced Randolph that many of the problems associated with racial
injustice were inextricably tied to the capitalist economic system. Racial equality would not be
achievable without a corresponding democratization of economic life as well. He argued that
capitalism only served to pit white and black workers against one another in a competition for
resources made unnecessarily scarce. This competition exacerbated racial conflict by causing
whites to believe that they needed to preserve white supremacy in order to maintain economic
security. As Randolph was becoming increasingly knowledgeable about socialism, he was
coming to believe that substantive change in the status of African Americans would only be
possible if they united with whites as workers to change the nation’s economic system. 76
After riots in East St. Louis, Illinois in 1917 resulted in the deaths of 40 African
Americans and the forced removal of nearly 6,000 more, Randolph and Owen cited the capitalist
economic system, which forced blacks into the role of strikebreaker in order to obtain any
employment as the fundamental cause for the racial violence. Economic racism vitiated any
possibility for blacks and whites to unite around their common cause as workers. As they put it
in 1919:
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Of more recent date we have the East St. Louis massacre, the cause of which is
fundamentally economic. Negro laborers were imported into the above named place to
work. They were either imported to take the jobs of white workers or to increase the
supply of labor, and thereby force down wages. This was the real cause of the conflict.”
We might as well meet the big, bald fact that Self-Interest is the supreme
ruler of the actions of men. The reason does not lie in race prejudice, but in the class
struggle. Blame your capitalist system. Of course, this does not justify or expiate the
crime; it simply explains it. Certainly the culprits should be brought to justice. 77

For Randolph and Owen, the great truth of socialism was its seeming understanding of
the seeming “Self-Interest” of human nature. African Americans had to be able to participate
fully in the nation’s economic life in order to break down other barriers to racial equality. In
order for blacks to become economically liberated they had to convince white workers of their
common interests as an oppressed class and unite against the industrial class. Blacks also had to
leave the traditional political parties that were not serving their interests and vote with the
Socialist Party. Randolph and Owen argued in the pages of the Messenger that, “[i]t is now up to
the Negro to choose wisely whether he will support the fusion combination which has buried the
hatchet so far as the Negro’s interests are concerned, or whether he will support the Socialist
Party which has helped the Negro in many fights throughout every country, notwithstanding the
fact that there was not a handful of Negro Socialists in the world.” 78 To Randolph and Owen,
this would represent a new level of political maturity.
Randolph put a great level of faith in the need for African Americans to create and join,
work through and work with labor unions throughout his career as an activist, starting in the
1910s. 79 Most black leaders, whether liberal or conservative, were reticent about cooperating
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with organized labor because of the widespread racial discrimination in most unions, although
the old guard of Du Bois and Washington were becoming more amenable to alliances with
organized labor by this time. 80 Unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
rarely allowed blacks to become members, and often actively worked to keep blacks from being
hired in their companies and industries. As a result, Randolph could understand this hesitance,
but he had been quite impressed with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) for its efforts
to bring unskilled industrial workers and agricultural workers, as well as workers of all races,
together under a single umbrella. 81 The IWW provided a model for radical unionism and
demonstrated to him that organized labor did not have to be the enemy of racial justice. And
later, as the president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) during the late 1920s,
he would push hard to have the BSCP recognized by the AFL despite criticisms from black
leaders on the political left and the mainstream. 82
Even though “black communists and black middle-class intellectuals” criticized
Randolph for fighting so hard to bring the BSCP into the AFL and for trying to forge substantive
connections with organized labor, by the end of the 1920s Randolph was moving more towards
them in terms of his willingness to engage with those who had positions of power within
establishment bureaucracies and racial liberal organizations. 83 In 1935 Randolph participated in
a conference on the “economic status of the Negro” sponsored by Howard University in
Washington, D.C., that included Lester Granger of the National Urban League, Professor Alain
Locke, M. O. Bousfield of the Rosenwald Fund, and black ministers, among others whom he
would have critiqued pointedly less than two decades before. Out of this conference emerged the
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idea for the National Negro Congress (NNC), a national umbrella organization for black
political, fraternal, and religious organizations, which Randolph strongly supported at its
inception. 84
By the start of the Second World War, however, Randolph broke with the National Negro
Congress because communists, whom he believed were more beholden to the dictates of
Moscow than the needs and interests of African Americans, now dominated the organization.
His public denunciation of communist-domination and resignation from the NNC further
estranged him from the communist left, but made him more popular with racial liberals such as
Mary McLeod Bethune and many ordinary blacks. 85
Randolph’s movement toward the mainstream did not discount his socialism— which he
still believed in fervently. Randolph had grown up with other intellectual influences that
remained with him throughout his life, however, including the teachings of his father, an African
Methodist Episcopal minister, and the abolitionist speeches of Frederick Douglass and Wendell
Phillips.86 From these sources would spring Randolph’s sense of Christian morality and faith in
the nation’s founding principles. Randolph’s Judeo-Christian moral compass 87 and his belief in
the values expressed within the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution would
make it possible for him to cultivate good working relationships with racial liberal leaders, such
as Walter White and Roy Wilkins of the national NAACP and Lester Granger of the NUL. And
his willingness to collaborate with racial liberals and challenge the government by working
within it allowed Randolph to build a large mass movement that also raised his leadership
profile.
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His attempts to build a mass movement for racial equality began in earnest when he
announced the formation of the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) in 1941. Randolph
supported the nation’s war effort against Nazism and Fascism, yet decried the widespread,
government-sanctioned racial discrimination in industrial employment and the armed services,
even at this critical moment when the entire country needed to be mobilized. After talks between
the White House, White and Randolph were unsuccessful in getting president Franklin Roosevelt
to support anti-discrimination in employment legislation, Randolph “upped the ante” for the
federal government to remain steadfast to its discriminatory policies. Randolph, who believed in
grassroots organization and had gained experience building organizations from the ground up as
president of the BSCP and the NNC, determined that African Americans needed to put direct
pressure on the federal government in order to break down racial discrimination in employment
at the federal level. Randolph declared that 10,000 African Americans would march on the
nation’s capital in July to 1941 to show their discontent with continued job discrimination even
as their government expected them to lay down their lives for the country. 88
The NAACP and NUL eventually, but only reluctantly, supported the MOWM. The
NAACP and NUL did not generally support mass action techniques because they preferred to
work behind the scenes negotiating with those in established positions of authority, where they
considered real power to lie. Mass actions were considered too difficult to control logistically,
and racial liberal leaders believed that the potential costs to the civil rights movement in terms of
bad publicity and public hostility outweighed the potential benefits to the movement. Walter
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White and Lester Granger respected Randolph very much, however, and as a result the NAACP
and NUL did end up lending financial assistance to the MOWM. 89
While the NAACP and NUL grudgingly supported the MOWM, there were other black
organizations, such as the Pittsburgh Courier newspaper, that did not support the march or the
continued existence of the MOWM after the initial march was eventually cancelled. From the
summer of 1942 and through 1943, there were several articles and editorials criticizing the
tactics of the MOWM and the leadership style of A. Philip Randolph. P. L. Prattis, in a June
1942 article titled “The Horizon,” asked what was unique about the March on Washington
Movement in comparison to all of the other black protest organizations on the scene throughout
the country? Prattis did not believe that there was anything novel about the MOWM as he
sarcastically wondered how the organization was going to follow the previous year’s “victory by
default,” as he characterized Executive Order 8802. 90 Another editorial in the same month in
1942, after the MOWM staged an 18,000 person rally at Madison Square Garden in New York
City, quipped that “it is one thing to get a mass of people together and steam them up to go
places, but it is quite another thing to organize them effectively to execute a prescribed
program.” The author dismissed the rally as a series of “ear-splitting generalities and blowsy
platitudes” and the MOWM as having no program, nor the organizational capacity to carry out
an effective agenda. 91 George McCray, in July of 1942, described the tactics of the MOWM as
“a menace to the interests of Negro labor” and Randolph’s rhetoric as “reckless” for focusing too
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much on the domestic travails of African Americans instead of what he saw as the more
important problem of “Hitlerism.” 92
Some of the most pointed criticism in the Courier would be penned by George Schuyler.
Schuyler, who had been Randolph’s employee and a fellow socialist during the 1920s, now
attacked the MOWM as a failure because there was still a need for agitation a year after
Executive Order 8802 had been signed. Schuyler characterized the MOWM as being nothing
more than A. Philip Randolph, and assailed Randolph as a leader with a “messianic complex,”
but no leadership ability. 93 Schuyler apparently received a good deal of criticism from readers
regarding his editorial, for he was prompted to respond to his critics a few weeks later, but he did
not back away from his opinions. Instead, he disparaged what he considered to be Randolph’s
attempts to use “force” to win rights for African Americans. Schuyler argued that “tests of
strength” such as marches on Washington or any other mass action protests were not only
doomed to fail because of blacks’ minority standing and relatively low economic and political
strength, but would be harmful to blacks’ cause because they were “divisive.” Schuyler
advocated a program of educating whites about the dangers to all citizens as a result of racial
discrimination, which he was convinced would “gain . . . ground slowly but solidly.” 94 Just as
his ideological mentor, Booker T. Washington, a generation earlier, Schuyler was willing to
concede the timetable for black liberation to whites without being willing to put any palpable
pressure on them to grant African Americans their birthright as American citizens.
Racial liberals may not have been enthusiastic supporters of mass actions but,
nevertheless, they acknowledged the value of those tactics under certain circumstances and could
be moved by public opinion to support them at times. Liberal leaders were also advocates of
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pushing for institutional changes in American society. Schuyler sought a solution to the problem
of racial inequality that did not involve racial conflict, harkening back in some ways to the
efforts at moral suasion by nineteenth century white abolitionists. In order for the absence of
racial conflict to be possible, however, blacks would not be able to press for their rights in any
frontally confrontational way. Therefore, Schuyler not only criticized Randolph and the MOWN
in this instance, but Schuyler became an arch conservative by the end of his life, arguing against
the entire premise of the liberal civil rights movement.
Schuyler began his public career as a socialist radical during the 1920s and 1930s, but
had begun his intellectual transformation into a conservative black thinker and activist by the
Second World War. From the late 1930s forward he would resuscitate the philosophy of Booker
T. Washington in terms of his views on how blacks should approach achieving racial equality.
Schuyler’s commitment to non-confrontational tactics for achieving racial equality would only
grow stronger as the civil rights movement picked up momentum. After World War II Schuyler
would become more actively involved in the growing conservative intellectual movement that
included many former liberals and leftists. 95 In 1960 he reiterated his argument from 1942 that,
“a disservice is often done, to the Negro or any other weaker group in society, by trying to rush
changes upon the country as a whole, because what you do often is set up a reaction.” 96
Schuyler believed that black leaders needed to consider the feelings of racist whites much more
seriously and think about how dismantling Jim Crow and implementing desegregation would
upset their sense of the ordering of the world.
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Randolph continued to meet with Roosevelt and his advisers through the first half of
1941 in his efforts to compel the administration to issue a ban on racial discrimination in federal
employment and the military, but they were largely unsuccessful until Randolph took an even
bigger risk by announcing that rather than 10,000, there would be 100,000 African Americans
marching on Washington, D.C. As the proposed date of the march drew closer and Randolph
remained committed to both having the march and 100,000 participants, Roosevelt felt more
pressure to avert it, if possible. Just one week before the scheduled July 1 march, Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 8802, which mandated that “there shall be no discrimination in the
employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or
national origin” and created the Fair Employment Practices Commission. 97
Randolph’s decision to focus on working to eliminate job discrimination reflected his
socialist outlook that the key to overall and lasting progress for African Americans was
inextricably tied to economic advancement. His socialist orientation also influenced his decision
to use mass action techniques. Mass action required African Americans’ direct participation in
service of their own liberation. His willingness to engage in negotiations with the White House,
however, reflected Randolph’s sense of practicality, which made it possible for him to work
cooperatively with racial liberal leaders at various times for much of his career.
After EO 8802 became law, Randolph agreed to suspend the march on Washington, to
the dismay of many, including his youth organizer for the march Bayard Rustin. Rustin was a
militant young leftist who shared Randolph’s views on economic and other matters, and was
dividing his time between the pacifist organization, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the March
on Washington Movement. Rustin had recently left the Young Communist League as a result of
the Soviet Union entering into an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1939. Rustin and others
97
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implored Randolph to reschedule the march. In a series of critiques reminiscent of those
Randolph and his fellow young radicals leveled against W. E. B. Du Bois and Robert R. Moton
during World War I, Rustin and other younger activists accused Randolph of selling out to
Roosevelt. 98
Randolph did not reschedule the march and Randolph’s and Rustin’s fledgling
relationship was strained for a time, but their personal and professional bond would not only
survive, but endure for the rest of Randolph’s life. Randolph and Rustin shared a great deal in
common in addition to their commitment to economic egalitarianism. Both men believed that
blacks would need to organize with whites as workers in order to achieve racial equality in
American society. 99 And they also had other intellectual influences that made it possible for
them to work with racial liberals. Rustin grew up as a Quaker and imbibed a particular ethos of
racial egalitarianism rooted in Christian principles from his parents and exposure to the Society
of Friends. Among Rustin’s other intellectual influences were Thomas Jefferson, Abraham
Lincoln, and W. E. B. Du Bois. 100
In the two decades after World War II, Rustin would carry forth Randolph’s philosophy
advocating working-class interracialism and total integration, combined with a Christian moral
compass, and faith in the existence of the American meritocracy. As with Randolph, the fact that
Rustin had denounced communism (even though he was a socialist) and evinced an abiding faith
the American democracy and democratic institutions, made it possible for him to collaborate
with racial liberals (although his homosexuality complicated those relationships) in the struggle
for black equality.
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Rustin not only worked with Randolph in the MOWM, but Rustin was one of the initial
leaders of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), an interracial nonviolent protest organization
founded in 1942, and would continue his civil rights and peace activism for the remainder of his
life. CORE marked the arrival of an organization “for whom active nonviolent resistance was
not, in Rustin’s words, ‘just a policy,’ but instead ‘a way of life.’ Consciously dressing
themselves in the garb of Gandhian philosophy, the young crusaders at the center of CORE made
nonviolence a spiritual road to follow.” 101 It is possible to imagine that the pacifism of the
Friend’s doctrine helped make the Gandhian philosophy of passive resistance resonate more
strongly, as Rustin would promote the principles of nonviolence to everyone he worked with,
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. CORE added to the growing list of racial liberal
organizations protesting for racial equality during the 1950s and 1960s, which would also later
include Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

By 1954, racial liberals, black conservatives, black nationalists, and black leftists were
not only drawing upon a historical tradition of diversity within African American thought but,
just as importantly, had built institutions in an effort to try and bring their various visions to
fruition. African American leaders built upon the ideas and organizations that had preceded
them in order to advance the cause of racial equality. Each generation of black thinkers was
connected to the leaders that had come before. Therefore, these different ideologies had some
common well-springs. But from the 1890s until 1954 liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, and
the left also became increasingly distinct through their institutionalization. As the civil rights
movement gained momentum after 1954, these various ideologies and their proponents would at
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times come into conflict and at others exhibit cooperation, as they battled for the hearts and
minds of blacks, and the soul of America.
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Chapter 2
Formations: Community, Consciousness, and Creed

Follow Negroes of the South, leave there. Go North, East,
and West—anywhere—to get out of that hell hole. There are
better schools here for your children, higher wages for
yourselves, votes if you are twenty-one, better housing and
more liberty. All is not rosy here, by any means, but it is
Paradise compared with Georgia, Arkansas, Texas,
Mississippi and Alabama. Besides, you make it better for
those you leave behind.
Stop buying property in the South, to be burned down and
run away from over night. Sell out your stuff quietly, saying
nothing to the lackeys, and leave! Come to the land of at least
incipient civilization! [Emphasis in original]
A. Philip Randolph 1

New York City has been unique in terms of its relationship to black intellectuals during
the first half of the twentieth century. Not only were there intellectuals of every ideological
stripe, but each group was able to make inroads in the city, both organizationally and in terms of
cultivating awareness of their principles among a broad segment of blacks. Intellectual, political,
and cultural activities developed very early in the century despite de facto segregation. The
relative lack of legalized segregation in New York City, the increasing density of the black
population—particularly, in Harlem—, and the variety of institutions dedicated to civil rights
activity helped blacks create the spaces to produce a movement for civil rights and racial
equality.
Between 1909 and 1920 African American and Afro-Caribbean activists managed to
transform New York City, and particularly Harlem, into the most important black community in
the country. By the time the United States entered the Great War, Harlem was a font of black
cultural, political, and intellectual activity. The black press became increasingly militant, as
titles of papers established in this period—Challenge, Crusader, Emancipator, and Messenger—
1
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suggest. Younger black leftists were admonishing their intellectual elders for telling blacks to
support the war effort and ordinary blacks staged protests against racial violence taking place in
other communities. 2
Black activists and intellectuals who held different views worked to create the institutions
as well as the necessary physical and cultural spaces to grow and sustain a national movement
for social, political, and economic justice. They used their intellectual capital in attempts to chart
the course of the movement locally and nationally. As a result, by the second decade of the
twentieth century, the growing number of blacks being drawn to Harlem had a plethora of
organizations to choose from to nourish their political and cultural appetites.
Black and white liberals established the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL). Blacks who had developed a
nationalist orientation could join Hubert Harrison’s Liberty League and Marcus Garvey’s
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The One Hundred Thirty-Fifth Street
branch of the New York Public Library (NYPL) developed into a significant space for the
dissemination of information on black history and culture, as did the Harlem branches of the
Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Associations (YMCA and YWCA). There were
also several publications of various political viewpoints that Harlem residents would read, such
as the New York Age, the New York Amsterdam News, the Messenger, the Crisis, and the Negro
World, among others that would challenge or confirm their currently held beliefs. To the extent
that these activists and intellectuals were successful in creating the various spaces for intellectual
development, much of the credit obviously lies with them and the tens of thousands that
comprised their membership rolls. New York City and State provided fertile soil in which an
organized black civil rights movement took hold and grew.
2
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Between 1873 and 1900 the New York State legislature passed several laws securing
equal rights for blacks. The state’s Civil Rights Act of 1873 granted suffrage without restriction
to black males. Two other civil rights acts guaranteed access to public transportation facilities
and accommodations. The state legislature also repealed the ban on interracial marriage during
this period. And New York City outlawed racial segregation in its public schools in 1900. 3 The
passage of legislation did not mean that these laws were always enforced or that African
Americans faced no racial discrimination but, as a result of this legislation being on the books,
New York City was a place where the legal spaces for organization and protest were wider than
in many other northern cities and more so than anywhere in the South.
The absence of overt legal segregation would certainly have made New York City a more
appealing place to live than southern cities, as A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen argued in
the Messenger in 1920. Blacks who were born in New York City, and the many hundreds of
thousands who ultimately migrated there between 1900 and 1954, sought to breathe life into
New York State’s more egalitarian legislation by working to see it enforced for all citizens,
regardless of color. In order to do this, black activists and intellectuals, operating from numerous
ideological viewpoints, worked to change the city and the nation in fundamental ways.

Early Institutional Development in Harlem

Between 1910 and 1920 New York City’s black population grew significantly from
91,709 to 152,467. The majority of the growth occurred in Manhattan, where the black
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population increased from 60,534 to 109,133. 4 In this decade, African Americans and AfroCaribbeans came north by the tens of thousands hoping to find greater economic opportunities.
And most of the nearly 50,000 blacks who settled in Manhattan found themselves in Harlem.
African Americans had begun moving to Harlem in small numbers during the 1880s as the
neighborhood quickly developed. There was a great deal of speculative building in anticipation
of expanding transportation infrastructure to northern Manhattan. Elevated train lines were
extended to Harlem up Lenox and Eighth Avenues, making the neighborhood very desirable.
But the northward migration really accelerated after 1900 as continued structural development—
eventually over-building—in Harlem, intensified overcrowding of the Tenderloin section of
west-Midtown Manhattan, and a bloody race riot in that year pushed and pulled African
Americans uptown.
By 1910, African American churches, mutual aid and benevolent societies, retail
businesses and welfare agencies had been following their congregants, cadres, clients, and
customers northward for several years. The black community in Harlem quickly became the
“largest colony of colored people, in similar limits, in the world” even before World War I; and
the population growth showed no signs of dissipating. According to historian Gilbert Osofsky,
two-thirds of Manhattan’s black population lived in Harlem by 1920. This represented about
73,000 people. 5
The rapid growth of Harlem—both in terms of population and space—as well as the
increasing numbers of black residents in other parts of the city created friction among blacks and
between blacks and whites. The major wave of black migration northward from all areas of the
4
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South and the Caribbean, beginning in about 1910 and lasting for the next two decades, is known
as the First Great Migration. This demographic shift coincided with both the First World War
and a period of increased political reform known as the Progressive Era. Progressive reform
during this period was characterized by academic studies of social ills; advocacy for and
implementation of legislation for the protection of female and child laborers; struggles to
dismantle corrupt urban political machines; more democratic voting practices; and a specific set
of middle-class values that emphasized assimilation into a homogenous, WASP-as-normative,
“American” culture.
Middle-class and native New York blacks did not look favorably on black migrants
before World War One. The migrants were here looking for better jobs than were open to blacks
in the South, but they were depicted as naïve, lazy and accused of spreading vice. At the same
time, as their numbers rose, African American leaders recognized the need to help migrants
adjust to life in New York City, and that they needed to mobilize as many black New Yorkers as
possible in efforts to obtain social equality. Most black New Yorkers, migrants or not, endured
brutality at the hands of the police force and discrimination in the housing and job markets. “The
harassment that Negroes experienced caused the New York Age to remark in 1910 that New York
should not be preoccupied with Jim Crow life in the South, but should devote their attention to
discrimination in New York.” 6
To combat these realities of living in New York City, middle-class blacks formed
organizations—some of them interracial—in the Progressive mold. The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League have been the two most
effective and enduring. These organizations were founded in New York City because the city
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had “long sponsored most white-financed Negro philanthropy”—at least since the late-eighteenth
century. 7 At its inception, the Urban League focused primarily on improving the day-to-day
material living conditions of New York City’s black inhabitants. The NAACP, however,
concerned itself more with fighting for African American civil rights at the state and federal
levels.
Black inequality—both in New York City and nationally—, racial violence in New York
City, as well as the lynching of a black man in Springfield, Illinois, in the midst of a 1908 race
riot were, however, the direct motivations for the group of progressive-minded whites and blacks
who came together to create what became the NAACP. 8 Anti-lynching activism had been the
central fight for most black leaders since the 1880s, but this incident—having taken place in the
“land of Abraham Lincoln,” the “Great Emancipator” and beacon of freedom—brought the
ugliness of lynching home for white reformers and threw into question once again, perhaps for
the first time in some while, the North’s image of itself as more “civilized” than the South. 9
Northerners had been constructing their identities, at least partly, in contrast to
Southerners for at least a century. Northerners in the late-nineteenth century often claimed that
lynching was a barbaric southern phenomenon, a crime that did not happen in northern locales
because they were more “civilized.” The problem with the way that northern “civility” was often
framed was that fewer instances of reported racial violence were believed to confirm the absence
of racism and the existence of harmonious race relations. The notion of civility absolved most
7
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northerners of critically examining the ways in which the institutions and ideas they
characterized as “southern” were actually national in nature. 10
But African American activists and intellectuals of the day, including William Monroe
Trotter, the Bostonian businessman, scholar, newspaper editor, and activist, and W. E. B. Du
Bois refused to absolve northerners or anyone else from recognizing that racial discrimination
existed throughout the United States and must end. Trotter and Du Bois were militant
integrationists, believing that every aspect of American society needed to be racially integrated
immediately; and up through the First World War Du Bois could be considered a racial liberal.
Not only did Du Bois believe that integration was a positive social goal to be attained, but he
also believed in the potential success of a biracial movement for social equality.
The establishment of the NAACP and the NUL would signal both the culmination of a
decade-long effort to institutionalize agitation for civil rights, and the organizational perpetuation
in the twentieth century of the tradition of racial liberalism that extends back to the abolitionists
of the nineteenth.

World War I, Racial Protest, and “New Crowd Negroes”

By the time America entered into World War I in 1917, however, the racial liberalism of
leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois was being vigorously challenged by younger African
Americans espousing other ideologies, including socialism, communism, and black nationalism.
10
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The question of how supportive blacks should be of the United States’ decision to enter the
global conflagration divided black leaders. President Woodrow Wilson framed the war as the
ultimate battle between good and evil; a war necessary “to make the world safe for democracy.”
Lofty ideals, to be sure, but African Americans had never been the full beneficiaries of
America’s democratic institutions and, consequently, Wilson’s rhetoric rang hollow in the ears of
many blacks. 11
But W. E. B. Du Bois worked to spur blacks to get behind the nation’s war effort by
urging African Americans to “Close Ranks” with their fellow Americans during the current
crisis. Du Bois argued in Crisis magazine, the official organ of the NAACP, which he edited,
that the German threat to democracy was dire. Du Bois characterized World War I as the “crisis
of the world” and 1918 as the “great Day of Decision.” Therefore, blacks should “forget” any
“special grievances” they had against the government and commit to the ideals being fought for
overseas. 12 “Closing Ranks” now would give African Americans even more moral leverage in
agitating for equal rights after the war ended, according to more moderate, racial liberals such as
Du Bois and James Weldon Johnson.13
Through the end of the First World War, Du Bois was the preeminent racial liberal in
many ways. Through this editorial Du Bois was evincing an implicit belief in the American
creed of meritocracy and trying to convince his fellow blacks to use moral suasion, at this critical
moment, to demonstrate their loyalty to the country and suitability for first-class citizenship.
This approach in pursuit of a more egalitarian society harkened back to the abolitionist
movement of antebellum America. The war also had to be won by blacks and whites, in his
11
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view, not only for African Americans to once again show their patriotism, but also because Du
Bois believed in the necessity of a successful biracial movement for civil rights. African
Americans playing a significant role in a victorious war effort could potentially go a long way
toward creating the racially integrated society he was fighting for.
Du Bois’ two-paragraph editorial and similar arguments from other black leaders led to a
firestorm of criticism from younger more militant black leaders such as A. Philip Randolph,
Chandler Owen, Hubert Harrison, and others toward their senior, more moderate counterparts.
Communist Party member Cyril V. Briggs and socialist W. A. Domingo, both leaders of the
African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), a radical black organization that advocated organizing the
black working class in order to combat racial and economic discrimination, also criticized Du
Bois and those of his ilk vigorously. Randolph, Owen, and Harrison—migrants to New York
City from Florida, North Carolina, and the Virgin Islands, respectively—wanted no part of what
they characterized as weak rhetoric and faulty logic. Randolph and Owen, who had come to
Harlem in 1911 and 1916, respectively, pointedly asked racial liberals and conservatives (whom
they regarded as two sides of the same rusty coin) within the pages of the socialist magazine they
edited, the Messenger, “Since when has the subject race come out of a war with its rights and
privileges accorded for such a participation? . . . Did not the Negro fight in the Revolutionary
War, with Crispus Attucks dying first . . . and come out to be a miserable chattel slave in this
country for nearly 100 years?” 14 In his nationalist magazine, The Voice, Hubert Harrison, who
had arrived in Harlem in 1900, chided Du Bois, writing that “America cannot use Negroes to any
good effect unless they have life, liberty, and manhood assured and guaranteed to them . . . the
so-called leaders . . . have already established an unsavory reputation by advocating this same
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surrender of life, liberty, and manhood, masking their cowardice behind the pillars of wartime
sacrifice.” 15
These various black newspapers and magazines, including the Crisis, the Messenger, The
Voice, the New York Amsterdam News, the New York Age, Briggs’ Crusader, Domingo’s
Emancipator revealed the ideological differences among the many black intellectuals in New
York when considering the path to social equality. The expansion and increasing militancy of
the black press was a national phenomenon that was centered in New York City. Of the 500
black newspapers and periodicals throughout the country by 1921, New York led the way with
seventeen, double the number of black newspapers than had existed in the city just one decade
earlier. It is not surprising that the Associated Negro Press, when founded in 1919, had its
headquarters in Harlem. 16
Young black radicals not only published and wrote for leftist magazines, they took those
messages—whether in opposition to African American participation in a “capitalist,”
“imperialist” war, or in support of an egalitarian, racially pluralist society—directly to the black
masses in Harlem, sometimes speaking from soapboxes on the corner of One Hundred ThirtyFifth Street and Lenox Avenue. 17 Historian Jeffrey Perry has argued that, “[Hubert] Harrison’s
outdoor lectures pioneered the tradition of militant street-corner oratory in Harlem. . . . [H]e
paved the way for those who followed—including A. Philip Randolph, Marcus Garvey, and,
much later, Malcolm X.” 18
Two other extremely important intersections in Harlem were One Hundred Thirty-Fifth
Street and Seventh Avenue and One Hundred Twenty-Fifth Street and Lenox Avenue. At times
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these also became platforms for Harlem radicals to lecture or engage in political debate on any
number of topics “from the French Revolution, the history of slavery, to the rise of the working
class. It was one of the great intellectual forums of America.” 19 In this way, Harrison and other
black radicals created public spaces comparable to the printed spaces they created in their
publications. And there were many to listen to their speeches, as two-thirds of Manhattan’s
109,133 blacks resided in Harlem by 1920.
The debate over African American involvement in World War I was a clash of
generations and ideologies. This episode marked the first major battle between racial liberals
and black leftists in the twentieth century, but not the last. Although the majority of New York
City’s African Americans did not join leftist political organizations following the First World
War, debate over the war catalyzed a shift within Harlem’s black community—and black
communities all over the country—toward more militant protests and the expression of more
radical ideas. Calls for national unity and the deferment of social equality came under even more
fire as racial violence exploded throughout the country between 1917 and 1920.
During these years major riots occurred in East St. Louis, Illinois in 1917, Washington,
D. C. in 1919, and in twenty-five other cities in that single year. Recorded lynchings of African
Americans, which had generally been declining each year between 1909 and 1917, began rising
thereafter peaking at 76 in 1919 and remained above 50 between 1918 and 1922. 20 In response
to the massacre in East St. Louis in which 40 blacks and eight whites were killed, and 6,000
more blacks were driven from their homes, as well as Congress’ continued unwillingness to pass
anti-lynching legislation, nearly 8,000 African Americans staged a silent parade down Fifth
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Avenue on 28 July 1917. According to the New York Times, “Without a shout or a cheer they
made their cause known through many banners which they carried, calling attention to ‘Jim
Crowism,’ segregation, disfranchisement, and the riots of Waco, Memphis, and East St.
Louis.” 21 Protests such as this took place in New York because African Americans had created
the legal, printed, public, and private spaces by the First World War to voice their dissent against
injustice in public ways. Not only had liberal blacks and whites established the NAACP and
NUL, more recently younger black nationalists and leftists had begun expressing their opposition
to blacks’ inferior status in American society with even bolder strokes, and without apology.
Outraged by the “reign of mob law,” the lack of federal protection, and the calls for appeasement
from established black leaders, Harlem, according to historian Jervis Anderson, had become the
“most militant community in the black world” by 1920. 22 That reputation would continue to be
bolstered throughout the rest of the decade, and was also part of a general trend in black
communities throughout the country.
In the midst of this spate of race riots A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen refused to
contain their anger at both the incidents of racial violence occurring across the country and what
they perceived to be the failures of liberal and conservative black leaders. In one of their many
Messenger editorials criticizing W. E. B. Du Bois’ stance urging blacks to support the war,
Randolph and Owen expressed the belief that the American government had betrayed blacks, just
as they predicted would happen. They offered an alternative method for blacks to gain their “just
rights” in the United States: “The Negro will never gain his just rights until the great masses, 12
million strong, become thoroughly permeated, saturated and shot through with treason to the
institutions of Jim-Crowism, lynching, race discrimination, segregation, disfranchisement, and to
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every instrument which maintains, perpetuates and fosters these pernicious institutions [italics in
the original].” 23 Randolph and Owen argued that Du Bois’ plea to blacks to put their special
grievances aside had not benefited them at all. Therefore, why should blacks remain loyal to a
system that only continued to disadvantage them? Randolph and Owen used the term “treason”
in the editorial, but it is important to recognize that the treason they advocated was not against
the United States, but rather those corrupted structures that allowed racial and economic
inequality to continue.
Nevertheless, as black leaders voiced stronger opposition to their race’s mistreatment
throughout the United States in the pages of their publications, the Department of Justice became
alarmed by the “increasingly emphasized feeling of race consciousness, in many of these
publications always antagonistic to the white race, and openly, defiantly assertive of its own
equality and even superiority.” 24

At the same time, Major J. E. Cutler of the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Department reported “a growing influence of radical publications and of a new type
of radical race leader,” which he said “constitute[d] a critical juncture in the history of the
colored race in this country.” After studying the conditions that gave rise to the “race
consciousness among the colored people today which is of recent origin,” Cutler
concluded: “Beyond a doubt, there is a new negro to be reckoned with in our political and
social life.” 25
Randolph not only affirmed that a “new Negro” existed, but asserted in the Messenger the “[t]he
New Negro demands political equality.” And “[t]he social aims of the New Negro are decidedly
different from those of the Old Negro. Here he stands for absolute and unequivocal ‘social
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equality.’ He realizes that there cannot be a qualified equality. He insists that a society that is
based on justice can only be a society composed of social equals.” 26
Everything became “new” as a “cultural rebellion of the first order erupted from beneath
the complacency and conservatism that were dominant characteristics of American society and
politics [during the 1920s].” 27 Whether it was “the New Woman” or the “New Art,” the
modifier “new” “signified a manifestation that blurred the boundaries between aesthetics,
politics, and lifestyle . . .” 28
African American artists, writers, scholars, and intellectuals also spoke in this language.
Randolph, Owen, and Harrison, for example, referred to themselves as “New Crowd Negroes” 29
to distinguish themselves from what they considered the “Old Negro political and intellectual
establishment—whether this establishment held the accommodationist views of Booker T.
Washington or the protest ones of Du Bois.” 30 In the spring of 1919 Randolph published an
article in the Messenger castigating the “old Leadership” for “fail[ing] miserably.” As Randolph
named names he characterized the older leaders—Du Bois most pointedly—as men who “have
simply held jobs, produced schoolboy rhetoric and lulled Negroes into a false sense of security”
or “have preached a gospel of satisfaction and content.” 31 In Randolph’s final analysis African
Americans needed new leadership, not only because he believed the old leadership to be
ineffective but also because black people were, themselves, becoming imbued with a more
militant consciousness.
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Hubert Harrison established the first organization and newspaper of the “new Negro”
movement in 1917 with the Liberty League and The Voice. Both were responses to the need for
a more “radical policy” in obtaining social justice than was being pursued by the NAACP at the
time. 32 But it was Dr. Alain Locke, one of the foremost leaders of the Harlem Renaissance, who
edited the manifesto of the “New Negro” movement in 1925. This was a term that was meant to
proclaim a more prideful mentality among blacks. It encompassed a movement included that not
only literature, but also “race-building and image-building, jazz poetics, progressive or socialist
politics, racial integration, the musical and sexual freedom of Harlem nightlife, and the pursuit of
hedonism.” 33
In addition to the socialist orators and the writers of the Harlem Renaissance who
proactively dubbed themselves “new,” Marcus Garvey had arrived in Harlem in 1916 after
founding the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Jamaica two years earlier.
Garvey was initially an admirer of Booker T. Washington, soliciting advice from him about how
to raise funds for an industrial school in Jamaica along the lines of Tuskegee Institute. After
Washington’s death in 1915, and before establishing a UNIA branch in Harlem, Garvey
modified his ideas somewhat. The focus of the UNIA shifted from building industrial schools to
building businesses and improving the economic standing of the race. “[H]e decided that the
wealth, business experience, leadership skills of African Americans, if properly organized and
directed, could stimulate the liberation and economic development of African peoples
everywhere.” 34
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By the early 1920s Garvey had built a mass movement and revived a strain of black
nationalist ideology that emphasized racial separation from whites, economic independence, and
a sense of pride in “African” culture and heritage that crossed over, at times, into racial
chauvinism. 35 While the threads of black nationalist thought go back to David Walker in the
1820s, and thus Garvey’s nationalist ideology was not entirely “new,” it was new to the many
Harlemites (and other blacks worldwide) who joined the UNIA, as it came wrapped in a fullyepauletted general’s uniform and all the pomp and circumstance one man could muster.
Randolph, Owen, Du Bois, Harrison, and most other black leaders at the time eventually
became intensely critical of Garvey and the UNIA. While no one could deny the popularity of
Garvey’s claims to black racial superiority and calls for economic and political autonomy, they
worked to discredit him and the UNIA. Initially, for example, Hubert Harrison believed that
Garvey was a brother-in-arms. The inefficiency and dishonesty Harrison witnessed as editor of
The Negro World, however, soured him on both Garvey’s ability to lead and the UNIA’s ability
to sustain a movement for black empowerment. Harrison, who briefly edited the UNIA
newspaper, The Negro World, during the first eight months of 1920 and helped transform it into
a formidable nationalist publication, criticized both Garvey’s character and intellect. 36 Harrison
wrote in May of 1920 that, “the first big defect . . . in Garvey’s make-up is a defect in the size of
his soul. He is spiritually and intellectually a little man.” 37 Harrison indicted Garvey for lying to
his followers and capitalizing financially on their lack of knowledge as to his actions,
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particularly as it related to the business ventures of the UNIA. 38 Harrison, however, was even
more upset by what he interpreted as Garvey’s lack of originality and genuine commitment to the
principles of black nationalism. Harrison argued that Garvey corrupted the principles of an
otherwise potentially constructive program for liberation and made it into a vehicle for selfaggrandizement. While Harrison was willing to acknowledge that there were some positive
elements in the UNIA, he was not really complimenting Garvey, for he accused Garvey of taking
those ideas from the Liberty League, including the tri-color flag concept, outdoor lectures, and
an organizational newspaper. Harrison was only willing to credit Garvey with “add[ing] an
intensive propaganda more shrewdly adapted to the cruder psychology of the less intelligent
masses, the sensationalism, self-glorification, and African liberation—although he knew next to
nothing about Africa.” Even the idea for the Black Star Line, Harrison attributed to another
founding member of the Liberty League. 39 By the end of the 1920s, Harrison did not give credit
to Garvey for his program.
Harrison was deeply committed to building a mass movement for black liberation. But
apparently, it needed to be done without at all appealing to sensationalism and frivolity.
Ideologically, Harrison was opposed to the programs of the NAACP and Du Bois. Though
Harrison chided Garvey for appealing to the “cruder psychology of the less intelligent masses,”
he disagreed with Du Bois’ notion that the wealthiest and best-educated ten percent of the
African American population had the obligation to lead and would pull the rest of the race
forward toward full social equality. Harrison was also opposed to what he argued was the
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NAACP’s “dependence” on whites; African Americans had to carry out their own movement
whether or not they could change the minds, or get the support, of whites. 40
A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen were committed to organizing a mass movement
for black liberation similar to Harrison, and like him they initially believed that Garvey had a
worthwhile program. Randolph and Owen had taken opportunities to introduce Garvey to
Harlem crowds when he first arrived, as had Harrison. But eventually, Randolph and Owen were
turned off by Garvey, criticizing his methods and ideas. They attempted to undercut his influence
on black Americans. By 1922 the attacks were explicitly personal as Randolph was upset by
Garvey’s claim that America was a “white man’s country,” and that blacks had not really played
a significant role in building the nation’s wealth and infrastructure. 41 He called Garvey’s claims
“fool talk” and appealed for Garvey to be driven from the country. 42 Randolph and Owen even
formed an anti-Garvey group, the Friends of Negro Freedom (FNF), in order to undermine the
work of the UNIA.
The Friends of Negro Freedom did not start out explicitly as an anti-Garvey group.
Created in May of 1920, the FNF was one of several organizations that Randolph and Owen had
created between 1917 and 1923, and its original purpose was to sponsor political and labor
forums to educate the mass of blacks about unionization and socialist politics. 43 Occasionally,
the group invited speakers to give lectures at the Harlem YMCA and YWCA on One Hundred
Thirty-Fifth and One Hundred Thrity-Seventh Streets, respectively. Some included Norman
Thomas, then director of the League of Industrial Democracy, Algernon Lee of the Rand School
or Social Science, and Walter White of the NAACP. Randolph and Owen hoped the FNF would
40
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become national in scope, but the organization did not catch on nationally and did not
accomplish much in its first couple of years in existence. Aversion to Marcus Garvey’s business
operations and his racial-separatist brand of black nationalism, however, gave the members a
cause around which to unify.
After Garvey was convicted of mail fraud in 1925 and subsequently deported to Jamaica
in 1927, the Friends of Negro Freedom became more of an intellectual forum that met either at
the Messenger’s office or at Randolph’s home. Randolph held regular Sunday morning meetings
of the Friends in his home on West One Hundred Forty-Second Street between Lenox and
Seventh Avenues. Breakfast would be followed by political discussion. Some of the regulars at
Randolph’s home were Frank Crosswaith, a graduate of the Rand School who wrote for the
Messenger, and who would join the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and later become an
organizer for the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union; William Pickens, Field
Secretary for the NAACP; Joel A. Rogers, a Jamaican-born historian and Africanist; Theophilus
Lewis, the drama critic for the Messenger; and George Schuyler, the office manager and a
contributor to the Messenger, who would become one of the country’s most important social
critics. 44
When Schuyler first arrived in Harlem in 1919 after a seven year stint in the Army he
soaked up as much knowledge as possible from everywhere, for there were so many newspapers
and magazines available in the city, compared to Syracuse where he grew up; “even the
Socialists and Communists had dailies,” he later commented in his autobiography. 45 Although
after the Second World War Schuyler would become an arch-conservative for the remainder of
his life, he had obviously been moved in some fashion by the socialist rhetoric he encountered
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because he joined the Socialist Party of America in November 1921 while he was briefly back to
Syracuse. Once he returned to Harlem at the end of 1922, he stayed for good. 46
In its function as an intellectual forum, the FNF serves as an example of the kinds of
private spaces that black activists and intellectuals created in order to debate pressing issues
concerning black people and different theoretical and practical strategies for addressing those
problems. These were people who were well read in political and economic theory, and had
personal experience with racial discrimination. They worked to translate their knowledge into
plausible strategies for affecting large-scale change to improve the status of blacks in New York
and the United States. George Schuyler in the 1930s and Kenneth Clark in the 1950s, among
others, would continue this tradition of private ongoing forums. Such private gatherings would
serve as important vehicles to connect black activists and intellectuals.
Between the young radicals, the Renaissance writers and artists, the NAACP, the NUL,
and the UNIA, Harlem was an incredibly rich, diverse, and contentious political and intellectual
landscape during the 1920s. 47 And this was the political and intellectual milieu into which tens
of thousands of migrants to Harlem entered. African Americans could be exposed to ideas that
they might never have encountered before, coming from the mouths of other blacks. And, there
were no physical reprisals for hearing—or speaking—opinions critical of whites or the
government. Ella Baker, who arrived in Harlem in 1927 and would become one of the most
important activist and thinkers of the civil rights movement, was intoxicated by political activity
in the Harlem of the late-1920s. Baker recalled that during this ear, Harlem was a “‘hotbed of
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radical thinking.’ 48 She went wherever there was discussion as she soaked up the radical
political ideas that flourished in Harlem. 49
Baker would contribute to the intellectual ferment in Harlem by establishing a Negro
History Club at the Harlem branch of the New York Public library at One Hundred Thirty-Fifth
Street and Lenox Avenue with the branch’s white librarian Ernestine Rose. Rose oversaw the
expansion of the library’s collection and encouraged other intellectual activities during the
1920s. “ . . . Rose’s teas, readings, and literary gatherings made the 135th Street branch a center
of Harlem’s cultural life.” 50 The discussions of the Negro History Club were often so interesting
they would spill out onto the street and continue informally right on the corner of One Hundred
Thirty-Fifth Street, the already established public lyceum in the middle of Harlem. 51
On these speakers’ corners Harlem’s residents could hear black intellectuals from a range
of political and ideological persuasions speaking of the injustices they faced as a group
throughout the 1920s. They could read an equally broad range of opinion in the magazines and
newspapers serving their community. According to historian Barbara Ransby:

The streets of Harlem provided a cultural and political immersion like no other. At no
other time in twentieth-century African American history was there a more vibrant black
public sphere in Harlem than in the 1920s and ‘30s, infused as it was with the exciting
intellectual rhythms of the black diaspora. The serious exchange of ideas, cultural
performances and political debates flowed out of classrooms, private homes, meeting
halls and bars onto the neighborhood thoroughfare of Lenox Avenue.
As historian Irma Watkins-Owens writes: “From World War I through the 1930s,
the unclaimed terrain of the Harlem streetcorner became the testing ground for many
political ideologies and a forum for intellectual query and debate.” 52
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The claims of the various orators rang true to many African Americans because of their personal
experiences with discrimination and life in impoverished conditions. 53

Community Solidification and Deterioration

As tens of thousands more African Americans continued to move up to Harlem through
World War One and into the 1920s, older white residents continued to vacate their homes and
move away from the business districts of Manhattan going farther north into Washington Heights
and other suburban communities in the outer boroughs. 54 Whites left Harlem, in part so that they
would not be forced to live in such close proximity to blacks, in part because those who owned
properties could profit from renting to blacks, and in part because subway expansion and bridge
building had made it possible to commute to the central city relatively quickly from longer
distances.
African Americans, seeking both a material improvement in their quality of life and the
psychic benefit of a Harlem address, quickly snapped up the hastily abandoned dwellings. As
Roi Ottley observed, by the 1920s

National attention soon was focused on Harlem, and, to Negroes everywhere, the
community became the symbol of opportunity. Wave after wave of migrants teemed into
Harlem. The Black Metropolis was indeed coming of age. It had its own schools,
newspapers and magazines, labor unions, hotels, hospitals, restaurants, churches, and a
multitude of organizations and societies like the Elks and the Masons. At first glace,
Harlem gave the impression of being self-sufficient, a community unto itself. 55
Having an address north of One Hundred Tenth Street, however, did not solve the problems
associated with urban poverty or being black and poor. While observers of Harlem during the
53
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1920s may have gotten the impression that it was a fully autonomous community, Ottley
confessed that “[a]ctually, it was no more self-sufficient than it [would be by the 1940s]. Its
people were dependent on the financial, commercial, and industrial arteries of the dominant
white group for its very life’s blood. It was this dependence, as well as economic and social
restrictions, that helped to give Negro life its distinct character.” 56
As far as housing went, just as in earlier black communities, many white landlords did
not sufficiently maintain their properties, allowing the buildings to fall apart. An article by
Winthrop D. Lane in the March 1925 issue of Survey Graphic, a social work magazine,
described the exploitation African Americans endured in the housing market as “extortion.” He
went on, “[t]he Negro is gouged. Because he is a Negro, because he can be taken advantage of,
because his racial position makes it possible to gouge him, he is gouged.” 57 This situation was
exacerbated by the practice among many black families of taking in additional boarders. Most
did this to meet their exorbitant rents, but the result was that many residences were filled beyond
their intended capacities. 58 By the end of the 1920s population density in Harlem was soaring as
over 164,000 blacks lived there, and as the numbers of people rose without the requisite
sanitation, hospital, and other essential services to serve the population, the quality of life for
most Harlemites declined precipitously relative to previous generations of residents, and was
quite difficult for most. 59
Besides occupying dwellings that would not be properly maintained, African Americans
did not control a significant proportion of the retail establishments in Harlem as late as the
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1930s. 60 Lack of access to job opportunities in Harlem’s retail stores was an important political
issue, particularly once the Great Depression hit. An economic calamity of global proportions,
the Depression negatively affected Americans of every racial and ethnic group, and social class.
Many millions of Americans experienced shocking poverty as they lost jobs, homes, and some,
hope for the future. But for African Americans, who were already at the bottom of the economic
ladder, the prospect and reality of losing their livelihoods was omnipresent. A New York Herald
Tribune article from 1930 underscored this point:

. . . the October stock slump produced five times as much unemployment in
Harlem as in other parts of the city. People who lost money fired their chauffeurs and
maids. Men who employed both races tended to fire the Negro worker first.
No one can get an exact estimate of unemployment in Harlem. Four churches and
social agencies give 30,000, 36,000, 25,000, and 28,000. These figures cannot be
vouched for. Social agencies usually put these things a little high. But there is no
question, from personal observation, that Harlem today faces a bitter unemployment
situation. 61
For the next few years the country continued to descend into the grips of economic
depression. President Herbert Hoover’s administration had placed the burden for national
economic recovery on the states, municipalities, and private businesses. This strategy had not
worked anywhere in America by 1932, and New York City was no exception. Even with the
change in the direction of the federal government after the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
New Deal policies were piecemeal and flawed, and often tolerated racial discrimination in their
application.
Therefore, access to jobs—particularly in Harlem’s retail shops—was a bitter subject for
black New Yorkers during the first half of the decade. Blacks in Harlem and in other cities
around the nation began organizing grass-roots campaigns to protest the dearth of jobs for
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African Americans in the stores they patronized most. Harlem’s campaign, launched in 1933,
was “the largest and most influential,” and organized by Abyssinian Baptist Church assistant
pastor Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Reverend John H. Johnson of St. Martin’s Protestant Episcopal
Church, and Fred R. Moore, editor of the New York Age. Protest leaders negotiated with white
business leaders in order to get them to hire black workers and also initiated boycotts of stores
that did not employ African Americans. The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work!” campaigns,
however, were only successful in securing temporary employment for black workers.
Oftentimes, blacks were terminated once the boycotts ended. 62
Black New Yorkers were not getting the economic relief they needed from the federal
government, the state or city governments; and earlier attempts at boycotts and negotiations had
not produced permanent results. In March 1935, Black New Yorkers took more dramatic
measures to express their discontent and try to get the assistance they needed. In part as a
reaction to the alleged beating and subsequent death of a 15 year-old Puerto Rican boy, Lino
Rivera, at the hands of a white storeowner who saw him try to steal a pocket knife, and in part as
an inchoate reaction against the police brutality and lack of job opportunities so prevalent in
Harlem, black residents turned to vandalizing white-owned businesses along One Hundred
Twenty-Fifth Street, one of Harlem’s major thoroughfares. It turned out that Lino Rivera had
not been beaten and was certainly not dead, but over the coming weeks and months it became
clear that there were much more fundamental issues at the heart of the disturbances of March 19
and 20 than what had or had not been done to Lino Rivera. 63
In the week after the riot Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. did not focus on Lino Rivera in trying
to explain why conditions had grown so ripe for the type of violence that had occurred. Rather,
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he emphasized the particular havoc that Harlemites were enduring due to the Depression
combined with the base alloy of racial discrimination. He reported in the New York Post that,
“[a]n increasingly impenetrable wall has sprung up around Harlem, especially during the last five
years. It is a wall of subtle prejudices, veiled discrimination and faintly concealed antagonism . .
.” He went on to say that, “[e]ach winter since 1930, the Negro at the bottom of the pile felt that
his burden was getting heavier. This past year Harlem was snowed under. One out of every
twenty residents of New York City is a Negro. There are around 300,000 black, brown and
yellow folk. One-half are not working, the other half is existing on the crumbs from the table.” 64
In response to the riot, Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia appointed a biracial commission to
study and issue a report on the incident. The twelve-member committee included E. Franklin
Frazier, Countee Cullen, Hubert Delany, and A. Philip Randolph. LaGuardia charged this
Commission on the Harlem Riot of March 19, 1935 with discerning the actual facts of the
incident, assessing the damage to Harlem properties, and ascertaining the underlying causes of
the riot. The Commission also provided suggestions for preventing a similar disturbance in
Harlem in the future.
The Commission’s findings confirmed the widespread poverty in Harlem and pointed to
inadequate services in the neighborhood as well as discrimination in terms of job access and
treatment by the police. The subcommittee investigating the events of 19 March discovered, in
the process of its fact-finding expedition, the depth of the antipathy on the part of Harlem
residents toward the police department. 65 Their report demonstrated that those feelings were not
without cause, as the subcommittee detailed several instances of apparent excessive force against
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African Americans. One such incidence involved Thomas Aiken, a black man who had been
waiting in line for over an hour outside the 369th Regiment Armory to receive food from the
relief bureau located there. When a couple of other men jumped into the line against the rules,
Officer David Egan and another patrolman told all three men to move to the rear of the line.
Aiken tried to explain that he was merely trying to reclaim his original place. Not wishing to
hear an explanation, Egan beat Aiken so savagely that Aiken ultimately lost an eye. To add
insult to injury, not only was Officer Egan not disciplined, but Aiken was charged with felonious
assault. 66 Clearly, there was much to find fault with regarding the NYPD’s treatment of African
Americans.
The final Commission report pulled no punches as far as the depth of poverty Harlem’s
blacks were in, the placing of blame for those conditions, and the solutions they offered.
Therefore, the report was considered politically controversial and Mayor LaGuardia attempted to
suppress the report. The Amsterdam News printed the report in its pages in 1936, however, and
attempted to hold the mayor accountable for both trying to keep the report from public scrutiny
and the endemic discrimination and poverty facing New York’s black population. 67
The Commission made numerous recommendations about what the city could do in order
to improve conditions in Harlem with regard to job discrimination, unemployment relief,
housing, education, health care, and relations with the police. All of the recommendations were
intended the remedy the structural inequalities that were rife in Harlem compared to other
neighborhoods and among other racial groups in New York City. 68 The commission was
concerned with trying to ameliorate the most fundamental problems that they found were at the
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cause of the disturbance. Therefore, they proposed comprehensive solutions. The Commission
concluded by saying that if their recommendations were heeded and conditions in Harlem were
improved, then another similar disturbance could be avoided in the future. But as long as the
quality of life for Harlem residents lagged far below all other New Yorkers, the city remained
vulnerable to other racial violence. Black leaders would continue to prod the LaGuardia
administration and even President Roosevelt for racially egalitarian legislation and to enforce the
statutes that already existed equally.

The “Dilemma” of a “Moral” War and Intellectuals After the Second World War

By the late 1930s, northern blacks were becoming an important constituency in the
national Democratic New Deal coalition that also included white ethnics and labor groups. And
as both the Democratic Party leadership and African American leaders recognized the growing
significance of the black vote, African American leaders began placing more demands on the
federal government to meet their needs as a group. African American leaders had been trying to
hold President Roosevelt accountable for his promises to the nation ever since he had taken
office in 1933. While blacks recognized that Roosevelt’s more activist economic policies were
an improvement over former President Herbert Hoover’s non-interventionist approach, they also
soon realized that although much was changing, too many things were remaining the same.
Federal policies tolerated racial discrimination and, in some cases, codified it. 69
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. and A. Philip Randolph voiced the dissatisfaction of blacks in
Harlem and around the country, as they endured unequal treatment under New Deal programs.
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Powell did so first as pastor of Harlem’s largest congregation, then as New York City
Councilmember in 1941, and later as a New York State Representative to Congress from 1945
until 1967. Randolph spoke on behalf of African Americans as president of the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters and Maids, the labor union that he led starting in 1925, and during the war
years as chairman of the March on Washington Movement (MOWM). In 1935, Powell
commented on the discrimination that was rife within New Deal programs, “What about the
federal relief jobs? That, my friends, is what Harlem wants to know. . . . the Civil Works
Administration refuses to hire Negroes. . . . The CWA has a professional division. How many of
Harlem’s 135 doctors and 100 dentists are working in that division? The answer is very
simple—not one!” 70 Powell went on to criticize the discriminatory practices that also occurred
in other New Deal agencies and blamed mayor LaGuardia’s administration for being insensitive
to the needs of the city’s black residents. Although that relief was often insufficient and
discrimination did persist, historian Cheryl Lynn Greenberg demonstrates that administrators of
New Deal agencies in New York City were somewhat more even-handed in dispensing relief to
African Americans than in many other places. 71
Nationally, black leaders continued to try and compel the federal government to remedy
the inequities African Americans faced at its hands; customary bias from New Deal agencies, in
federal employment, and segregation in the Armed Forces. 72 After the Second World War
started in 1939 and Roosevelt began trying to prime Americans for possible military intervention
after 1940, African American leaders, if not as ambivalent as at the outset of the First World
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War, were still quite cautious about lending blind support to the war effort. Many still harbored
feelings of betrayal; the calls to “close ranks” during World War One seemed to backfire as
racial violence tarnished the nation’s battle for democracy. The extent to which African
Americans should support the war effort precipitated a debate among black leaders similar in
many ways to the debates during World War I. The New York Age reported in January of 1942
that:

Negroes in America are not one hundred per cent sold on the war effort of the
nation and will not be until they are given some of the rights of democracy which have
been denied them in the past.
This was the consensus of opinion which came to light Saturday afternoon at a
session of the National Coordinating Committee at the Harlem Branch Y.M.C.A.
. . . [Judge William H.] Hastie asked the opinion of the group on their theories
about Negro thought on the war. This question produced an embattled controversy
among some of the race’s most prominent leaders. 73
The debate among black leaders produced both calls to close ranks with the president
again and arguments that African Americans had no obligation to fight on behalf of a nation that
denied them full citizenship rights, just as during World War I. The major difference, however,
between African American responses during World War II and World War I was not in terms of
actual African American involvement. After the bombing at Pearl Harbor, blacks were among
the first to join the war effort in any way they could. Most who signed up for duty believed, as
fully as any other group of Americans, in the message that this was a morally just war for
democracy all over the world.
Rather, the major difference had to do with the demands African Americans placed
directly at the door of President Roosevelt in order to secure federal intervention on behalf of
their own community. In 1940, A. Philip Randolph and Walter White, head of the NAACP, met
with Roosevelt in order to discuss the demands of black workers. Among the issues that they
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wanted Roosevelt to address were the integration of the military forces and ending racial
discrimination in defense contracting.
When Randolph saw that Roosevelt was not particularly responsive to his and White’s
demands, he upped the ante by threatening to launch a march on Washington with as many as
10,000 protesters if Roosevelt did not commit to dealing with these issues. Randolph began to
coordinate the “March on Washington Movement” in an effort to force Roosevelt’s hand to
propose legislation to deal with racial discrimination in government defense industries. As he
continued to plan the march, which was slated for July 1, 1941, he informed Roosevelt that he
planned to have more than 100,000 African American protesters descend on Washington, rather
than his initial 10,000-person estimate. 74
As Roosevelt prepared the United States for the prospect of war, the last thing he wanted
to deal with was a mass protest by African Americans who he realized had a legitimate gripe
with the government. Franklin even enlisted the assistance of his wife, Eleanor, because of her
popularity among black leaders and Mayor La Guardia in order to try and convince Randolph to
cancel the march. 75 This and all of the other attempts on the president’s part to discourage the
march were unsuccessful. So, in exchange for Randolph’s willingness to call off the march,
Roosevelt worked with him to create legislation that committed the government to address the
black leader’s issues. President Roosevelt showed Randolph several drafts of what ultimately
became Executive Order 8802. The order established the Fair Employment Practices
Commission and prohibited racial discrimination in defense industries and government. 76
With EO 8802 Randolph called off the march, but did not dismantle the March on
Washington Movement. He was criticized in some circles—even within the MOWM—for
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canceling the march, as some were dissatisfied that the executive order did not desegregate the
armed forces or go far enough in other areas. Many ordinary blacks were confused, and others
were disappointed that the march was brought to a halt so quickly and neatly. 77 Black leaders,
however, could still look at Executive Order 8802 as a concrete victory. It was the first time
since the Reconstruction Era that the federal government had intervened directly on behalf of
blacks. 78 Acknowledging that this singular executive order was not enough, by itself, to remedy
the discrimination that existed within the federal government, Randolph still opined
optimistically about the virtues of the order. “‘I know that this order is certain to stir the hopes
and aspirations on Negroes throughout the nation, who only seek opportunities to work
according to their qualifications. It is the hope of the Negro March-on-Washington Committee
that this executive order will represent thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions in increased
wages in Negro communities, which will reflect themselves in higher standards of living, more
education and recreation for the children, a greater security and assurance of more abundant
life.’” 79 Randolph also offered that the negotiations that produced Executive Order 8802 had
taught black leaders a very valuable lesson. He told a Harlem audience a few months after the
order had been issued that, “‘the March on Washington Movement has learned that the Federal
Government itself has become the carrier of the germ of race discrimination and segregation; and
that ‘the Government and the President will respond to pressure and the organization of the
Negro masses can exercise pressure.’” 80
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That Randolph and White were able to compel Roosevelt to issue an executive order was
the result of several factors emergent since the 1930s that would continue into the 1950s and
1960s. Among the most important of those factors was the population shift that brought
hundreds of thousands of African Americans out of the rural South to the urban South, North,
and West. During the First Great Migration about 300,000 African Americans left the South.
The Second Great Migration, which is generally purported to have lasted from 1940 to 1970, was
much larger. Between 1941 and 1945 alone, 700,000 blacks migrated from the rural South, with
400,000 of them finding their way to the North and West to work in war industries. With such
large numbers swelling the populations of urban centers, blacks changed the composition of
political districts and were in better position to influence the outcome of political contests. 81
Just as important, if not more so, was the growth of the American economy during the
war years, and over the next two decades. Right as the New Deal programs were running out of
steam by the end of the 1930s, governmental spending for war production injected a muchneeded boost into the national economy. The government assumed a larger role in managing the
economy than it had even during the New Deal. The most the federal government had spent in
any given year on New Deal programs was $8.5 billion; by 1945 government expenditures had
reached $100 billion. The Gross National Product also grew by leaps and bounds as it increased
from $206 billion in 1940 to $500 billion in 1960, and soared to $800 billion by 1970. Many
Americans saw their salaries double during the war years while inflation was kept low. 82
African Americans shared in the wartime and postwar economic growth as they gained
access to better jobs and membership in labor unions, and as restrictions on promotions began to
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slacken. Wartime jobs and rising wages led to growth in the black middle-class and a higher
standard of living for many. The combination of greater political leverage and buying power
raised blacks’ expectations of their elected officials to unprecedented heights. 83
By the time the United States officially entered the war and began to send troops into
combat in 1942, most all black intellectuals had come around to supporting the war effort. But
not by soft-pedaling the pervasiveness of racial discrimination throughout American society, and
not as a result of uncritical patriotism. Rather, the war raised the importance of demonstrating
that African Americans were truly part of the nation. 84

On the intellectual front, there had also been significant developments since the 1920s
that helped to de-legitimize the notion of black racial inferiority. In 1923 the famed Columbia
University anthropologist, Franz Boas, gave a lecture at the One Hundred Thirty-Fifth Street
Branch of New York Public Library in Harlem in which he argued that “there is no evidence
whatever to prove that the white man is inherently superior to any other, or that the Negro would
not have accomplished all the white race has if he had been placed in the same environment or
had the same opportunities.” Boas went on to argue that race is a social construct with very little
basis in biology. As he put it in his address, “‘Race . . . is a very elusive term to define, since
there are no hard and fast lines between them. Similar characteristics are to be found in races
that are supposed to be widely apart, and there are certain characteristics that are common to all
humanity.” 85
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African American intellectuals also weighed in on the subject of racial theory. They
made much the same arguments as Boas, in some cases even earlier. A. Philip Randolph stated
simply and unequivocally back in 1919 that, “Races are equal. They are equal in mind. They
are equal in body. They are equal in moral and ethical standards. There is probably no bogey
more pernicious or more false than the claim of racial inferiority.” 86 Randolph cited
contemporary textbooks, Dynamic Sociology and Applied Sociology, written by Brown
University professor Lester F. Ward to back up his claim. He used them to argue that the
positive and negative characteristics found in human beings were distributed across races
equally.
James Weldon Johnson advocated racial pluralism and argued against “Anglo-Saxon”
superiority, as embodied by “Anglo-Saxon Clubs” of the era. Johnson argued that the “AngloSaxon” and his culture were both myths and that it would be “better to encourage people to bring
here their cultural heritages, to give us in America the benefit of their songs and dances and
literatures and customs, than to try and force them to conform to some Anglo-Saxon idea of what
is American.” 87
Discussions about the biological equality of all human beings and arguments for an
inclusive definition of who was an American were not merely intellectual exercises. By the
1880s and 1890s, one of the uglier consequences of Progressivism’s valuation of scientific data
and the professionalization of the academy was that theories about a global hierarchy of races,
with Anglo-Saxons or Aryans as the superior races and Africans as the most primitive, began to
be couched in the language of biology. Not only were pseudo-scientific theories taught in
universities throughout the country, but these theories also affected legislation regarding
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immigration and the segregation of blacks and whites. Congress passed Chinese Exclusion Acts
in 1882, 1892, and again in 1902 that prohibited Chinese immigration to the United States. And
as was stated above, Jim Crow legislation throughout the South became more entrenched during
the 1890s and 1900s. A Congressional committee, the Dillingham Commission, even published
an encyclopedia of races in 1906, in which every “race” was catalogued. Virtually every harmful
stereotype of any ethnic group in American society was now supposedly “proven” by this
commission. The apogee of racial theory’s impact on legislation occurred with the Immigration
Act of 1924 which set quotas on the number of persons entering the country from outside the
western hemisphere “in order to select those best suited for American society.” 88
As the 1920s became the 1930s and the Depression throttled world economies,
immigration to the United States dropped considerably, so it was not as important a priority for
congressional legislation, but many people still held strong beliefs in white racial, cultural, and
intellectual superiority. Boas and his students continued to publish scholarly studies that worked
to debunk the idea of white racial superiority. In 1941, Melville J. Herskovitz, a student of Boas’
at Columbia, published another important book working from the premise of human biological,
cultural, and intellectual equality titled The Myth of the Negro Past. In it, Herskovitz argued that
African American culture continued to retain many African influences into the present day. This
was a very controversial argument at the time. The Myth of the Negro Past was, however, an
important contribution to the growing body of scholarship produced in the previous twenty years
that argued both that African Americans possessed a heritage that had positively contributed to
America’s development, and that blacks were indeed Americans and deserving of equal rights.
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The most important single work as far as articulating the racial liberal ideology was
Gunnar Myrdal’s, An American Dilemma, in 1944. The ‘dilemma’ was that the United States
was founded on the principles of human equality, democratic political and civil institutions, and
the belief that people could advance as far as their hard work and natural intellect could take
them, yet African Americans had never been fully included in that covenant. 89 Myrdal and his
interracial team of researchers and consultants—Alain Locke, E. Franklin Frazier, Kenneth
Clark, and co-founder of the National Negro Congress and future diplomat Ralph Bunche
amongst them—believed, however, that ultimately the American creed would triumph in its
struggle over racial exclusionism; and that a pluralistic society could be created if whites came to
grips with their consciences. An American Dilemma helped cement racial liberal ideology as the
orthodoxy of the civil rights movement until the mid-1960s.
An American Dilemma, coming as it did during World War II with the war’s moral
justifications to save the world from totalitarianism and preserve freedom, helped bolster African
American campaigns for social justice. 90 The country may have been on the right side in a
morally just war overseas, but African Americans reminded public officials that they were
absolutely on the wrong side in the domestic war for equality and civil rights. “Black Americans
commented upon ‘this strange and curious picture, this spectacle of America at war to preserve
the ideal of government by free men, yet clinging to the social vestiges of the slave system.’” 91
Harlem’s African American activists including George Schuyler, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., A.
Phillip Randolph, and others exposed the hypocrisy of the American claim to moral supremacy
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by constantly making the injustices of American society toward blacks subject to scrutiny in both
the national and international courts of public opinion. Ralph Bunche stated dryly “the fight now
[in Europe] is not to save democracy [in the United States], for that which does not exist cannot
be saved.” 92 African Americans, with the “Double V for Victory at Home and Abroad”
campaign, initiated by the Pittsburgh Courier back in 1942, clearly articulated in various ways
that an Allied victory—particularly an American victory—would mean little unless it included
both an end to European colonialism and American racial injustice. 93
After the war ended, the spirit of cooperation that characterized the relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union quickly soured as both countries vied for global
economic, political, and cultural supremacy. The cold war that developed not only shaped a
hostile foreign policy towards the Soviets, but also resulted in repressive domestic policies that
attempted to curb any and all voices of dissent against the status quo. The cold war had a
chilling effect on the movement for civil rights and the intellectual left between 1945 and 1954.
Communists, socialists, and other left-wing activists were compelled to either modify, or
completely deny, their earlier beliefs in order to remain active in progressive social activism.
Many Americans lost their jobs or were forced to sign loyalty oaths to keep them. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation began surveilling Americans involved in civil rights organizations in
attempts to discredit their leaders and undermine the work of these groups. And numerous
people were dragged in front of the House Un-American Activities Committee in order to
preserve their reputations, implicate others of being communists, and demonstrate their
patriotism.

92

Ralph Bunche; in Mark Mazower, Dark Continent, 195.
John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism & the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 29.
93

94

The Second World War went a long way to de-legitimize racial theory in academic
circles, as the world now knew the destruction these theories could cause if carried to their
extreme. And African Americans worked to capitalize on the moral leverage they had as a result
of their patriotic participation in the war effort, given the moralistic justifications for the US
entering the war. Civil rights agitation, both in New York City and nationally, by no means
ceased. But the social, political, and material pressures to conform to a conservative version of
patriotism intensified in the decade after the war and succeeded in decimating much of the
prewar Left. As historian Robert Griffith argues, “[t]he aggressive actions of right-wing interest
groups were not . . . met by countervailing pressures from the left. Instead, the same broad
forces that lent strength and legitimacy to the postwar right served to undermine and destroy the
postwar left.” 94
The deterioration of the postwar left applied to the nation and to New York City. The
effectiveness of communist, socialist, nationalist, and other left-wing activists in New York was
subverted to a great degree not only by governmental efforts to crush popular social action, but
also by the ideological divisions amongst black leaders who disagreed with one another about the
most effective ways to achieve full racial equality. 95
As a result, if during the 1920s and 1930s, younger black radicals were the ones pushing
the envelope in devising the tactics for civil rights struggle, by the early 1950s the pendulum had
swung back in the direction of the more moderate racial liberals who had been at the forefront of
the civil rights struggle during the 1910s. Between 1945 and 1954 the NAACP and National
Urban League, particularly the NAACP, reestablished itself as the foremost national civil rights
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group working through the courts to dismantle legalized racial segregation. Still headquartered
in New York City, the membership rolls of the NAACP increased more than nine times rising
from 50,000 to 450,000. The NUL also continued to operate in the midst of the repressive social
and political climate. And black intellectuals, either working through these organizations or
independently, continued to make Harlem the intellectual center of the civil rights movement.
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Chapter 3
Brightening and Dimming Optimism: Racial Liberalism Ascendant and in Crisis

By the middle of the 1950s, racial liberalism had reemerged as the predominant ideology
guiding the civil rights movement. During the early 1930s, the growing influence of the
Communist left on African American intellectuals and more educated blacks was based on the
communists’ rhetorical commitment to achieving racial justice by destroying the capitalist
economic and political institutions that fostered inequality. The Communists supported rent
strikes for better living conditions, protested the eviction of black families from their homes,
and—most famously—provided legal representation for the Scottsboro Boys in 1931—nine
black youths from Alabama who were unjustly charged with raping two white women. The
American Communist Party (CPUSA) also gained standing among the masses due to its
willingness to directly intervene on behalf of African Americans. 1 By the second half of the
decade the American Communist Party (CPUSA) decided to emphasize its revolutionary rhetoric
less, and commit to working with non-communist reform groups in what is known at the Popular
Front period. 2 The position of the Party shifted even more by the final years of the war as the
CPUSA tried to push the idea that communism was the definition of Americanism. Through the
years of the Second World War leftist ideologies gained more influence among African
Americans in New York City. After the Second World War, however, the influence of leftists in
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the black freedom struggle—particularly Communists—receded under the pall of virulent anticommunism that grabbed hold of American society. 3
The final Allied victory over Japan in August of 1945 ushered in a new epoch in world
history. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two global superpowers, both
hoping to reconstruct the entire world in their own images. The resulting militaristic competition
between the two nations turned the globe into a bi-polar world. Moreover, both nations sought to
win the support of the emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, using economic
incentives, military forces, and propaganda in order to further very different ideological agendas.
The United States espoused a liberal democratic ethos that included: individual rights that
the government could not take away, a commitment to human freedom, self-determination, and
market economy. At the same time, the US painted the Soviet Union as the national embodiment
of atheistic evil. According to American political officials, the Soviet Union’s existence was a
threat to American national security and even American civilization. 4
The governments were not only antithetical to the other, but they were also antagonistic
toward each other. The Cold War helped shape American foreign policy—particularly with
regard to the emerging nations in Africa and Asia—and it also affected how the nation dealt with
dissent within its own borders. 5
In this new geopolitical context, President Harry Truman made it clear that the United
States could “no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice and
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discrimination.” 6 In order for the US to give substance to its claim as the moral leader of the
world, the country had to get its own “racial house” in order. After World War II it was more
apparent than ever before that the United States could no longer act as if it were physically or
ideologically isolated from the rest of the world. No matter how much American leaders may
have wished differently, every discriminatory action taken by the federal government with regard
to domestic race relations and foreign policy toward Africa, Latin America, and Asia was
subjected to international criticism and used as propaganda to embarrass the United States on the
world stage. 7
Cold War politics made it politically advantageous for the United States to make it easier
for civil rights activists to push for civil rights. Domestic incidents of racial discrimination were
being broadcast to the world at every opportunity. American injustices became world news as
foreign news organizations reported to their countries; foreign diplomats and emissaries reported
back to their home governments; foreign students and visitors from African and Asia returned
home to describe their encounters with discrimination; and black American leaders publicized
the plight of African Americans and their government’s unwillingness to ameliorate their
suffering. 8 In a rapidly changing world in which African and Asian nations were casting off
European domination, the unapologetic defense of white supremacy was now a political liability
in foreign affairs. Domestic racial politics became very important when the United States
attempted to increase its influence in these parts of the world. 9
During the 1950s the Cold War was omnipresent in American economic, political, social,
and intellectual life. Black intellectuals of all stripes had to decide how they were going to
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operate within the constrictions and exploit the opportunities that having competing
“superpowers” presented. On the one hand, segregationists pilloried all attempts to challenge the
racial status quo as “un-American” and “communist-inspired;” particularly powerful epithets to
contend with in the mid-1950s. Southern politicians argued that African Americans were actually
quite contented with the conditions in the South and that it was “outside agitators” and not “their
blacks” that were concerned with social equality. To abandon racial segregation would
potentially precipitate the unraveling of American society. A large segment of southern whites
accepted this point of view and used it as a justification for the maintenance of white
supremacy. 10
On the other hand, there were ways in which blacks could exert pressure on the political
establishment in order to bring about change because of the country’s thirst for increased
political influence. 11 Black intellectuals could affect positive change for African Americans
when they: exposed the injustices perpetrated against blacks—either by the federal government
or without adequate federal response—to a wide enough national and international audience;
framed the actions of segregationists as un-American; and/or successfully portrayed the protests
for racial equality as the purest expression of those fundamentally American ideals of freedom,
liberty, and human equality. 12
Thus, the Cold War hindered the civil rights movement in some ways as the federal
government and southern state governments sought to repress civil rights agitation and dissent
against the status quo more broadly. But there were also opportunities to use American global
political ambitions for the benefit of the domestic civil rights agenda, and black intellectuals
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sought to do this to the fullest extent possible, while minimizing the negative consequences of
the ensuing blowback.
The Cold War was not the only factor that determined how black intellectuals were going
to operate in the post-war era. It did, however, fundamentally alter the relationships between
certain individuals and groups. Historical circumstances present from the 1930s up through the
end of the Second World War made it imperative for intellectuals and organizations of different
ideological perspectives to submerge many of their conflicting principles in an effort to build a
broadly based movement for civil rights and maintain individual relevance. Black organizations
often came together under umbrella organizations, such as the National Negro Congress (NNC)
in 1936, in order to coordinate information, resources, and activities with other groups. A
“popular front” of communist and liberal organizations developed in an attempt to deal with the
issues of economic inequality and job discrimination. 13 After the war, however, the political
landscape shifted rightward and brought ideological differences back to the fore and impeded the
possibilities for future alliances. 14 Therefore, the examples of grudging cooperation between
racial liberals organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and black communists that existed during the heyday of the black left in the
1930s and early 1940s were no more by the early 1950s. 15
As significant a factor as governmental efforts at undermining leftist agitation was in
causing cleavages among communist groups and other organizations, it was not the only factor.
The Popular Front began to unravel even before the end of the war, as exemplified by A. Philip
Randolph’s break from the National Negro Congress in April of 1940. Randolph had been one
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of the principle founders of the NNC back in 1936. Randolph’s prestige convinced the NAACP
to join the group initially, even though there was also a growing communist presence in the
organization. But after the Second World War began in 1939, according to scholar, Nikhil
Singh, the NNC began to fracture. As Singh explains,
[The NNC] collapsed in 1940 around the issue of its affiliation with the Labor
Non-Partisan League. While the contention has been understood as revolving around the
issue of communist domination of the Congress and the political fissures that opened
after the Nazi-Soviet pact, these controversies were themselves the manifestation of the
Congress’s inability to decide whether race-organization or interracial class-solidarity
would be its primary principle. Randolph . . . quit the Congress in 1940 after it endorsed
affiliation with the Labor Non-Partisan League because he believed it meant that the
NNC was “no longer truly a Negro Congress” with a “leadership which is uncontrolled
and responsible to no one but the Negro people.” 16

Therefore, the causes for the demise of the Popular Front were not only international
events, as has previously been claimed, but also conflicts over the best course of the domestic
movement.
Historians, Eric Arnesen and Manfred Berg emphasize the growing Communist control
over the NNC as the primary reason for Randolph’s decision to leave the NNC and the
disintegration of the Popular Front. In their view, once the Soviet Union and Germany entered
into the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, the American Communist Party and NNC were rocked
internally. Over the next couple of years the CPUSA switched its position from opposing World
War II to supporting the war effort, pushing the struggle for black equality further down of the
Party’s agenda. After the Germans broke the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the CPUSA was forced to
support American involvement in the war, the Party expressed the belief that protests for racial
equality were unwanted distractions and should be stopped. The de-emphasis of black civil
rights by the Communists convinced Randolph and many other African Americans that the
16
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CPUSA had no genuine interest in civil rights, but were only trying to exploit the plight of
African Americans for the benefit of the CPUSA and Moscow. As the communists had taken
control of the NNC by late-1939, Randolph chose to resign rather than remain president of the
organization. 17
Nationalist intellectual, Harold Cruse, argued that a big part of the problem was the
communist strategy of “attempting to capture every group” the way it had the NNC. He argued
that the Communists really had no program to offer that was relevant to black New Yorkers in
the postwar era. Rather, “[t]he Communists lived in a dream world of the recall of past glories of
a foreign revolution that had no meaning in the United States.” 18 There were reasons, other than
governmental pressure, why some African American leaders became disaffected with
communism during the 1940s.
In the postwar period, black leaders of all ideological persuasions continued to agitate for
civil rights. In many ways, the reasons for the war strengthened the arguments of many activists
as to why African Americans deserved full political, social, and economic equality with whites;
particularly racial liberals who relied on the ideas of the Constitution and Declaration of
Independence as their touchstones. Racial liberals sought to make civil rights a moral issue, as
often as possible. Following the ideological blueprint articulated by Gunnar Myrdal, racial
liberals challenged the country to live up to its professed creed by citing its own foundational
texts.
Because many Americans framed attempts at challenging the racial status quo as “unAmerican” or “communist-inspired,” some black activists—particularly racial liberals and their
organizations—sought to insulate themselves from suspicion and reframe their goal of achieving
17
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racial equality as quintessentially American. 19 NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins argued
that, “the survival of the American democratic system in the present global conflict of ideologies
depends upon the strength it can muster for the minds, hearts and spiritual convictions of all its
people.” He further maintained that ‘the Negro wants change in order that he may be brought in
line with the American standard . . . which must be done not only to preserve and strengthen that
standard here at home, but to guarantee its potency in the world struggle against dictatorship.” 20
Racial liberal intellectuals, more than nationalists and leftists, worked to have their actions in
support of racial equality be interpreted as affirming American ideals—democracy, freedom,
human equality, and now anti-communism. As a result, to the extent that issues of racial
equality were able to gain a hearing on the national level, racial liberals were once again at the
forefront of pushing them forward.
Black nationalist intellectuals, with their call for economic and territorial autonomy, were
not willing to work within liberal-democratic institutions in order to achieve their goals.
Socialist and communist intellectuals—although coming from different ideological perspectives
themselves—were often lumped together by political leaders and ordinary Americans who
simply regarded them as enemies of the state, and would have liked to see them expunged from
American life. Leftists were also sometimes hostile towards working through liberal-democratic
institutions to achieve racial equality. Therefore, although agitation for racial equality by any
group was not encouraged during the 1950s, racial liberals were perhaps best able to adapt their
rhetoric to fit within the constraints presented by the increasingly conservative intellectual,
political, and social milieu. These different positions on the efficacy of working within
19
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established government institutions in order to achieve civil rights can be seen in the different
approaches of Kenneth Clark and Milton A. Galamison on the issue of school desegregation in
New York City.
Racial liberalism was the predominant ideology guiding the civil rights movement during
the 1950s. By the end of the decade, however, frustrations among all classes of African
Americans with the lack of progress toward racial integration in public schools and the wider
society provided an opening for more radical ideologies and direct action tactics to gain
adherents. Black liberal intellectuals and organizations would have to decide whether or not they
would work to incorporate the different ideas of leftists, nationalists, and conservatives into their
repertoire or risk facing irrelevance as the movement continued. And this was true of both the
northern and southern streams of the civil rights movement.
The ideological shifts that the civil rights movement underwent were much more national
than regional in nature, even with the differences in culture, political economy, demographics,
and the nature of white supremacy. This is especially true since many of the most significant
intellectuals and tacticians of the local and national movements were based in New York City.
Through the middle of the 1960s, racial liberals proved sufficiently flexible to absorb external
challenges from other black leaders and maintain their preeminence among the black masses.
After the middle of the decade, especially among younger urban blacks, racial liberalism was
less palatable, black nationalism gained more adherents, and the rhetoric and goals of the black
freedom struggle shifted.

Responses to Brown
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The fundamentally American idea that all human beings are created equal from birth and
entitled to the opportunity to rise as high as their hard work and intellect would allow epitomized
both the nation’s greatest promise and contribution to mankind, yet it also made all the more
disheartening the state of domestic race relations following World War II. All Americans were
far from treated equally. Black leaders of all ideological persuasions recognized that there was a
disconnect between the values expressed in the nation’s foundational texts and the reality of
blacks’ status within American society. Racial liberal leaders, however, were more committed
than conservatives, black nationalists, and leftists to articulating how wide this gap remained at
mid-twentieth-century using the words of the “founding fathers” to make their arguments.
Liberals did more than merely invoke the Declaration of Independence or US Constitution; they
evinced a commitment to working within liberal-democratic institutions to achieve their ends;
total equality with whites as signified by the complete integration of American society (and
social and legal equivalence).
Because integration was a central goal for racial liberal intellectuals, they worked to
attack segregation wherever and however they could. One of the arenas in which racial liberals
sought to destroy segregation was in education. A reason for this was that these middle and
upper class blacks placed an extremely high value on formal education as the surest way to
ascend the American social ladder. 21 Another reason was that racial liberals believed that
integrated classrooms were the place where the most progress regarding race relations could be
made. According to racial liberals, education was key to dismantling prejudice. 22 Also, public
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schools were a striking example of the inequalities that existed between blacks and whites in
American society.
There were wide disparities in funding between white public schools and black public
schools in both the North and particularly in the South. Although the gap in education spending
between northern and southern states was narrowing by the 1950s, southern state legislatures,
historically, appropriated relatively little money to public education. The proportion of
educational funding to African American schools might be anywhere from one-third to oneeighth of the amount set aside for the education of white children. 23 In the five cases that were
combined into Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, of which the school board of
Clarendon, South Carolina, was one of the defendants, unequal allocation of public funds was
one of the primary legal issues. According to historian Richard Kluger, “[i]n Clarendon County
for the school year 1949-1950, they spent $179 per white child in the public schools; for each
black child, they spent $43.” 24
Schools for black youth throughout much of the South—particularly the rural South—
could barely qualify as such. Often these “schools” were little more than one room shacks in
which one or two teachers might be asked to instruct up to eight grade levels of children
simultaneously. In Clarendon County there were five times fewer schools for whites than for
blacks, yet the white schools had three times the monetary value. 25 African American
elementary schools were never on par with schools for white children—even though Plessy was
national law—nor did they contain adequate classroom space, heating or plumbing. Many
schools did not have cafeterias to provide meals for students.
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If the condition of southern schools for blacks was appalling, northern schools, were also
quite uneven in terms of the quality of facilities in predominantly black schools and majority
white schools. In New York, where de jure segregation had not existed since the first decade of
the twentieth century, African American and Puerto Rican parents in Brooklyn organized the
Bedford-Stuyvesant-Williamsburg Schools Council in 1943 to protest the inferior education their
children were receiving. They saw that the public schools their children attended were older than
majority white schools on average and in disrepair, less equipped in terms of supplies and books,
did not offer hot lunches or have health care facilities in some cases, and were lacking in
instructional and recreational spaces in comparison to predominantly white schools. The goal of
the Schools Council was to ameliorate these inequities for the sake of their children’s
educations. 26 North and South, blacks challenged their status as second-class citizens and began
demanding that the government—local, state, and federal—start protecting the Constitutional
rights guaranteed them and their children. These calls would only become more insistent over
the course of the next two decades.
In the context of New York City, where de jure segregation did not exist in the public
schools and mass organization would not be subject to violent repression or economic
intimidation, ordinary citizens formed groups and tried to negotiate directly with the powersthat-be in order to enact change through influencing policy changes or local legislation. In the
South, where African Americans had virtually no access to political power on any level, “blacks
were in a better position to seek redress through the courts.” 27 Both of these strategies—
negotiation with city agencies and litigation—reflect the predominance of the liberal ideology

26

Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New York
City Schools (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 62.
27
Quote by Genna Rae McNeil; in Waldo E. Martin, Jr., ed., Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with
Documents (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 10.

108

guiding the civil rights movement, with its desire to work within established democratic
institutions.
One of the most important of these institutions was the courts. While local groups or
even citywide organizations operated in New York City and in other northern locales, groups
such as the NAACP worked primarily through the legal system. By the early 1950s, the NAACP
had been engaged in the legal battle for equalization in educational opportunity for nearly two
decades. Working from a strategy to chip away at southern Jim Crow school systems, first in
graduate and professional schools, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDEF)
garnered Supreme Court victories during the 1930s and 1940s that mandated the admission of
qualified black applicants to previously-all-white state universities because the schools for
African Americans were either non-existent or woefully unequal to the schools available to
whites. The strategy of whittling away at Jim Crow by working within the limits set by the
doctrine of “separate but equal” obtained victories for the NAACP, but they had only limited
applicability and the process was incredibly slow. Thurgood Marshall, lead counsel for the
NAACP LDEF and future Supreme Court justice, who advocated the “incremental” strategy
during the during the 1930s and 1940s, realized by 1950 that “[u]nless the Court could be forced
to confront the legality of segregation itself, NAACP lawyers might have to spend the next halfcentury arguing cases of unequal educational facilities one by one. Meanwhile, segregation
would go on.” 28
The NAACP lawyers and many of the social scientists who supplied their expertise to the
organization, particularly City College of New York clinical psychologist Dr. Kenneth Clark,
thought of themselves as social engineers who were attempting to use the legal system to help
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precipitate the full flowering of democracy for all Americans. 29 In their minds, Brown v. Board
of Education and the cases that preceded it were about attaining the highest ideals of the
American creed through the manipulation of democratic legal institutions. As Brown worked its
way through the federal court system, the lawyers counseled their clients to expect many
setbacks during the process, but also believed that their ultimate victory was both possible and
foreseeable.
These racial liberals had enough faith in the legal system to trust that their belief in the
efficacy and necessity of racially integrated schools would be vindicated. According to Alfred
Kelly, “[t]here was a very conservative element in these men in the sense that they really
believed in the American dream and that it could be made to work for black men, too. . . .
[Thurgood Marshall] truly believed in the United States and the Constitution, but [thought] that
the whole system was tragically flawed by the segregation laws. Wipe away those laws and the
whole picture would change. Marshall and his colleagues were no rebels. They felt the social
order was fundamentally good. What they wanted was the chance to share in it like men.’” 30 As
far as racial liberals were concerned, the true American creed had never been implemented, and
to facilitate its application for all would be revolutionary. The revolution they sought to initiate,
however, was a reformist one. This may sound oxymoronic, but racial liberals believed in
democratic political institutions and a capitalist economic order. Racial liberals, in general, and
the NAACP, in particular, were not seeking to destroy capitalism or the structure of the
American government. They simply wanted to be equally served by both.
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Finally, after two years and two rounds of argumentation in front of the Supreme Court
on these five cases, the near-twenty-year legal fight to strike down legal segregation in public
education and near-sixty-year fight to overturn Plessy ended on 17 May 1954. The decision was
an important milestone for the country. It would be difficult to imagine the extent to which the
country would be affected. Black and white, North and South, city and town, almost every
citizen would be affected by the decision and the responses from blacks and whites to the new
mandate varied significantly.
Among whites across the South, responses ranged from pledges of defiance to calls for
compliance. In Mississippi, rabid segregationist Senator James Eastland snarled that “the South
will not abide by nor obey this legislative decision of a political court. . . . We will take whatever
steps are necessary to retain segregation in education.” Senator John Stennis, no less virulent a
racist, was more cautious when he initially observed that “there is plenty of time, and I believe
there are even years to seek a solution.” In Cleveland, Mississippi, a young Episcopal priest
named Duncan Gray even urged his fellow Mississippians to comply with the Brown decision.
Not only did this clergyman take a public stand in favor of desegregation, he did so without
reprisal from local whites. 31
In Greensboro, North Carolina, the school board met on 18 May 1954 and voted six to
one to endorse a proposal by Chairman D. Edward Hudgins “committing Greensboro to
implement the Supreme Court desegregation edict.” Greensboro school superintendent
Benjamin Smith agreed with Hudgins. ‘“It is unthinkable,’ he said, ‘that we will try to abrogate
the laws of the United States of America.’ Any effort to evade the decision, Smith declared,
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would be a disaster to the country and signify the end of democracy.” 32 On 19 May the city’s
largest paper applauded the school board’s decision to come to terms with the Supreme Court
mandate. Sensing how the world had, indeed, been irrevocably altered, the Daily News
editorialized, ‘“how one felt or what one did about segregation before Monday . . . has become
relatively academic now. Segregation has been ruled out and the responsibility now is to
readjust to the reality with a minimum of friction, disruption, and setback to the school
system.’” 33 These examples are significant in underscoring the fact that public opinion among
southern whites had not completely hardened against the Brown decision in the middle of 1954
the way that it eventually would by 1957.
African Americans’ reactions to Brown were just as varied as among whites, but along a
slightly different track. Most African American newspapers were jubilant about the decision as
were men and women on the street, believing that it did nothing less than signal a new era in
American race relations. Kenneth Clark wrote that Brown confirmed the continued existence of
“the American Dream.” For Clark—and other racial liberals—Brown validated their desire to
continue working through “the system” in order to reform it. Responding to the decision, Clark
declared that “[t]he Court in these decisions proclaimed to a sceptical [sic] world that the
American dream could be a reality and that in America human beings were not required to fight
for justice by self-defeating force, hatred, and bloodshed.” 34
In some corners of black America, however, commentators expressed concerns about the
implications of Brown. Black intellectuals were posing tough and important questions—and in
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some cases, offering answers—about larger issues such as the continued necessity of African
American-run institutions and whether or not racial integration was a laudable social goal. The
fact is that there were several different perspectives on these issues, reflecting ideological
viewpoints that had existed historically among African Americans.
Conservative anthropologist and writer, Zora Neale Hurston, bristled at what she
interpreted as an insult hurled at black schoolteachers and administrators who, she argued, were
pouring their heart and soul into their students, were succeeding at improving the quality of
education for black youth, and were creating a more healthful environment for their students than
would be common at white schools. “Negro schools in [Florida were] in very good shape and on
the improve,” according to her. 35 Blacks did not need to force their way into places where they
were not wanted, and simply sitting in classrooms with white children would do nothing to
improve the educational experience for black youths. “If there [were] not adequate schools in
Florida, and there is . . . some inherent and unchanging quality in white schools, impossible to
duplicate anywhere else, then I am the first to insist Negro children of Florida be allowed to
share this boon. But if there are adequate Negro schools and prepared instructors and
instructions, then there is nothing different except the presence of white people.” 36 To believe
that African Americans needed to attend school with whites to receive a quality education was to
reify white intellectual superiority and work from a model of black deficit as far as Hurston was
concerned. “Both Hurston and W. E. B. Du Bois saw the negative views of black culture in the
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liberal assimilationism driving the NAACP legal assault against Jim Crow as wrong-headed and
dangerous.” 37
George Schuyler, a friend of Hurston’s, fellow member of the conservative American
Writers Association after the war, and journalist for the Pittsburgh Courier newspaper, initially
praised the Brown decision in the Courier. Within a year, however, he was already calling
desegregation a failure in much of the South and criticizing the tactics of most civil rights
leaders. 38 This was evidence of Schuyler’s hardening conservatism after the Second World War
and his increasing hostility toward the liberal-led civil rights movement. Schuyler agreed with
Hurston that it made no difference whether schools were comprised of all white students or all
black students as long as it had a good curriculum. 39 In Hurston’s and Schuyler’s emphasis on
what one might call “the fallacy of proximity” argument, however, they did not adequately
address the current, and continued, disparity between black and white schools.
Hurston’s and Schuyler’s contention misrepresented the claims of racial liberals like
Kenneth Clark—and leftists such as Brooklyn Presbyterian minister Milton A. Galamison—who
argued that racially segregated schools were inherently inferior on two other grounds. Clark
repeatedly argued that segregated schools placed a stigma on black children that distorted the
personality development of both black and white children. Black children, according to Clark,
learned to internalize messages of inferiority, while white children developed an over inflated
sense of self-importance and skewed conception of fairness. 40 Galamison argued that black
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children needed to be in classes with white children because those schools were better funded
and equipped, staffed with more experienced teachers, and prepared to offer more challenging
and diverse curricula. 41 Clark invoked an important racial liberal principle by asserting that the
destinies of blacks and whites were inseparably linked. Galamison combined his belief that
public schools in New York needed to be integrated because to deny integrated education was
anti-democratic with more pragmatic concerns that responded to conditions as they were, not as
he believed they should be. 42 Galamison’s argument directly responded to the conservative
position that integrated schools were not essential because black and white schools were rapidly
being equalized, and the argument that civil rights leaders were only concerned with the physical
proximity of black and white children to the exclusion of other educational factors.
The questions that the Brown decision raised for black intellectuals were larger than that
of the physical proximity of black and white children. Everyone understood that the implications
of the decision reflected shifts in the balance of power between the federal government and the
states, the course of the wider black freedom struggle, and the efficacy of racial integration as a
social goal. Black activists and intellectuals, whether liberal, conservative, nationalist, or leftist
viewed Brown and the broader civil rights struggle through their particular ideological prism.
This caused them to devise different strategies in order to achieve black equality. As a result,
black intellectual thought existed along a spectrum as brilliantly complex as the colors of a
rainbow. There was no singular way of viewing the issues raised by Brown.
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Zora Neale Hurston, for example, did not only consider the issue of whether or not it
mattered if public schools were racially segregated. Hurston’s argument against the Brown
decision was also couched within a larger conservative argument about the encroachment of the
federal government into the daily lives of Americans. While liberals such as Kenneth Clark and
socialists such as A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin were lobbying for greater federal
involvement on behalf of civil rights, Hurston believed that the effort to force southern schools to
desegregate was not just about schools or desegregation. Rather, it was “to keep [the South]
busy while more ominous things were brought to pass;” that being government by decree. 43 By
1960, George Schuyler did not believe that the Brown cases should have been argued in front of
the Supreme Court at all. 44
Schuyler went even further to argue that Brown was in many ways a step backward,
because indirect approaches to the “Negro problem” had been more successful up until that
point. He favored continuing to pursue the more gradual approach of working within the bounds
supplied by Plessy because he believed that the South was making genuine efforts to equalize
educational facilities after the 1952 Supreme Court decision requiring the state of Kansas to
appear before the Court and defend its statute to permit segregation at the elementary level.
Schuyler argued that the region needed to be given sufficient time to actually provide equal
educational facilities. 45
Rather than view the issues presented in the Brown case—addressing nearly a century of
inadequate educational opportunities and unequal educational facilities—from the perspective of

43

Hurston, “Court Order Can’t Make the Races Mix,” in Martin, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education, 211.
“Reminiscences of George S. Schuyler,” (1962), 624, in the Oral History Research Office Collection of the
Columbia University Libraries (OHRO/CUL).
45
US Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 344, US 141 (1952); “Reminiscences of
George S. Schuyler,” (1962), 621-622, 626, in the Oral History Research Office Collection of the Columbia
University Libraries (OHRO/CUL).
44

116

those who had been consistently denied their Constitutional rights for too long, Schuyler
empathized with southern whites whose way of life would be radically altered once black and
white children attended the same schools. Schuyler maintained that progress would be
determined by what people would accept, and the Brown decision only served to put people on
the defensive and alarm them. Schuyler argued that African Americans needed to take a “longer
view” on these issues and accept that there were legitimate reasons why whites were resistant to
integrated education. He was an advocate of the segregationist argument that blacks were still
not adequately prepared to interact with whites as equals. As he put it, “In my opinion,
considering the role of the Negro in the United States, I think the first prerequisite is education
and acculturation, so that whatever gap there is between Negro and white population will be
reduced.” 46
Schuyler’s argument about the cultural gap between blacks and whites reflected both his
bias against southern blacks, which had been learned at an early age from his mother and
grandmother and remained with him his entire life, and his “characteristic lifetime ambivalence
about African Americans.” 47 As biographer Oscar R. Williams explained, “[a]lthough
[Schuyler] would speak out against racial prejudice and praise individual African Americans, he
harbored a longtime disdain for the majority, many of whom were poor, southern, and had
suffered under Jim Crow laws.” 48
Schuyler’s position on school integration is also reminiscent of Booker T. Washington’s
justification of withholding political rights from African Americans by white southerners during
the 1890s. Washington, like Schuyler, argued that blacks would not gain their political rights
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“through outside or artificial forcing, but will be accorded to the Negro by the Southern white
people themselves, and that they will protect him in the exercise of those rights.” 49 Black rights
were to be granted by whites when they deemed African Americans worthy of exercising them.
Like Schuyler, Washington looked at the problems of interracial relations as a function of a
literal difference in the levels of cultural and intellectual evolution. Until this gap was
significantly closed—and Washington did not venture a timetable for how long this process
would take—whites were justified in permitting blacks only a nominal citizenship.
Washington, at the dawn of the twentieth century, and Schuyler now at the midpoint of
the twentieth century were both challenging the racial liberal assumption that racial integration
was a laudable social goal to be pursued. Not all black intellectuals believed this to be the case,
and definitely not on the same terms or timetables that racial liberals proposed.
While black conservative intellectuals were opposed to the Brown decision, they were not
necessarily against racial integration in principle. Rather, they wanted the process to occur
without social disruption. Schuyler was deeply concerned with white reaction to African
American demands for equality. He believed that non-confrontational tactics which focused on
educating whites about racial prejudice at the grassroots were more effective than the methods of
the NAACP. According to him, these were only about “battling against what the whites have
done all the time . . .” 50 Washington had expressed the same sentiment: “I early learned that it is
a hard matter to convert an individual by abusing him, and that this is more often accomplished
by giving credit for all the praiseworthy actions performed than by calling attention alone to all
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the evil done.” 51 To Schuyler, the NAACP’s narrow definition of “advancement”—advocating
federal legislation and prosecuting white misdeeds—did more harm for the movement than good.
Conservatives, therefore, disagreed with racial liberals about the goal of integration in
some instances, such as public school integration, and at other times disagreed about the desired
pace as well as the methods to be used to achieve integration. These different views were the
result of ideological differences about the nature of difference between blacks and whites.
Racial liberals saw blacks and whites as essentially the same; sharing the same “American”
values and philosophical values as articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the US
Constitution. A common humanity and American birthright entitled African Americans to the
same citizenship rights as white Americans immediately. Conservatives, by contrast, placed
more emphasis on differences in behavioral patterns or familial structures between blacks and
whites to argue that the “gaps” between the races could not yet be bridged; it would take longer
and blacks simply needed to be patient.
These two positions on integration and reactions to the Brown decision were not the only
ones among African Americans. The Nation of Islam (NOI), the black nationalist religious
organization that Malcolm X became the national spokesman for, also opposed the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown. The reason for their opposition, however, was not that they believed
blacks were unprepared for the responsibilities of American citizenship. Malcolm and the
Nation were hostile to racial integration in both theory and practice. Elijah Muhammad preached
that whites were pushing for integration in order to keep blacks from finding true salvation in
Allah. 52 To Elijah Muhammad, leader of the NOI, the Brown decision was merely another
example of white “tricknology” to keep blacks willing to operate within societal structures that
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continued to oppress them. 53 Muhammad, and his chief disciple, Malcolm X, taught followers
that whites were “devils” who had no intention of genuinely integrating with African
Americans. 54
The Nation of Islam’s and Malcolm X’s hostility to racial integration reflected both the
disaffection of northern urban blacks who had been forced to endure the slings and arrows of
racial discrimination far too often and a belief that the current political and economic system
could never be transformed to benefit blacks. Since the 1930s the NOI had encouraged its
members to disavow formal politics because the American economy and government were
doomed to destroy themselves. Muhammad referred to America as the “modern Babylon,” a
reference to the ancient kingdom that collapsed as a result of its sinful decadence. He declared
that “America is falling; she is a habitation of devils and every uncleanness and hateful people of
the righteous.” He urged that blacks “[f]orsake her and fly to your own before it is too late.” 55
The Nation of Islam advocated racial, economic, and political separatism for black Americans. 56
Founded in its initial form in the fall of 1932, the Nation of Islam incorporated many of
the tenets of black nationalism into its version of Islam. 57 The Nation’s social, political, and
economic objectives hearken back to the Garvey movement of the 1920s. 58 Both Garvey, and
later the Nation of Islam, advanced the notion that blacks need not assimilate into the larger
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American society or integrate with whites. Much as white bigots would argue, for blacks to
integrate with whites in any way would lead to the degeneration of the black race and ultimately
work to keep blacks in an oppressed status in American society. Blacks and whites attending
school together would lead to other types of social interaction that they feared would lead to
interracial sexual relations.
The Brown v. Board decision produced various responses from African American leaders
in the days, weeks, months, and years after it was handed down. Rather than being monolithic,
African American intellectuals’ reaction to the Court’s mandate differed and their thought also
differed substantively about the larger social and ideological implications of the ruling. While
racial liberals and socialists generally supported the decision, and racial integration generally,
nationalists and conservatives opposed the ruling, although for different reasons. Conservatives
were not necessarily against the principle of integration, but were definitely critical of the
methods by which liberal leaders were agitating for it. But now that Brown was law, those who
favored the ruling were determined to see it implemented across the country. The ideological
differences between liberals and leftists helped to determine that they would pursue different
approaches toward achieving this end.

Desegregating and Integrating New York City’s Public Schools

Segregation in public education on the basis of race had been illegal in New York City
since the turn of the twentieth century. Therefore, in New York City, just as in most other
northern urban areas, eradicating legalized racial segregation of public schools was not the focus
of agitation among African American activists and intellectuals. Yet, in New York City, as in
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other comparable northern cities, racial segregation existed in the schools and so Brown did
affect northern school boards and city officials. Parents and intellectuals pressured the Board of
Education and the mayor to work affirmatively toward integrating New York City’s public
schools.
Dr. Kenneth Clark had been complaining to the Board of Education before May 1954 that
by maintaining a segregated school system they were failing to fulfill their obligation of
providing equal educational opportunities to all of the children of New York City. His desire to
destroy segregation extended back to his time at Howard University, a historically black college
in the District of Columbia. Clark, who had grown up in New York City since age six and
attended public schools, decided to go to Howard because blacks were in control
administratively, in the classrooms, and within the student body.
Clark became editor of the school newspaper, the Hilltop, and engaged in protest
activities against segregation in Washington. Clark organized a group of twenty students to go
into the area of Capitol building and protest the racially segregated eating establishments. The
“Capitol Hill Twenty,” as they became known, were arrested and taken to jail, prepared to stay
the night or longer for their cause. University president Modecai Johnson, however, had their
names removed from the police record and they were released on bail into his custody only hours
later. Clark and his fellow students risked expulsion, but expressing their displeasure was more
important to them. Clark and the other protesters were spared suspensions, but this was due only
to the efforts of supportive radical professors such as Ralph Bunche, who taught political science
there during the 1920s and 1930s. 59
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Clark learned a great deal outside the classroom while at Howard from his protests and
arrest, but also inside the classroom from militant professors like Bunche. In the 1930s, Bunche
was a leftist scholar who advocated a complete overhaul of American capitalism. He had no
confidence in the NAACP’s liberal approach of seeking redress through the courts and its focus
on achieving political and social equality. As far as Bunche was concerned, realizing true
equality by working within governmental institutions was impossible. “The inherent fallacy of
this belief rests in the failure to appreciate the fact that the instruments of the state are merely
reflections of the political and economic ideology of the dominant group, that the political arm of
the state cannot be divorced from its prevailing economic structure, whose servant it must
inevitably be.” 60
Clark undoubtedly thought about Bunche’s words very deeply as he worked to develop
his own worldview in college and as an adult. As he established his own academic career,
earning his Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia University and then becoming the first African
American professor to receive tenure at the City College of New York after joining the faculty in
1942, Clark came to a different conclusion about the efficacy of working within liberaldemocratic institutions. He participated in organizations that were autonomous of government
agencies in his quest to destroy segregated educational institutions, but he also believed that he
could be highly effective at destroying segregation from the inside. Clark and other racial
liberals—like the NAACP lawyers—went a step further than believing that the legal system or
the basic structures of government could be used for good. Rather, these structures were
inherently good and had been corrupted by people who did not believe in the real American
creed. Hence, when Clark had the opportunity to work within governmental bodies or pursue
justice through legislative channels, he did so willingly. Other intellectuals would not be so keen
60
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on becoming enmeshed in officially sponsored activities or organizations, believing that to do so
would lessen their ability to be a voice for substantive change.
In the months before the Supreme Court decision Clark spoke at an Urban League
symposium and at the “Children Apart” conference sponsored by the Intergroup Committee on
New York’s Public Schools (IC). The Intergroup Committee had been founded during the first
half of 1953. It was an umbrella organization representing groups that worked for the welfare of
New York City’s children. The IC had three main objectives: to educate the public about the
conditions and standards of the public schools, to get the Board of Education to commit to an
“objective and systematic study of the effects of de facto segregated schools in New York City
upon the development and educational achievement of children,” and to get the Board to both
issue a policy statement and initiate affirmative action to demonstrate that segregated education
would not continue in the city. 61
Both in front of the Urban League of Greater New York and at the IC conference Clark
accused the New York City Board of Education of operating a racially segregated school system
that provided inferior educations to its African American and Puerto Rican charges. Although
Clark’s statements spurred fierce defenses of Board actions from Board of Education members,
he did not relent in his attacks on New York City’s policies after the Brown decision. Clark
made his allegations and presented his evidence publicly over the city’s radio waves and in the
newspapers. In the months after May 17 he uncovered evidence that the Board was allowing
white parents to circumvent its own neighborhood school policy by busing white children a mile
61
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away from their homes so that they would not have to attend the predominantly black elementary
schools that were within walking distance. 62 The neighborhood school policy operated from the
assumption that it was desirable to have children attend the schools closest to their homes,
especially in the lower grades, because they would be in surroundings and around people they
were familiar with. 63 The Board of Education would use this argument at different times in
order to shoot down proposals that would increase racial integration in New York City’s schools.
So to find out that the Board was facilitating the evasion of its own beloved policy in order to
foster segregation was a particularly damning discovery.
In light of Clark’s bombshell, the Board of Education said it would address the situation
the following year. To demonstrate that it believed in integrated schools, the Board contracted
the Public Education Association (PEA) to perform its own independent study of the school
system in June of 1954 and submit its findings and recommendations to the Board the following
year. In December 1954 the Board also established its own Commission on Integration (CI) with
a policy statement firmly placing the New York City Board on the side of the Supreme Court
decision and committing the Board to actively promoting racially integrated schools.
We interpret the May 17th decision of the United States Supreme Court as a legal
and moral reaffirmation of our fundamental educational principles. We recognize it . . .
as a challenge to Boards throughout the nation, in Northern as well as Southern
communities, to re-examine the racial composition of the schools within their respective
systems in order to determine whether they conform to the standards stated clearly by that
Court.
The Supreme Court . . . reminds us that modern psychological knowledge
indicates clearly that segregated, racially homogeneous schools damage the personality of
minority group children. These schools decrease their motivation and thus impair their
ability to learn. White children are damaged too.
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Public education in a racially homogeneous setting is socially unrealistic and
blocks the attainment of the goals of democratic education, whether this segregation
occurs by law or by fact. In seeking to provide effective democratic education for all the
children of this city, the members of the Board of Education . . . are faced with many real
obstacles in the form of complex social and community problems. . . . [T]he board is
determined to accept the challenge implicit in the language and spirit of the decision. We
will seek a solution to these problems and take action with dispatch, implementing the
recommendations resulting from a systematic and objective study of the problem here
presented. 64
It is perhaps ironic that the Board was accepting the argument of one of its toughest critics,
Kenneth Clark, as the basis for its moral compulsion to achieve integrated schools. When asked,
Clark agreed to serve on the CI, which included leaders of various parental, civil rights, civic,
and educational organizations around the city. The thirty-seven members of the CI were charged
with examining all aspects of the New York City school system and to provide recommendations
to improve the schools. Ella Baker, the leftist activist of the New York City NAACP would also
be a member of the diverse coalition. Once the Commission officially began its work in April
1955, it divided itself into seven sub-commissions; each one taking a specific aspect of the
school system, studying it in depth and then coming back to the Board with its recommendations.
Participating on the Commission on Integration fit within Clark’s racial liberal
framework because he believed that working through the Board of Education would be the most
effective way to achieve the goal of integrated schools. Racial liberals believed in working from
within established democratic organizations and systems. For Clark, this was an imperative. He
argued, “[p]ast gains have indicated that that it is possible for a stigmatized minority group to
improve its status significantly within the flexibility of the American system of government.
One of the important realities which must be taken into account, in appraising the chances of
success of Negroes in his struggles against racial segregation, is the power of American
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democratic ideals and traditions.” 65 Clark not only pointed to his belief in the “flexibility” of
American institutions and the endurance of the American creed as arguments for working within
governmental agencies. In the same article he argued that whatever improvements African
Americans saw in their status since the end of the Second World War “ha[d] come about as a
consequence of legislation, litigation, or executive decree.” 66 Clark believed he would have the
opportunity to directly shape Board policy by serving on the CI, so he was initially optimistic
about the prospect of remedying the state of segregated education in New York. He trusted the
Board’s stated commitment to the success of the CI and its own policy statement.
Clark chaired the sub-commission on Educational Standards and Curriculum. When it
issued its report to the Board of Education in the summer of 1956, the sub-commission
concluded that there were disparities in the achievement levels between predominantly minority
and predominantly white schools; and that the gap in achievement levels between black, Puerto
Rican and white students actually widened the longer black and Puerto Rican children remained
in the system. To Clark and the other members of the sub-commission, this pointed to another
fundamental problem in the school system: inequalities in educational standards and
philosophies toward teaching students of color that were, at their core, racist. Clark’s subcommission called for the Board to make “intellectually gifted” classes available throughout the
city, do more to standardize the curriculum citywide, and equalize the number of certified,
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experienced teachers in all schools. 67 The Board approved the report of the Educational
Standards and Curriculum sub-commission, as it did with all of the sub-commission reports.
The various sub-commissions, in most cases, affirmed what the Public Education
Association concluded when it released its report in the late fall of 1955. Besides determining
that over seventy percent of the city’s public schools were segregated—meaning that they were
comprised of populations that were either ninety percent or more white or ninety percent or more
black and Puerto Rican—the PEA study produced five other significant findings. When
compared to mostly white schools the schools that were predominantly black and Puerto Rican
tended to: 1) be located in older buildings with less than satisfactory floor and playground
spaces; 2) have fewer tenured faculty members, a higher proportion of probationary teachers, and
higher teacher turnover rates; 3) offer more “classes for retarded children” and “fewer classes for
bright children;” 4) have lower standardized test scores; and 5) have larger average class sizes
for their mainstreamed students. 68 All signs indicated that African American and Puerto Rican
youth were being deprived of adequate educations by the New York City school system. Clark
continued to prod the Board of Education to work toward racial integration as a part of the
Commission on Integration until it was dissolved in 1960. He would be disappointed by the
Board’s unwillingness to implement the CI’s proposals on more than one occasion during the
Commission’s six-year existence.
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Another of the most prominent leaders in the struggle to integrate New York City’s
public schools, Milton A. Galamison, preferred to be independent of the Board of Education and
governmental institutions entirely, in his attempts to influence school policies. Unlike Clark, the
model racial liberal who believed it possible to effect change from within, Galamison, a leftist,
did not trust the Board of Education or politicians generally. Therefore, he did not want to be
censored in terms of his rhetoric or tactics for achieving racially integrated schools.
Galamison was the pastor at Siloam Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn’s BedfordStuyvesant neighborhood; the borough’s largest African American Presbyterian church in the
borough’s largest African American community. Bedford-Stuyvesant’s black population had
been growing for several decades by the 1950s, but had really increased rapidly during World
War II as blacks continued to migrate to New York from the rural South and found extreme
overcrowding in Harlem. Between 1940 and 1960 Brooklyn’s African American population
more than tripled from 107,263 to 371,405. 69 Galamison had become Siloam’s pastor in 1948
and quickly made it clear to his largely middle-class congregation that he was a sociallyconscious minister, unafraid to get involved in civil rights causes. He taught his congregants that
acting humanely toward all people and fighting against injustice were obligations of true
Christians and, therefore, he expected his flock to feel and act in a similar manner. 70
Soon after being installed at Siloam, Galamison used the television and radio airwaves to
spread his messages of Christian kindness and social justice to a broader audience than just his
congregation. During the late 1940s Galamison made several appearances on a local church
program Dumont Morning Chapel, and by the early 1950s he was appearing on another local
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radio program Radio Chapel. Galamison was also contributing to the New York Amsterdam
News by the early 1950s. It is significant that Galamison, a black minister, had the opportunity to
frequently appear on radio programs and in newspapers to reach wider audiences. His messages
in this period were not overtly political, but they provided much more exposure for him and his
church. 71
Galamison always demonstrated through his working relationships that he was willing to
collaborate with anyone whom he believed was on the right side of a cause he supported. Even
in an era of anti-communist hysteria, Galamison was willing to work with people who had been
accused of, or who had actually been members of the Communist Party. He refused to be cowed
by the tactics of red-baiters who sought to isolate activists and vet social protest movements by
hanging the tags of communism or subversion on them. Galamison could work with communists
without being a member of the Communist Party himself. 72 He combined beliefs in social
justice and economic equalitarianism, with the principles of Christian brotherhood and an allinclusive human family. 73
While Galamison’s willingness to work with all parties fighting for justice was
admirable, it would eventually make it difficult for Galamison to function within the liberal
NAACP. Galamison became a member of the Brooklyn NAACP in the mid-1950s and was
elected chair of the NAACP Schools Workshop in December of 1955. Galamison, along with
fellow branch members Annie Stein, Claire Cumberbatch, and Winston Craig organized the
NAACP Schools Workshop, a group that worked through existing parent and teacher
organizations to educate parents about the issues concerning Brooklyn schools. As director,
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Galamison would take a more confrontational and grassroots tack toward pursuing school
integration than many within the branch and the national NAACP were comfortable with.
Galamison’s approach of challenging the policies and leadership of the New York City
Board of Education through dramatic public statements and attempts at mass action would strain
his relationship with the NAACP. The national NAACP had built its reputation as a result of its
legal victories for civil rights and was no fan of mass action techniques for several reasons. For
one thing, mass actions were more difficult to control than legal fights. For the national
leadership of the NAACP, the masses were thought of as a very sharp double-edged sword. On
the one hand, it was important for the organization to increase its membership so that it could
fund its initiatives and lay claim to representing the interests of as large a segment of the African
American population as possible. On the other hand, the NAACP sought to negotiate with white
leaders and was willing to accept more moderate gains in exchange for continued access to the
halls of power, rather than lose its authority as the spokes-organization for black America.
Racial liberal leaders and their organizations did not evince a significant active role for
the masses. In part, this is a reflection of one of the ideas that heavily influenced the direction of
racial liberalism in the twentieth century: W. E. B. Du Bois’ notion of The Talented Tenth. Du
Bois argued that there was perhaps ten percent of the African American population that was well
enough educated and materially able to lead the masses. These people were obligated to form
the vanguard that would lift the remaining ninety percent out of the ditch of ignorance and
poverty into the blue sky of intelligence and equality. The notion of the Talented Tenth both
illustrates the belief that those with status are somehow inherently more fit to lead and that
people of lower status—whether educationally or materially—cannot adequately comprehend the
depth of their own oppression or mobilize themselves to fight it. The underlying principles of
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the Talented Tenth guided the strategies of the NAACP since its inception and racial liberal
ideology more generally.
Kenneth Clark articulated some of the critiques and concerns about the long-term
viability of mass action techniques in 1958 when discussing Martin Luther King Jr.’s rise to
prominence after the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 and 1956. As he put it, “[a]n objective
appraisal of the effectiveness of King’s ideology would have to recognize the fact that in spite of
the successful boycott the actual desegregation of the buses of Montgomery was determined by a
decision of the US Supreme Court. Furthermore the philosophy of ‘love for the oppressor’ has
not resulted in the desegregation of the public schools in Montgomery, Alabama.” 74 Clark
contended that while mass action had some limited use, it had to be conceded that the important
actions—the “real” power—still resided in the formal institutions of political authority.
Clark also expressed concerned about whether the masses could carry out a nonviolent
philosophy of loving one’s oppressor over a long period of time. He maintained that “[t]here are
further serious questions concerning the psychological implications and consequences of a
strategy based upon the capacity of an oppressed group to love—in the literal meaning of the
term—their oppressors. This might be possible of a few highly developed and philosophically
sophisticated individuals, but it is questionable whether it is realistic for large masses of
individuals.” 75 Clark pointed up a class divide based on educational attainment that, to him,
made mass action not only of limited effectiveness in changing public policy, but also potentially
harmful to the participants themselves.
Racial liberals preferred strategies in which they could express grievances through
established institutions, build and maintain political and economic alliances with the wealthy and
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powerful, and retain favor in the court of public opinion. As a result, racial liberal organizations
such as the NAACP and the National Urban League (NUL) and preeminent racial liberals such
as Kenneth Clark employed tactics that would not alienate those with substantial formal political
and economic power. Rarely during the 1950s, did the NAACP or NUL participate in, much less
initiate, mass action protests. 76 More often, they might contribute financially but not in a more
public way.
The national NAACP’s hesitance or unwillingness to engage in more direct action or
mass action protest sometimes caused friction between the national office and local branches that
in certain cases wanted a more militant tack on civil rights. The Brooklyn branch of the NAACP
provides an example of the increasing conflict between locals and the national office during the
second half of the 1950s. It shows why, in the case of Milton A. Galamison and other leftists, it
became extremely difficult for them to remain within the NAACP.
Galamison and the other militant members of the Brooklyn branch began the NAACP
Schools Workshop in 1955 as a vehicle for black, Latino, and white parents in BedfordStuyvesant and other parts of Brooklyn to express their unhappiness with the policies of the
Board of Education. The membership of the Schools Workshop exercised power by writing
letters to school officials criticizing the Board’s actions, but also by selecting the people who
would negotiate with city officials. 77 Galamison was also willing to mobilize the members to hit
the streets in order to protest the continued segregation and unequal learning conditions in
predominantly black and Latino schools.
In the three years after Brown, Milton Galamison and the parents of the NAACP Schools
Workshop became increasingly frustrated with what they considered to be the bad faith dealing
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of the Superintendent of Schools, William Jansen, and the New York City Board of Education.
Since it had begun its investigations in April of 1955, the Commission on Integration had
submitted several reports about different aspects of the public school system to the Board of
Education throughout 1956. The Board had approved of all of the reports brought to them—
more or less enthusiastically—, had implemented a couple of policies, and issued press releases
stating their commitment to desegregation. Yet, when Galamison and the NAACP Schools
Workshop challenged the Board to actively work to integrate Junior High School 258 (JHS 258)
in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the Board balked.
Galamison and the parents of the Schools Workshop saw the integration of JHS 258 as
essential to demonstrating the Board of Education’s commitment to racial integration. The
Board had pledged to make JHS 258 an integrated school when it opened in 1955, but as of
November 1956 only between 12 and 15 out of nearly 1,100 students were white. 78 When
pressed on the issue, Jansen maintained that some progress had been made toward integration,
but massive racial integration would be virtually impossible because JHS 258 was located in the
heart of Bedford-Stuyvesant, an overwhelmingly black neighborhood. 79 It was only in the
“fringe” areas where there were racially mixed residential patterns or where the communities of
varied ethnic groups merged, that Board leaders believed the most substantive integration could
take place. Galamison issued a statement saying he did not believe that JHS 258 was in the heart
of Bedford-Stuyvesant and that any statements Jansen or the Board made about progress toward
integrating JHS 258 were “inadequate and misleading.” 80

78

Ibid., 63.
“NAACP Rebukes City Board for All-Negro Brooklyn School,” New York Times, 2 November 1956. Box 1,
Folder 7, “Superintendent of Schools, William Jansen, Subject Files: Racial Discrimination,” Series 456, Board of
Education Papers, Special Collections, Milbank Memorial Library, Teachers College, Columbia University, New
York. Will be referred to subsequently as the “Jansen Files on Racial Discrimination.”
80
Ibid.
79

134

It turned out that the Board had made different promises to various constituencies. While
Superintendent Jansen told civil rights groups that the Board would actively work to integrate
JHS 258,81 he also worked to assuage white parents’ fears by assuring them no “radical’ changes
would occur within the system. Ultimately, rather than actively work to integrate JHS 258,
Jansen pledged to provide the school with additional services. 82
This apparent evasion of the Board’s initial pledge fueled Galamison’s already-existent
distrust of political figures and governmental agencies. In November of 1956 he took a very
bold step voicing the displeasure of the Schools Workshop parents and other more militant
members of the Brooklyn NAACP by going to Mayor Robert Wagner and demanding that he ask
for Jansen’s resignation. Galamison threatened that unless something was done to “clean up” the
situation at JHS 258, he had 25,000 African Americans ready to vote Republican in the next
election. 83
Sparks flew in several directions once the press picked up Galamison’s petition.
Galamison’s urging that Superintendent Jansen be asked to resign began a war of words in the
New York press. Galamison pointed to an apparent unwillingness to implement many of the
Commission of Integration’s recommendations. Jansen, however, continued to deny that he was
a segregationist and stood by the Board of Education’s policy of sending children to the schools
in closest proximity even if it hindered racial integration.
Besides the row in the press between Galamison and Jansen, Galamison’s November
letter ignited controversy within the Brooklyn NAACP and revealed significant differences
between the desired approaches to obtaining social equality of some of the local branches as
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opposed to the national headquarters. Galamison was elected president of the Brooklyn
NAACP in December of 1956. He believed, nevertheless, that major obstacles to launching a
direct grassroots assault on segregation in New York City’s schools came from his own branch.
Those within the Brooklyn NAACP who opposed Galamison contended that he had overstepped
his authority with his letter to the mayor and that he was too much a cowboy who made public
statements without going through the established channels. He ruffled the feathers of more
moderate members of the branch who preferred less combative modes of protest. 84 Complaints
about Galamison would only grow louder over the three years of his tenure.
Galamison’s letter upset Roy Wilkins and the national NAACP. The national
organization did not want to burn bridges with the Board of Education in New York, which it
contended was much more committed to NAACP goals than most school boards throughout the
South. By lumping the New York City Board in with southern boards, Wilkins argued that
Galamison’s action jeopardized the future of the school desegregation movement in New York
and nationwide. Wilkins strongly urged the Brooklyn branch to “adopt a less provocative
endeavor” going forward. 85
The discord between Wilkins and Galamison over the means to achieve desegregation
underscored ideological differences between racial liberals and many leftists that often made for
tense working relationships, if they could work together at all. In the case of communists,
affiliations with the American Communist Party often precluded any working relationship. In
1958 the New York branch of the NAACP denied membership to former Manhattan borough
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president, Ben Davis, because of his Communist Party affiliation. 86 For those who were
democratic socialists such as A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, or Galamison, they too
approached the struggle for black equality from a different vantage point, which could
complicate alliances with racial liberals.
The concept of the Talented Tenth justified the idea that a small group of leading men
and women (mostly men) should make the decisions by which “the race” would progress. One
consequence was hierarchical organizational structures in racial liberal organizations. By
contrast, Galamison organized mass actions with the NAACP Schools Workshop and was
willing to work with ordinary people who were committed to desegregating the city’s public
schools, even if they did not have the “credentials” desired by the national leadership. 87 This
difference in the conception of who could be a leader and means of the desired end of school
desegregation would make it extremely difficult for Galamison to remain a leading force within
the NAACP by the end of the decade. Ultimately, frustrated with the unwillingness of the
NAACP—both local and national—to take a more militant approach toward achieving school
desegregation, Galamison split with the NAACP in 1960 and formed an independent grassroots
organization along the same lines of the Schools Workshop. His group would be free to pursue
the mass action strategies and public confrontations that Galamison believed would force the
Board to take more affirmative actions to desegregate the public schools.

Dimming Optimism: The First Crisis of Racial Liberalism in this Era
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As stated previously, neither black nor white public opinion was monolithic in the
immediate days and months after the Brown decision in 1954. Many African Americans
regarded the decision as a signal that a progressive, racially integrated American future was just
offstage ready to assume its starring role in American life. There were also blacks who had
reservations and anxieties about the implications of the decision on black-owned institutions,
especially schools.
White Americans were also in no way a monolith in terms of their opinions and actions
regarding Brown. There were those few who hailed the courage of the Supreme Court justices
and hoped that the decision would usher in a more egalitarian racial order. A larger percentage
of whites were anxious about the repercussions of the ruling. They did not know exactly in what
ways their lives would change or how quickly, but they were willing—or were resigned—to
accept the Court’s decree and make the best of the new situation. And there was also a smaller,
but very vocal, percentage of hard-core racists who were willing to defy the Supreme Court in
order to maintain segregation.
The rabid segregationists were on the defensive by 1954. A. Philip Randolph stated that
black Americans were “steadily and substantially winning the fight for integration and a firstclass citizenship status in the vital, varied stages of life . . .” as he addressed a group of United
Nations delegates in 1954. 88 The intensity of African American agitation for civil rights had
increased since the end of World War II, even though black leaders found it more and more
difficult to operate in the cold war milieu.
Racial liberals and other African Americans who supported Brown wanted the
implementation of the decision to be swift and sweeping. Kenneth Clark, for example, posited
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wherever possible over the next two years that the desegregation of public schools needed to be
immediate, rather than gradual. 89 He argued, in fact, “there was no evidence that merely because
a longer time was taken to desegregate a given institution that this necessarily meant that it
would be more successful than desegregation which took a shorter time.” Clark continued, “it
was found that when the desegregation process was unnecessarily prolonged, that this not only
did not insure any greater effectiveness but was found to be associated with either prejudice,
conflict, indecision or some degree of hostility against desegregating.” 90 According to Clark,
gradualist proposals would only allow the forces of opposition towards desegregation time to
reconstitute themselves and delay change more effectively.
Clark’s argument about gradual desegregation was being proven correct in the three years
after Brown. In New York City, despite the Board of Education’s statement aligning itself with
the Supreme Court and the formation of the Commission on Integration, school integration was
proceeding at a snail’s pace, at best, and many argued the Board was failing to integrate the
schools at all. 91 The patience of black and Latino parents, as well as civil rights leaders was all
but gone, as the atmosphere of cautious optimism that still existed at the end of 1956 was
evaporating.
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By the end of 1956 white opposition to Brown had hardened to the point of crystallization
in much of the South. In Greensboro, North Carolina, the “ebullient optimism” of the immediate
post-Brown years “had been shattered” by 1957. The token integration that had taken place
came to represent more of a defeat than a victory as the support for compliance that existed three
years earlier was unable to triumph. 92 In 1956 the Mississippi state legislature passed a
resolution declaring the Brown decision ‘“invalid, unconstitutional, and of not lawful effect’” by
a vote of 136 to 0 while singing Dixie . . . literally. 93 And then, of course, there was Little Rock.
On 4 September 1957, Arkansas governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National
Guard to make sure that nine black students did not enroll at all-white Central High School. For
days mobs of white adults and students appeared each morning to make sure that the guardsmen
did their duty. Television and print media flocked to report on the “Little Rock crisis.” The
tension reached a frenzied pitch over the next few weeks as Faubus appeared contrite to
President Eisenhower one day and brazenly defiant the next. After allowing riotous whites to
run wild destroying the school and assaulting reporters by simply removing the Guard on 23 and
24 September, Eisenhower finally reached his breaking point. He treated the city of Little Rock
and the state of Arkansas as if it were in a state of insurrection and deployed one thousand riottrained soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division into Little Rock by nightfall. Finally, school
integration resumed the following morning without incident. 94
The violence in Little Rock, and persisting segregation in New York City and elsewhere,
demonstrated just how much more work would have to be done before not only school
desegregation was achieved, but also the broader struggle for equality would be won. Resistance
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forces had reorganized themselves in the three years since the Brown decision. And some black
leaders were much less certain by the end of the decade that the racial liberal approach was the
most efficacious.
A. Philip Randolph, for example, was not nearly as optimistic about the current state of
the “Civil Rights Revolution” (as he often called the black freedom struggle) or blacks’ resolve
to see the fight to a victorious end by the middle of 1958. In his address to the National Negro
Publishers Summit that May, he wondered aloud if African Americans still possessed “the will to
face the future with force and fortitude, without fear.” He believed he was witnessing “a
corrosive and deadening state of dejection, defeatism and despair; a sort of creeping paralysis of
faith in our cause and faith in ourselves” among blacks. 95 Randolph also expressed the view that
blacks had relied too heavily on white allies to prosecute the movement up until that point.
While white allies were necessary in the fight for social justice, Randolph maintained that blacks
needed to realize that they had to be the primary proponents of their own liberation. White
liberals could not “save” blacks, Randolph told his audience; black people had to save
themselves. 96 Randolph was not opposed to an interracial movement for justice, nor did his faith
in American liberal-democratic institutions waver, but it was clear to him that the movement did
need to go in a new direction and that new ideas were necessary if the movement was going to
make any more positive gains for African Americans. The movement would enter a new phase,
deal with new issues, and create new opportunities for advancement in the new decade.
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Chapter 4
Racial Liberals Work to Maintain Relevance

The Brown v. Board of Education decision appeared, for many, to mark the dawn of a
new day in America with regard to race relations. While there were varied reactions among
African Americans throughout the country, most considered the decision to be a high water mark
for the movement; a catalyst for the inevitable destruction of segregated public education, and
soon the entire Jim Crow social structure. The decision was also the culmination—the apogee—,
in many ways, of the NAACP’s legal strategy to dismantle segregated public education. After
the initial ruling was handed down in May of 1954, the organization immediately went to work
on figuring out how to present to the Supreme Court a plan for how to implement this decision
on a national scale. At the same time, however, forces that were opposed to the letter and spirit
of the Brown decision were hard at work trying to find ways to obviate the new law of the land.
Over the next several years, the opposition to desegregating public education became more
intense and increasingly institutionalized in the form of White Citizens’ Councils and the revival
of the Ku Klux Klan in the South, and the stubborn resistance of boards of education and local
school districts in the North.
While no black leaders expected the nation’s schools to be completely integrated over
night, they did expect that they would receive the backing of the federal governmental
infrastructure in compelling recalcitrant school districts to desegregate their public schools.
Actual desegregation, however, proceeded at a snail’s pace wherever it was occurring at all, and
the region of the country did not necessarily provide a definitive answer as to whether the school
system would desegregate voluntarily. Activists in New York City, for example, discovered that
although the Board of Education committed itself to desegregating its public schools,
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rhetorically, the Board was quite unwilling to implement policies that would produce racial
integration on a citywide scale.
Over the course of the remainder of the 1950s frustration mounted among activists who
were working to desegregate public schools with less and less tangible success. As a result, the
optimism that characterized the reaction to the initial Brown decision in 1954, and the moral and
ideological power enjoyed by the NAACP and other liberal activists, was fading by the end of
the decade. The NAACP, and racial liberals more generally, would search for ways to maintain
their sway over the direction of the civil rights movement as more militant and younger activists
who advocated more confrontational tactics were beginning to make their way to the forefront of
the civil rights struggle. 1 The alternative was to risk fading into irrelevance, a fate the NAACP
and other racial liberals believed catastrophic for the ultimate success of the movement.
The fight to maintain relevance manifested itself in several ways; in conflicts between
some local branches of the NAACP and the national leadership; in an effort by better established
liberal organizations to bring the more youthful independent organizations into their orbit; and in
an attempt by the NAACP to reinvent itself and its role within the civil rights movement during
the early 1960s in order to align itself more with the youthful, more militant direction the
movement appeared to be taking. As a result, by the middle of 1963 racial liberalism was clearly
in ascendance once again. In large part because racial liberals were compelled to refashion the
ideology in order to incorporate more militant attitudes within in. And the re-ascendance of
racial liberalism in 1963, cemented by the triumphs in Birmingham, Washington, D.C., and the
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proposal of the Civil Rights Bill to Congress, presented new increasingly confounding dilemmas
for racial liberals.

In New York City, the local branches of the NAACP were intimately involved in the
efforts to desegregate public schools after 1954. Leaders of the local braches, as well as
representatives from the national headquarters were in constant dialogue with the city’s Board of
Education. The Brooklyn branch of the NAACP, with Reverend Milton A. Galamison as the
head of its education department after December of 1955, enjoyed a particularly contentious
relationship with the Board. The ideological differences between Galamison and the Board
combined with mutual personal dislike to create explosive exchanges in the press between
Galamison and school Superintendents William Jansen, John Theobald, and Bernard Donovan
during the 1950s and 1960s. Galamsion’s willingness to mix-it-up with the Board also strained
his relationships within the NAACP, however. Even though he was elected president of the
Brooklyn NAACP in December of 1956, Galamison faced stiff resistance to his confrontational
tactics from more moderate members within the branch as well as from members of the national
leadership. 2
Galamison, along with fellow branch members Annie Stein, Claire Cumberbatch, and
Winston Craig organized the NAACP Schools Workshop, a group that worked through existing
parent and teacher organizations to educate parents about the issues concerning Brooklyn
schools. As director, Galamison would take a more confrontational and grassroots tack towards
pursuing school integration than many within the branch and the national NAACP were
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comfortable with. In October of 1956 Robert L. Carter, who had been a member of the NAACP
legal team that argued Brown, sent a memo to Gloster Current, the director of branches for the
national NAACP, that foreshadowed the potential for conflict between the national headquarters
and some of its local branches if the national organization continued to be unresponsive to the
requests of its branches.
In the memo, Carter relayed the idea that the Brooklyn NAACP desired to work with the
national headquarters in order to develop a citywide strategy for desegregating the public
schools. Galamison’s education committee suggested that the national headquarters hire a fulltime staff member to work with all of the New York branches in order to promote more
coordination between the branches and the national headquarters about how to compel the Board
of Education to implement its own policy statement. Carter told Current that the national
leadership needed to make greater coordination around the issue of school desegregation a higher
priority, and that if this could not be done, then the Brooklyn branch should be encouraged in its
efforts to deal with this issue on its own. 3 The Brooklyn NAACP was not simply waiting idly
for the national organization to make all of the decisions about how they should proceed in
battling this issue, however. Galamison and his allies were mobilizing.
His approach of challenging the policies and leadership of the New York City Board of
Education through dramatic public statements and attempts at mass action would make it
increasingly difficult from Galamison to remain in the NAACP, however. The national NAACP
had built its reputation as a result of its legal victories for civil rights and was no fan of mass
action techniques for several reasons. For one thing, mass actions were more difficult to control
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than legal fights. For the national leadership of the NAACP, “the masses” were thought of as a
very sharp double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was important for the organization to grow
its membership so that it could fund its initiatives and lay claim to representing the interests of as
large a segment of the African American population as possible. On the other hand, the NAACP
sought to negotiate with white leaders and was often willing to accept more moderate gains in
exchange for continued access to the halls of power, rather than lose its authority as the spokesorganization for black America.
Racial liberal leaders and their organizations did not evince a significant active role for
the masses. In part, this is a reflection of one of the ideas that heavily influenced the direction of
racial liberalism in the twentieth century—W. E. B. Du Bois’ notion of The Talented Tenth. Du
Bois articulated in his The Souls of Black Folk in 1903 that perhaps ten percent of the African
American population was well enough educated and materially able to lead the masses; and that
these people were obligated to form the vanguard of the race that would lift the remaining ninety
percent out of the grimy ditch of ignorance and poverty into the clear blue sky of intelligence and
equality. The notion of the Talented Tenth both illustrated the belief that those with status were
somehow inherently more fit to lead, and implied that people of lower status—whether
educationally or materially—could not adequately comprehend the depth of their own oppression
or be mobilized to fight against it themselves. The term was not in use anymore by midcentury,
but the underlying principles of the Talented Tenth concept guided the strategies of the NAACP
since its inception and racial liberals more generally into the 1960s.
Racial liberals preferred strategies in which they could express grievances through
established channels of power, build and maintain political and economic alliances with those in
powerful governmental positions, and retain favor in the court of public opinion as much as
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possible. As a result, racial liberal organizations such as the NAACP and the National Urban
League (NUL) and prominent racial liberals such as Kenneth Clark employed tactics that did not
threaten the perpetuation of liberal democratic institutions. Clark, although a staunch critic of
the New York City Board of Education, did agree to participate on the Board’s Commission on
Integration (CI) as an attempt to influence the direction of school policy “from the inside.” And
rarely did the NAACP or NUL participate in, much less initiate, mass action protests. 4
The national NAACP’s hesitance or unwillingness to engage in more direct action or
mass action protest sometimes caused friction between the national office and local branches that
in certain cases wanted a more militant tack on civil rights. The Brooklyn branch of the NAACP
provides an example of the increasing conflict between locals and the national office during the
second half of the 1950s. It shows why, in the case of Milton A. Galamison and other leftists, it
became extremely difficult for them to remain within the NAACP.

Galamison and several militant members of the Brooklyn branch began the NAACP
Schools Workshop as a vehicle for black, Latino, and white parents in Bedford-Stuyvesant and
other parts of Brooklyn to express their unhappiness with the policies of the New York City
Board of Education. The membership of the Schools Workshop exercised power by writing
letters to school officials criticizing the Board’s actions, by researching information about the
schools their children were attending, and also by selecting the people who would negotiate with
city officials. 5 Galamison was also willing to mobilize the membership to hit the streets in order
to protest the continued segregation and unequal learning conditions in predominantly black and
Latino schools.
4
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In the three years after Brown Milton Galamison and the parents of the NAACP Schools
Workshop became increasingly frustrated with what they considered to be the bad faith dealing
of the Superintendent of Schools, William Jansen, and the New York City Board of Education.
Since April of 1955, the Board’s own Commission on Integration had submitted several reports
about different aspects of the public school system throughout 1956. The Board had approved of
all of the reports; yet when Galamison and the Schools Workshop challenged the Board to
implement the Commission’s recommendations and actively work to integrate Junior High
School 258 (JHS 258) in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the Board balked.
Galamison and the parents of the Schools Workshop saw the integration of JHS 258 as
essential to demonstrating the Board of Education’s commitment to racial integration. The
Board had pledged to make JHS 258 an integrated school when it opened in 1955, but as of
November 1956 only between 12 and 15 out of nearly 1,100 students were white. 6 When
pressed on the issue, Jansen maintained that some progress had been made toward integration,
but massive integration racial integration would be virtually impossible because JHS 258 was
located in the heart of Bedford-Stuyvesant, an overwhelmingly black neighborhood. 7
It turned out that the Board had made different promises to various constituencies. While
Superintendent Jansen told civil rights groups that the Board would actively work to integrate
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JHS 258,8 he also worked to assuage white parents’ fears by assuring them no “radical’ changes
would occur within the system. Ultimately, rather than actively work to integrate JHS 258,
Jansen pledged to provide the school with additional services. 9
In November of 1956 Galamison took a very bold step voicing the displeasure of the
Schools Workshop parents and other more militant members of the Brooklyn NAACP by going
to Mayor Robert Wagner and requesting that he ask for Jansen’s resignation. Galamison
threatened that unless something was done to “clean up” the situation at JHS 258, he had 25,000
African Americans ready to vote Republican in the next election. 10
Sparks flew in several directions once the press picked up Galamison’s petition. 11
Galamison’s urging that Superintendent Jansen be asked to resign began a war of words in the
New York press. Galamison pointed to an apparent unwillingness to implement many of the
Commission of Integration’s recommendations to demonstrate Jansen’s unsuitability. Jansen,
however, continued to deny that he was a segregationist and stand by the Board of Education’s
policies of sending children to the schools in closest proximity even if it hindered racial
integration. In a letter to Galamison in November of 1956 Jansen sarcastically remarked that, “It
is important to remember that in calculating distances to a school building we must calculate
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them by measuring the distance that children have to walk and not distances as the crow flies.” 12
Jansen was expressing his belief that zoning to desegregate JHS 258 and the entire school
system, more generally, was unrealistic.
Besides the row in the press between Galamison and Jansen, Galamison’s November
letter ignited controversy within the Brooklyn NAACP and revealed significant differences
between the desired approaches to obtaining social equality of some of the local branches as
opposed to the national headquarters. Despite having been elected president of the Brooklyn
NAACP in December of 1956, he nevertheless believed that major obstacles to launching a
direct grassroots assault on segregation in New York City’s schools came from his own branch. 13
Those within the Brooklyn NAACP who opposed Galamison contended that he had overstepped
his authority with his letter to the mayor and that he was too much of a cowboy who made public
statements without going through the established channels. He ruffled the feathers of more
moderate members of the branch who preferred less combative modes of protest. 14 Complaints
about Galamison would only grow louder over the three years of his tenure.
But he was not the only activist who had attempted to move the national NAACP toward
a more militant stance and build a grassroots movement to challenge governmental power. Ella
Baker was also committed to this approach of producing societal change. 15 She eventually
decided to leave the organization in frustration over the NAACP’s hierarchical structure, its lack
12
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of grassroots mobilization, and its gradualist politics. 16 According to historian John D’Emilio,
Baker, along with Bayard Rustin and Stanley Levison, actively sought to dislodge the NAACP as
the predominant civil rights organization during the late 1950s. They believed in mass-action
strategies for building a social movement, while Wilkins and the NAACP did not. 17
Galamison’s letter about Superintendent Jansen upset Roy Wilkins and the national
NAACP. The blowback from Galamison’s action put the NAACP on the defensive. The
national organization responded with a press release stating that “any further action with regard
to Jantzen’s [sic] resignation would be a matter of concern of the Branch president, the Executive
Committee and National Office” in order to corral Galamison. At the November meeting of
New York’s local chapter presidents and education committee chairs, however, Winston Craig of
the Brooklyn branch placed blamed for the current troubles of the Brooklyn branch squarely on
the shoulders of the NAACP, saying that if the national headquarters had taken more decisive
and affirmative action nine months ago (presumably, when the national NAACP first got reports
about the lack of integration at JHS 258), the local branch would not have felt compelled to take
this step. 18 The meeting adjourned with resolutions to put more systematic protocols in place
with regard to making public statements and to make investigating public school segregation in
the city a higher priority of the NAACP, but the national organization would also make sure that
no more calls for the resignation of Board members would come from anyone representing the
NAACP. 19
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Wilkins and the national leadership bristled at Galamison’s approach because the national
organization did not want to burn bridges with the Board of Education, which it contended was
much more committed to NAACP goals than most school boards throughout the South. By
lumping the New York City Board in the same category of recalcitrance as southern boards,
Wilkins argued that Galamison’s action jeopardized the future of the school desegregation
movement nationwide. Wilkins did not want to do anything in New York that might harm the
desegregation movement in the South, where he believed progress was being made, and was
(implicitly) more critical. 20 The national organization wanted to protect its prerogatives with the
municipal leadership in the city. Wilkins strongly urged the Brooklyn branch to “adopt a less
provocative endeavor” going forward. 21
Wilkins also expressed the same sentiment to Constance Baker Motley, a lawyer for the
NAACP, in the spring of 1957 regarding the battle to desegregate the public schools throughout
New York State. In his memo to Motley, Wilkins commented that he did not want to see the
same mistakes repeated in other parts of the state that had been made in Brooklyn. Wilkins was
clearly referring to the media firestorm that Galamison had created with his public statements
about William Jansen. Wilkins praised the national NAACP’s “calm analysis and suggestion of
study and action” in response to the State Commissioner on Education’s report on the progress of
desegregation in New York. But he lamented that somewhere along the line the NAACP’s
position had been hijacked as some “engaged in tactics which have tended to alienate potential
allies.” He pledged not to tolerate the use of methods—like those in Brooklyn—that could be
20
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potentially injurious to the NAACP in the court of public opinion or fuel resentment in school
systems that had not yet complied with the Brown decision. 22
The discord between Wilkins and Galamison over the means to achieve desegregation
underscored ideological differences between racial liberals and many leftists that often made for
tense working relationships, if they could work together at all. In the case of communists,
affiliations with the American Communist Party (CPUSA) often precluded any working
relationship. In 1958 the New York branch of the NAACP denied membership to former
Manhattan borough president, Ben Davis, because of his Communist Party affiliation. 23
Galamison organized mass actions with the NAACP Schools Workshop and was willing
to work with ordinary people who were committed to desegregating the city’s public schools,
even if they did not have the “credentials” desired by the national leadership. Galamison found
that these parents could be effective leaders in their own right. 24 This difference in the
conception of who could be a leader and means to the desired end of school desegregation would
make it extremely difficult for Galamison to remain a leading force within the NAACP by the
end of the decade. Ultimately, frustrated with the unwillingness of the NAACP—both local and
national—to take a more militant approach toward achieving school desegregation, Galamison
split with the NAACP in 1960. He reached the conclusion that he and his allies “could do better
outside the NAACP than [they] could do inside the NAACP.” 25 Galamison formed an
independent grassroots organization along the same lines of the Schools Workshop, named the
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Parents Workshop for Equality in New York City Schools. His group would be free to pursue the
mass action strategies and engage in the public confrontations that Galamison believed would
force the Board to take more affirmative action to desegregate the public schools. 26

The year 1960 was a critical one for determining the continuing relevance of racial liberal
ideology. Not only did Galamison leave the NAACP, but also a new civil rights organization
emerged onto the civil rights scene in the South that would reflect the growing militancy of
younger activists coming of age in the South. Ella Baker played an instrumental role in helping
to establish the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the wake of college
student sit-ins across the South during the winter of 1960. Students-turned-activists wanted to
keep the momentum of the sit-in movement going as far into the future as they could take it.
And they saw themselves as both part of—and distinct from—from broader mainstream liberal
civil rights establishment. 27 Students such as Diane Nash and James Bevel may have admired
Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young, but they saw themselves as the
vanguard of the movement and were determined that their organization not be a mere carbon
copy of the NAACP, the Urban League, or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC). 28
Baker would help to ensure that SNCC would be different from its liberal counterparts.
She had worked for both the NAACP and SCLC, but had left both organizations over
disagreements about the structures and philosophies of both organizations. 29 As a field organizer
26
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for the NAACP from 1940 until 1946 Baker worked to convince the national leadership that it
was in the best interests of African Americans, generally, and the organization, in particular, to
make the policies and practices of the NAACP more inclusive and egalitarian. She advocated
that the organization be willing to take more confrontational stances in local campaigns. And
that was how Baker worked as she traveled the country recruiting members and trying to
establish new chapters. Baker worked to make sure that the new chapters she helped get up and
running would be sustainable once she departed. 30 Baker worked to cultivate local leaders so
they carry on their own struggle, rather than be dependent on the dictates from the national
headquarters.
Baker helped to imbue SNCC with the same philosophy that ordinary people were
capable of prosecuting their own movement for equality; that local residents did not need better
educated leaders or spokespeople to inform them of the depth of their oppression. For Baker, as
with Galamison and the students of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the masses
were central to their political vision for change. 31 Therefore, the goal of SNCC field workers
was to train local residents—regardless of their educational level—in the tactics and philosophy
of direct-action protests and voter registration, so that they could carry on their struggle for
equality once SNCC organizers were no longer in the community. 32
Consequently, Baker helped the student organizers create an organizational structure that
was less hierarchical and more decentralized than those of the NAACP and SCLC. 33 SNCC was,
therefore, a youthful, independent, response to the more established liberal civil rights
organizations. SNCC would receive monetary assistance from SCLC and the NAACP, but it
30
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would also strive to maintain its independence from the elder organizations. SNCC would grow
ideologically distinct from SCLC and the NAACP and it reflected itself tactically, structurally,
and in terms of the public face of the organization.
Tactically, SNCC focused primarily on local campaigns throughout the South to bring
about desegregation and register African Americans to vote. The NAACP also participated in
voter registration and supported local civil rights campaigns, but the NAACP was more focused
on cases that they hoped would have national implications. Structurally, although SNCC had a
Coordinating Committee that was charged with making organizational policy, SNCC’s field
workers exerted a great deal of control over the direction of policy in their organization; much
more than field workers exercised in either the NAACP or SCLC. 34 While the NAACP and
SCLC recruited new members and established new branches, SNCC was much more concerned
with cultivating indigenous leadership.
In terms of the public face of the organization, SNCC reflected youth and militancy. The
group’s leaders were in their twenties. SNCC identified itself as a “revolutionary” organization.
As Clayborne Carson argues, this was not to advocate the overthrow of the federal government,
but rather meant as a challenge to both segregationists and more moderate civil rights leaders,
and to affirm a willingness to enter into cooperation with other student organizations that sought
radical social change. 35 The public face of SCLC was Martin Luther King, Jr. and as a result, the
organization’s success was inextricably tied to King’s popularity. King helped the SCLC raise
money, but also always verged on being a cult of personality. The public face of the NAACP
was one of moderation and negotiation. The NAACP was clearly working for integration, but
would be made to look increasingly conservative and, perhaps, timid in comparison to SNCC.
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SNCC was not only part of a youth movement within the civil rights movement, but also
part of a broader challenge to the predominance of liberal ideology that also included Milton A.
Galamison’s new organization, the Parents’ Workshop for Equality in New York City Public
Schools (PWE) at the beginning of the 1960s. For both SNCC and the Parents’ Workshop,
ordinary people were going to play the decisive role in bringing about lasting social and political
change, and in order to retain their predominance in the movement, liberal leaders believed that
they would have to incorporate these organizations and some of their tactics into their repertoire
of activities. But would liberals go further and begin to reconceptualize racial liberal ideology in
order to transform the movement?

Sensing the shift that was occurring among younger participants in the civil rights
movement, the NAACP began to reposition itself within the movement, moving somewhat to the
left of where it had been previously. As sociologist, Charles Payne argues, “SNCC’s entry,
along with the expanded visibility of the similarly aggressive CORE, pressured older civil rights
organizations into a reconsideration of tactics. It put the NAACP in a position where it was
forced to support some direct-action projects, even though that ran counter to the organization’s
essential style.” 36 Roy Wilkins worked hard to counter the criticisms of the NAACP that the
organization was stuck in a bygone era. In his speech to the NAACP national convention in
1961, he pointed out a significant increase in the number of delegates between the ages of 25 and
40. He told the convention, “I am sure you will be interested to learn, that a markedly increasing
proportion of the delegates were young adults in the age bracked [sic] of 25 to 40 and those who
never admit that they are getting old in the age bracket from 40 to 50. It would seem to me that
this indicates that the NAACP is replacing its glorious leaders, who are now in the process of
36
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moving off the stage and that contrary to the popular propaganda that this organization is dead or
dying on its feet, an old-fashioned and unrepresentative and stifled from the top by old leaders.
The registration of these young people . . . would seem to disprove any idea that we have
hardening of the arteries or stultification of the brain.” 37 It was clear that the growth of groups
such as SNCC and CORE, and the increasing prevalence of direct-action tactics were weighing
on the NAACP and beginning to furnish a substantive challenge to the NAACP. Interestingly,
however, Wilkins worked to frame this surge of youth activism as stemming from within the
NAACP as opposed to from without and emphasized the growth of the NAACP youth branches
as opposed to the growing popularity of SNCC, CORE, and other grassroots organizations that
were independent of the NAACP. Wilkins made it a point that the NAACP was going to spend
more money and energy building up its youth branches throughout the country. Indeed,
according to Wilkins, it was time for the NAACP to “invest in the future.” 38 This is not to say
that the NAACP youth branches had not been growing, but Wilkins’ renewed focus on the youth
branches was spurred in large part by the challenge that SNCC and CORE represented.
Wilkins also hit on the theme of debunking the idea that the NAACP was too old and too
timid in its actions when he told the convention that, “[i]t is significant, I think, to repeat that far
from being on the tail and catching up, as some inexpert observers have asserted, the NAACP
sponsored the vast bulk of the sit-in demonstrations across the South in 1960 and 1961. . . . [T]he
backbone of the organized movement was the NAACP, as it should have been.” 39 With
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statements such as this, Wilkins was attempting to do three things simultaneously. He was
arguing against the idea that the NAACP was out of touch with the current increasingly militant
tenor of the civil rights struggle. He was arguing against the idea that the NAACP only engaged
in litigation and was not involved in grassroots protest. And he was attempting to reassert the
predominance of the NAACP at the cutting edge of the civil rights movement. Wilkins asserted
that the NAACP was “the only true national organization” and its size and means, as well as its
history afforded it its place leading the civil rights struggle. 40
Wilkins also made other overtures, rhetorically and otherwise in 1961, in order to
demonstrate that the NAACP was at the forefront of the movement, that it did understand and
agree with the more confrontational mood of younger activists, and that it could share the civil
rights stage with younger organizations. In Wilkins’ address to the NAACP national convention
in 1961 a major theme was that the NAACP had taken—and was prepared in the future to take—
much tougher stands against segregation. He told the convention delegates that the NAACP was
“not now, and never [has] been satisfied with tokenism” in the South, and that northern school
districts were “obligated to devise and to use methods to comply with the court’s order
regardless of geographical, residential segregation.” 41 This non-compromising stance surely
played very well to the delegates in attendance, even though it was different than how he had
dealt with Galamison back in 1957. The NAACP was “impatient” with the slow pace of
segregation. This was most aptly displayed by the NAACP’s youth activists throughout the
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South, according to Wilkins. 42 Again, he was responding to the prodding of more militant
activists with a different view from the NAACP about how to achieve social change, but again
he chose to frame the organization’s shifting position in terms of internal demographic change
rather than as the result of external challenges to the organization. This would allow Wilkins to
frame the liberal position as consistent with direct-action as the organization used these strategies
more in the future.
He even invited James Farmer, the national director of CORE, to address the convention
delegates in order to illustrate a sense of solidarity with the more militant, left-wing of
movement. Farmer referred to CORE and the NAACP as “sister organizations” and praised the
historical achievements of the NAACP and acknowledged the primary role the organization
played in the struggle for racial equality for the preceding fifty years. He also, however, made
the point that this was the time to “unlock the power” of the individual; that at this historical
moment, “[n]o longer need the little individual be content with watching the talented pros act for
him.” Farmer argued that now, in the 1960s, “[e]ven the ingifted [sic], untalented, unskilled
individual is finding a new importance and power, and dignity on the picket line, on the lunch
counter stool, in the bus.” 43 Farmer was endeavoring to demonstrate a unity of purpose between
CORE and the NAACP, but also implying that the NAACP needed to change its long-held ideas
about mass action and how to mobilize people for the purposes of achieving racial equality.
The NAACP’s ideological shift leftward seemed to have slowed somewhat by the
national convention in 1962. As Roy Wilkins addressed the convention delegates, the tone of the
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speech was one of mild defiance against the progression toward more confrontational approaches
to attain equality. Wilkins worked to dispel the idea that there was a rigid dichotomy between
litigation and direct-action, that an organization had to be in one camp or the other, or that one
camp was more worthy than the other. As Wilkins put it,

We of the NAACP have felt some understandable irritation at the contention that
we are oriented toward legal activity exclusively, and that the “shift” must be exclusively
to those equally time-honored methods which every diagnostician now glibly calls “direct
action.” I say we have been irritated, but I hasten to add that we have never faltered in
the crusade. The exhibit here at this convention reporting activities of out Branches in 48
of the 50 states, and the presence here of local and state NAACP leaders and young
people who have been arrested for their vigorous devotion to the program is testimony to
the fact that there is a vigorous program in force. 44
Wilkins was working to both restore value to the legal and financial role that the NAACP had
played in the struggle up to this point, providing bail money and legal representation for those
who had been arrested and a lobby for civil rights legislation in Washington, D.C., and frame the
NAACP as a youthful, equally dedicated organization to direct-action as SNCC or CORE. The
“irritation” that the NAACP felt was the result of the substantive ideological challenge that
SNCC and other grassroots organizations provided to the NAACP’s style of leadership and
liberal ideology.
The tone of defiance continued a bit later in the speech as Wilkins referenced recent
newspaper reports that touted the revival of litigation replacing direct-action techniques for
advancing the movement. “We don’t want to yell ‘we told you so,’” Wilkins told the audience,
“but ‘court and legislative action’ are old NAACP methods. Two years ago, at the peak of the
sit-ins, certain rival spokesmen declared these methods were ‘outdated.’ The newspapers and
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magazines, to egg on a split in Negro ranks, echoed the new spokesmen. Now, two years later,
these same methods are ‘new.’” 45
While Wilkins acknowledged that there was a role for mass action in helping accomplish
the goals of the movement, the tactic Wilkins emphasized in his address that the NAACP should
be focused on was voter registration. It was voting, according to Wilkins, that was the best
safeguard for the rights of the individual and the preservation of a democratic society. 46 Based
on the awards that the NAACP distributed to its local branches in the year preceding his 1961
address, the NAACP voting registration efforts were focused in urban areas throughout the
country. Recognition was bestowed upon local chapters in Memphis, New York City, Detroit,
Cleveland, Baltimore, and Dallas, among other places. 47 SNCC was also engaged in voter
registration, but they were targeting smaller communities in the rural South, where it was often
much more difficult to get people registered, and where larger organizations had given up trying.
What is important note about Wilkins’ emphasis on voter registration in his 1962 address
was that Wilkins considered voter registration to be a “quiet” activity; of vital importance, but
“quiet.” SNCC would not likely have considered voter registration to be quiet, especially
considering the violent retribution volunteers and residents had to endure in order to attempt to
register. And Wilkins urged the NAACP’s local branches not to engage in any activities that
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might “in any way reduc[e] the forward movement” of voter registration. 48 He was telling the
local branches that they needed to be less conspicuous in their local activities, less
confrontational, they should not arouse the ire of local residents or those in positions of power
that might endanger the ability of the NAACP to have access to the halls of power.
The final half of Wilkins’ address returned to core liberal themes: the interconnectedness
of blacks and whites in determining the future of the United States, the contention that African
Americans were as much a part of the fabric of the nation as any other group and were “real”
Americans, and that blacks believed as fervently as whites in the American creed. Wilkins
argued against Booker T. Washington’s idea that blacks and whites could be “as separate as the
fingers” in some areas and “as one as the hand” in others. Black and white southerners, Wilkins
argued, were inextricably tied together in determining the economic and political destiny of the
South. The South would never reach its full economic potential, Wilkins contended, until the
region fully incorporated blacks into its economic structure in the same proportions as whites. 49
Wilkins affirmed the organization’s impenetrability against communism by saying, “We
of the NAACP are not communists, of course” and pointing out that southern law enforcement
could not substantiate any of their claims of communist infiltration.50 An important declaration
to make during the Cold War and in the face of attacks of this nature in opposition to the
NAACP. But the rebuke of Communism also allowed Wilkins to affirm the liberal belief in the
US Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the American ethos of meritocracy. He

48

Roy Wilkins, “Before the Closing Session of the 53rd Annual Convention NAACP, July 8 1962, 1-2, Box III:
A 15, Folder 1, NAACP Administration 156-65, Annual Convention File, 1962, Speeches, NAACP Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
49
Roy Wilkins, “Before the Closing Session of the 53rd Annual Convention NAACP, July 8 1962, 3, Box III: A
15, Folder 1, NAACP Administration 156-65, Annual Convention File, 1962, Speeches, NAACP Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
50
Roy Wilkins, “Before the Closing Session of the 53rd Annual Convention NAACP, July 8 1962, 3, Box III: A
15, Folder 1, NAACP Administration 156-65, Annual Convention File, 1962, Speeches, NAACP Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

163

would declare the NAACP’s belief in human equality as he quoted the Declaration and
referenced Locke’s idea of government’s social contract with its citizens. Wilkins called on
number of historical figures, including Patrick Henry, Paul Revere, Denmark Vesey, and
Frederick Douglass, 51 in order to demonstrate the integration of black and white in his thought,
the historical circumstances—the American Revolution and the fight to abolish slavery—in
which the ideals of human equality have triumphed over those of injustice and discrimination,
and to place the civil rights movement and the work of the NAACP within the broad sweep of
liberal American history and thinking.

The NAACP may have gotten back to affirming racial liberal ideology by 1962 in
defiance of the oppositional ideology of grassroots groups such as SNCC, CORE, and
Galamison’s Parents’ Workshop, but that does not mean that the NAACP or racial liberal
ideology was not changed in some ways as a result. By 1962 these organizations were viable
organizations (CORE had been for some time by now) and the NAACP—whether on a local or
national level—had developed working relationships with all of them. In order to do so, the
NAACP broadened its organizational program in order to incorporate some of the tenets and
tactics of those groups within it. By doing so, the NAACP helped to maintain its organizational
and liberalism’s position at the forefront of the civil rights movement as it would enter into its
most fruitful period legislatively from 1963 to 1965.
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Chapter 5
Crossroads: The Seasons of Our Discontent

January 1, 1963 marked the one hundred year anniversary of the Emancipation
Proclamation; a fact lost on no leader in the black freedom struggle. The centennial of this most
important of American pronouncements was a poignant reminder of the persisting deprivation of
black Americans in relation to whites in the United States. A century after Abraham Lincoln had
set slavery on the path to extinction and blacks on the path to full citizenship, black Americans
were still not accorded the full compliment of rights guaranteed to citizens by the U.S.
Constitution.
The “dilemma” that Gunnar Myrdal described in 1944 still plagued American society, as
far as liberals were concerned. Alexander Allen, associate executive director of the National
Urban League, at a ceremony commemorating the Proclamation’s centennial remarked that,
“[t]he full promise of the Emancipation Proclamation [would] not be realized until the Negro
family is freed from the stifling confines of the racial ghetto.” 1 Socialists were forecasting the
emergence of new battlegrounds in the “civil rights revolution” due to the technical automation
that was making tens of thousands of jobs obsolete. Nationalists remained unconvinced that the
United States was a society worth integrating into. Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam declared
the Emancipation Proclamation a “farce” and held their own “Freedom Fete” in Harlem on
Lincoln’s birthday in order to issue their own Emancipation Proclamation Day. 2 And
conservatives remained convinced that the liberal civil rights organizations were conducting the
movement in a self-serving manner.
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The pace of tangible improvement in the social and economic conditions of African
Americans was too slow for many, or appeared to be non-existent. Black leaders all over the
country had been mounting campaigns since the Brown decision to protest against the numerous
inequities that plagued African Americans: school segregation, disfranchisement, unequal public
accommodations, employment discrimination, police brutality, and housing discrimination
among the many. White political leaders in Birmingham had found ways to suppress the
formation of a large-scale mass protest movement since the founding of the Southern Negro
Youth Congress in 1937, the movement towards automation in factory work was
disproportionately hurting black workers all over the country, and the school desegregation
movement was being stymied in New York City by school board officials that stuck to a strategy
of delaying any policies to integrate the public schools on a citywide scale. Blacks’ frustration
with the current state of affairs, which had been mounting for some time, now reached the
boiling point by the spring of 1963. It would be a year of reckoning for African Americans and,
indeed, the nation. Those seeds of liberation that black intellectuals and activists had sown in the
less hospitable soils of decades past were going to bear fruit.

The Spring of Our Discontent

African Americans’ collective frustrations were crystallized, in large part, as a result of
the protests in Birmingham, Alabama. Blacks in that city were sacrificing their bodies and, in
some cases, their lives in their struggle for first-class citizenship. The scenes of Birmingham’s
Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” Connor turning snarling German shepherds loose
on nonviolent protesters and fire hoses being unleashed on teenagers angered African
Americans, and indeed the world, like few other episodes had. This coalescing movement was
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fueled by the recalcitrance and insensitivity of Connor and other local officials. As dogs were
sicked on demonstrators, Connor was reported as having screamed to the newsmen reporting the
story, “Look at that dog go! That’s what we train them for—to enforce the law.” 3
Film images of Connor’s dogs “enforcing the law” became ubiquitous on television
newscasts all over the country as the developing unrest in Birmingham dominated the nightly
news for months. Shocking pictures and dramatic descriptions of the scenes in Birmingham also
sold newspapers all over the world. 4 The protests in Birmingham illustrated, in the most vivid of
colors, that April, May, and June of 1963 was the spring of blacks’ discontent.
Publicity of the violent response to civil disobedience being beamed around the nation
and globe was significant for several reasons. For Birmingham’s black citizenry, it became
increasingly difficult to remain unmoved by their fellow citizens’ courage and willingness to
endure whatever might come in order to desegregate the “oldest” of old southern cities. More
and more of Birmingham’s blacks, even children as young as seven years old, joined the
demonstrations in whatever way they could. For African Americans around the country,
desegregating “Bombingham” became a rallying cry in the fight against Jim Crow across the
nation. In April of 1963 groups of blacks and whites picketed hundreds of “five and dime”
stores in 45 states to protest the segregationist policies of stores in Birmingham. Among the
chains picketed were F. W. Woolworth and S. H. Kress. The picketers called for the immediate
desegregation of public accommodations in Birmingham. 5 In New York City, blacks picketed
City Hall to protest the jailings in Birmingham and push the Kennedy administration to intervene
in the city. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) also sponsored several demonstrations
3
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around New York City. 6 Just as blacks in Birmingham threw down the proverbial gauntlet
against continued segregation in their city, African Americans nationwide broadened the scope
and significance of those demonstrations well beyond Birmingham.
The turmoil in Birmingham eventually compelled the federal government to intervene in
the city for several reasons. There were circumstantial and ideological imperatives for the
federal government. For one, what was happening in Birmingham had the potential to negatively
affect US foreign policy objectives around the world. The geopolitical configuration of the
globe had been changing dramatically since World War II due to the Cold War and anti-colonial
independence movements occurring throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America; movements
that were accelerating by the early 1960s. The United States was working to keep as many of
these countries as possible within their sphere of influence and out of the clutches of the Soviet
Union. Consequently, the federal government could not stand idly by for too long, allowing the
naked repression of peaceful African American dissent to persist unchecked.
Connor, for his part, attempted to sway public opinion against the civil rights protests and
justify his efforts to suppress the movement in a tried-and-true manner. He asserted, as was
common for southern officials to do before the 1960s, that the problems in Birmingham were the
result of “outside agitators” and “communists” (often the terms were synonymous) coming into
the city to stir up trouble, and did not reflect the thinking of the majority of “good Negroes” in
Birmingham. Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy, leaders of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and the Birmingham campaign, did encourage “sympathizers anywhere
to come to Birmingham and see for themselves what [was] happening.” 7 But as more adults
continued to march throughout the spring, and even young children willingly offered themselves
6
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up to the altar that was the Birmingham city jail, it became obvious to anyone who cared to
plainly look that the “good Negroes” of Birmingham were sick and tired of being treated as
inferior human beings in the city—and the country—in which they had been born and raised.
Besides, the Kennedy administration believed that supporting African Americans’
movement for civil rights was the morally correct choice. As timid as the administration had
been in its stance on outwardly supporting the liberal movement, the unrest in Birmingham and
the recalcitrance of officials there was demonstrating to the administration that they needed to
take a much stronger position on civil rights in the weeks and months to come. The news
coming from Birmingham was terrible, Connor was being totally uncooperative, and black votes
had been critical to Kennedy’s electoral victory in 1960.
Blacks, the country over, prodded the president for his administration’s assistance.
Gladys Harrington of the New York CORE, for example, declared in early May that “[t]he
Negro children and adults of Birmingham, Alabama, are citizens of the United States as well as
of Alabama, and are entitled to the full protection of the Federal Constitution. There is no
excuse for President Kennedy to stand idly by while American citizens are denied their
elementary rights as human beings.” 8 As a result, the violence in Birmingham, foreign policy
implications, and ethical principles compelled the federal government to act. Kennedy did
eventually speak to the nation in order to decry the violence in Birmingham and urge Americans
to work towards more equitable race relations in the United States.
His speech to the American people on June 11, 1963, addressed the fact that blacks were
being denied their civil rights under the Constitution, as well as systematically being deprived of
opportunities for educational, economic, and social advancement simply because of the color of
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their skin. That, one hundred years after “President Lincoln freed the slaves . . . their heirs, their
grandsons, are not fully free.” Kennedy also referenced America’s role in the world as a beacon
of freedom and that in order to claim that position, blacks could not be less free than other
Americans. Kennedy told the American people, “We preach freedom around the world, and we
mean it, and we cherish our freedom here at home, but are we to say to the world, and much
more importantly, to each other that this is the land of the free except for the Negroes; that we
have no second-class citizens except Negroes; that we have no class of caste system, no ghettoes,
no master race except to with respect to Negroes?” 9
Kennedy issued a call to Congress for legislation that could finish the task that Lincoln
began a century earlier to make African Americans fully equal under the law and help provide
blacks with equality of opportunity to make better lives for themselves. It would eventually
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 10 But just as much, if not more than emphasizing the need
for legislation, President Kennedy, in typical liberal fashion, framed the problems of race
relations in the United States as “primarily . . . a moral issue.” Legislation, he said, was
important, but laws alone would not be enough. Every individual American would need to
change their attitudes and behaviors regarding African Americans, so that blacks would not need
to demonstrate in the streets in order to obtain basic rights. The president declared to American
people that, “Now the time has come for this Nation to fulfill its promise. The events in
Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or
legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them.” 11
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And as if to punctuate the main arguments of the president’s speech, and to illustrate how
divided and violent the nation had become, Medgar Evers, Mississippi NAACP field secretary,
was assassinated on his doorstep that very same night, practically in the presence of his wife and
children. He was the victim of a shot in the back from a high-powered rifle as he returned from
addressing a rally for integration. “The bullet ripped through his back, went through his body,
smashed a window and hit the refrigerator in the kitchen.” 12 For the Evers family, Medgar’s
death certainly made the spring of 1963, the season of their discontent.

The months of demonstrations in Birmingham affected blacks all over the country. Many
prominent black intellectuals were compelled to comment on the brutality of the city’s police
force, as well as on the strength and courage of the black community there. Bayard Rustin
argued in June of 1963 that the campaign in Birmingham had amounted to a declaration of war
on the Jim Crow system by blacks. Rustin contended that Birmingham revealed a new militancy
among blacks and a more confrontational attitude toward whites. 13 The trope of the “new”
African American has been used frequently since the 1910s (perhaps too often) to argue that
blacks as a collective had adopted a different way of conceiving their condition in America, or a
distinct method of attempting to ameliorate the problems that affect them. Rustin did not mean
that African Americans had ever ceased agitating for equality. But he argued that, “what is new
springs from the white resistance in Birmingham, with its fire hoses, its dogs, its blatant
disregard for black men as people, and from the Afro-American’s response to such treatment in
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the year of our Lord 1963.” 14 How the white resistance in Birmingham was qualitatively
different from the night rides and lynchings more prevalent during earlier decades was not
delved into, but Rustin maintained that somehow the naked brutality in Birmingham sparked and
cemented a new collective mindset and blacks. African Americans were somehow more
focused, more determined, more courageous than they had been previously.
In a 1963 television interview with Kenneth Clark as part of a series titled, “The Negro
and the American Promise,” James Baldwin, the noted novelist and cultural critic, framed the
meaning of Birmingham somewhat differently than Bayard Rustin. Baldwin asserted that the
protests and upsurge in youth activism in Birmingham proved “that the Negro has never been as
docile as white Americans wanted to believe. . . . [T]he Negro has never been happy in his place.
. . . [Those students] proved they come from a long line of fighters . . .” 15 For Baldwin, the
intensity of the protests and the reactionary responses of Connor’s men reflected “not that the
Negro had changed but that the country had arrived at a place where he can no longer contain the
revolt.” 16 America was in a state of crisis and Birmingham blacks were providing the strongest
moral challenge for the entire American system to live up to its professed creed—and save
American “civilization.” 17
Framing the issue of racial inequality as a moral problem that affected both whites and
blacks, and persisting racial discrimination and conflict as the potential knell of American
society, was a hallmark of racial liberal ideology. Kenneth Clark and James Baldwin
consistently expressed the belief that the destinies of blacks and whites in the United States were
inextricably linked, and used this line of reasoning to argue for the desegregation of schools,
14
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public accommodations, and all other aspects of American society. For liberals, racial
integration was a laudable goal, and the total integration of American society was the most
effective way to achieve—and to demonstrate—racial equity and understanding.
So, when other leaders articulated the idea that the fates of blacks and whites in this
country were inseparable, they were expressing a liberal principle. Bayard Rustin agreed with
the racial liberal viewpoint on many issues, even though he took a different economic tack from
most liberal leaders. The belief in the shared destiny of blacks and whites in this country was
one of those shared viewpoints.
Also, Reverend Milton A. Galamison, the Brooklyn minister who had been a leader of
the Brooklyn NAACP during the late-1950s, left the organization in 1959, and began his own
grassroots organization concerned with equalizing public educational opportunities for black and
Puerto Rican children in New York City, expressed the belief that blacks needed to pursue
integration. Blacks had as much claim to America as any other group. He engaged in a televised
debate with Malcolm X of the Nation of Islam on the efficacy of racial integration among other
topics during the spring of 1963. Excerpts of Galamison’s comments were published soon
afterwards in Freedomways magazine under the title, “Integration Must Work—Nothing Else
Can.” Galamison argued that blacks needed to continue to fight for an integrated American
society; integrated at every level. As far as Galamison was concerned, he and other blacks had
as strong a claim to America as any white person, not only because they were citizens, but also
because their ancestors had also fought the nation’s wars and had helped build the nation—
literally—into what it had become. As a result, Galamison argued, “[blacks] ha[d] been
integrated [into the fabric of American history, society, and culture] at every level of the sowing.
It [was] in the arena of the reaping that [blacks had] been short changed.” The fact that African
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Americans were not being treated equitably in American society was not because they were not
“American” enough, but rather was an indictment of the nation. 18
Galamison characterized American society as suffering from the “sickness” of racism but
included himself and other blacks within it by calling the United States “our society” and its
sickness “our sickness.” 19 This rhetorical strategy of employing “our” was not only another way
of declaring America as much his as anyone else’s, but also demonstrates the influence of liberal
ideas on Galamison’s approach for achieving racial equality for blacks in the United States.
Although I consider Galamison a leftist, the willingness of liberals and other leaders to claim
America as “theirs,” warts and all, probably signified the biggest ideological difference between
liberals and nationalists, such as Malcolm X and Harold Cruse, who did not include themselves
or the masses of blacks in their indictments of the country’s racial policies.
As the primary spokesperson for the Nation of Islam (NOI) Malcolm espoused the
mandates of its leader, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. The United States was heading on a
path towards inevitable destruction and that blacks needed to avoid that fate by actively and
completely separating themselves from white America. At the Nation of Islam’s annual
convention in February of 1963 Malcolm declared that “[blacks and whites] can no longer live
together in the same house,” meaning the United States. 20 As a Chicago Daily News article
reported, “He urged that American Negroes be given a divorce and property settlement by the
white man.” 21 Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad did not believe that African Americans would
ever achieve equality in the United States and that the only ways for blacks to do so were either
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to return to the African continent or to receive territorial and financial reparations from the
United States and be allowed to function as a sovereign nation. As Malcolm put in it during an
interview with Dr. Kenneth Clark in the spring of 1963,
. . . since [the white man’s] own history makes him unqualified to be an inhabitant
or a citizen in a kingdom of brotherhood, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad teaches us
that God is about to eliminate that particular race from this earth.
So, since they are due for elimination, we (meaning the members of the NOI)
don’t want to be with them. We’re not trying to integrate with that which we know has
come to the end of its rope. We’re trying to separate from it and get with something
that’s more lasting, and we think that God is more lasting than the white man. 22
In this interview Malcolm used a pluralistic pronoun as did Galamison, “we” compared to
Galamison’s “our.” Malcolm, however, used “we” to mean Nation of Islam members, in
particular, who were all black, and all African Americans, more generally. He was not
attempting to claim America, but rather to deny America’s claim on his person and his allegiance
the same way that he believed America continued to deny its bounty to him.
Malcolm X represented the NOI all over the country and the world by the spring of 1963
and he advocated that black Americans needed to separate themselves from white America as
soon and as thoroughly as possible. The NOI and Malcolm X were not advocates of racial
integration the way other black leaders were. One reason why not was that the Muslims believed
that “integration [was] something which a superior race force[d] on an inferior one” and
Malcolm X certainly did not agree that American whites were superior to black Americans. 23 He
did not believe that whites would allow blacks to live with them as true equals. 24 Neither did
Malcolm place any faith in the idea that the United States would eradicate segregation for moral
reasons. Bill Dowell of the Daily Tarheel reported in April of 1963 that Malcolm claimed, “The
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only time the U.S. had ever made a move for integration . . . was when it felt that foreign opinion
called for it or there was some other ulterior motive. Whenever integration was argued for, as an
honest moral goal . . . it was looked down on. If the motive is bad . . . how can the result help
but be bad?” 25
Malcolm X and Harold Cruse criticized both African American leaders and whites who
argued that interracial partnerships were the only way to achieve total equality in the United
States. Consistent with the fact that the NOI did not allow white members, Malcolm argued that
the black freedom struggle needed to be an all-black movement. African Americans needed to
lead their own organizations to advance their own agendas. And any blacks that associated too
closely with whites could not be trusted to put the needs of black people first. As Malcolm put it
his interview with Kenneth Clark: “ . . . whenever you have a group of black people sitting down
with the white man, supposed to represent the black masses, you can never get anybody who is
involved in any kind of intermarriage, in any kind of situation, who will be qualified to represent
themselves as spokesmen for the black masses in this country. . . . [Y]ou can’t find masses . . . of
black people who will accept any black man who’s married to a white man [sic] as a spokesman
for black people, or a black woman, who’s married to a white man, as a spokesman or a
representative of what black people feel and think.” 26
Harold Cruse, although he did not follow the “back-to-Africa” nationalist thread, also
decried the “integrationist impulse” among liberal black leaders. He had been saying since the
mid-1950s that black leaders needed to stop relying on the theories of white leftists and develop
an indigenous African American cultural criticism. Cruse announced to a friend in September of
1956 that he and a few other contemporaries were establishing a cultural group for black writers.
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Whites would only be allowed to join this group as “patrons” and would not be allowed to vote
or help set policy for the organization-to-be. 27 The reason for not allowing whites to have
leadership roles in the group was because Cruse believed that whites who became involved in
black organizations and movements tended to subsume them in what he considered “white”
political issues and make them inert. Over time, Cruse would toughen his opposition to white
participation in black organizations and movements, as he increasingly saw white leftists as
largely to blame for the ineffectiveness of the black struggle for equality. 28
Besides criticizing the actions of whites in the civil rights struggle, Malcolm X and Cruse
were also quick to attack black leaders whom they believed were using ineffectual tactics in
trying to achieve racial equality. Cruse had been condemning black leaders who he believed
embodied the “integrationist impulse” since the 1950s, even going after W. E. B. Du Bois on this
score in an editorial sent to the Amsterdam News, the New York-based black weekly, in February
of 1956. He ended that editorial with this scathing critique:
These are some matters which Dr. DuBois [sic] and others might do well to
ponder over. While they are so pondering they should look into the matter of the
American Negroes’ domestic life for his house is badly out of order and the white folks
can’t be held responsible for that. Dr. DuBois [sic] can help to get our house in shape by
watching his choice of words and adjectives because the American Negro has got to start
a cleanup campaign on his own racial ideology for it is dirty, suffocating and nauseating
with a stifling miasma of the implied superiority of the lightness of skin. This pandering
to white values pervades the entire structure of Negro social, political and cultural
activity all the way from conservative to the Marxist leftwing, including the Communists.
In fact, this whole “integration mania” which is sweeping the colored middle classes, and
their black supporters, and the “brownskinned [sic] elite” ought to be investigated. It is
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extremely doubtful if all of us American Negroes will be able to “whiten up”, “brown up”
or “lighten up” enough to be free by ’63. 29
Cruse believed that the issue of how to achieve racial equality in America was a cultural question
beyond the comprehension of white Marxists in the United States. And Russian communists had
nothing significant to say about the racial situation in America because they did not understand
its complexities. An even bigger problem that Cruse saw, as a result, and the reason why he was
so critical of Du Bois, was that Cruse believed black intellectuals were “so tied up” with whites’
version of Marxism that they could not think intelligently about the issue of race in America
anymore. 30
By the mid 1960s Cruse argued that Marxist doctrine was not being adapted to fit the
current economic and political conditions facing African Americans in the mid twentieth
century. Marx had made his observations about social structures and relations in Europe in the
mid-nineteenth century, yet contemporary Marxists refused to contextualize his theory in their
historical time and place and retool them to be useful for the United States in the 1960s. 31 Black
intellectuals, according to Cruse, were either unwilling or incapable of adapting Marxism to fit
the American context in 1963.
While Cruse pointed up the class divisions, color consciousness, and integrationism that
was “stifling” the black movement—and believed was only worsening by 1963, Malcolm
focused his ire on the philosophy of nonviolence as practiced by Bayard Rustin and Martin
Luther King. Malcolm and the NOI, while willing to “join any group or picket line they thought
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would help the Negroes,” would not react nonviolently if they were attacked. 32 Malcolm said
that the Muslims would have pursued quite different tactics in Birmingham than the nonviolent
direct action strategy that was being implemented. According to Malcolm,
The Negroes approach to their Birmingham problems [was] no good . . . ‘You
draw away from them and they accuse you of hate and you draw to them and they sic
their dogs on you . . .’
‘Mr. Muhammad teaches us to separate from the white man since you can’t get
along with him . . .’
Birmingham Negroes . . . should kill ‘the two or four legged dogs which attack
them.’ If Muslims were involved in the Birmingham protests . . . they would defend
themselves against the police dogs and policemen who attack them with nightsticks and
fire hoses. 33
Malcolm’s rejection of nonviolence both as a moral philosophy and protest strategy made
it next to impossible for substantive relationships to develop between him and most other
leaders. As critical as Malcolm was of most other black leaders, they often reserved their
harshest rebukes for Malcolm and black nationalists more generally. Milton Galamison
maintained that black nationalists were trying to be better racists than white supremacists:
The new nationalists are saying to the racists, ‘I will show you what it is to be the
object of race arrogance. I will be just as you are.’ The worst harm white supremacy
could inflict on me is to mold me in the image of its buffoonery. Yet white supremacy
has achieved the supreme stroke of perverted genius in convincing some Negroes that the
desire for racial unity is symptomatic of inferiority and pridelessness. 34
Galamison maintained that blacks could not respond to white supremacist attitudes by simply
articulating the reverse. To do so would not only be incorrect factually, but also morally.
Galamison characterized black nationalism, of the typed espoused by Malcolm X and the Nation
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of Islam, as reverse racism and a hollow ideology that was a detriment rather than an aid to black
equality.
James Baldwin offered an eloquent analysis and critique of black nationalist ideology in
the spring of 1963 as he explained to Kenneth Clark the appeal of Malcolm X, particularly to
northern urban blacks. Baldwin told Clark that Malcolm was capturing the spirit of a changing
zeitgeist by telling black people that they should indeed be proud of being black. Baldwin
absolutely agreed with that and acknowledged how important it was, psychologically, for black
people to hear that message when so often they were bombarded with the exact opposite
message. The problem with the articulation of pride in blackness the way Malcolm and the NOI
did it, as far as Baldwin was concerned, was that “in order to do this, what he does is destroy a
truth and invent a history. What [Malcolm] does is say, ‘you’re better because you’re black.’
Well, of course that isn’t true.” 35 Baldwin leveled the same charge against black nationalists as
Galamison, that the ideology was based on a false morale; a false sense of superiority. Baldwin
warned that ideologies based on theories of racial superiority always “leads to a moral
bankruptcy.” 36
One trait of black liberal leaders, as well as black leftists who were influenced by liberal
ideology, was indictments of black nationalism. Those leaders who advocated integration
criticized black nationalists for their unwillingness to work in interracial coalitions with whites.
At best, nationalists were unrealistic. At worst, they were black supremacists and unpatriotic.
These leaders would continue their condemnations into 1963 and well beyond, as Birmingham
raised the stakes of the black freedom struggle.
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Because many black liberal leaders believed Birmingham was providing an unparalleled
opportunity to compel the nation to work on behalf of African Americans on moral and political
grounds, and because of the growing impatience with the pace of social change, many black
liberal leaders were quite disappointed with the level of support they received from white
liberals. They began to voice, in speeches and in print, their dissatisfaction with what they
considered the condescension and lukewarm commitment to racial equality from white liberals.
James Baldwin wanted white liberals to realize that it was not their job to try and “save” black
people. Blacks did not need to be “saved,” and for whites to frame the problem of American
racism in those terms was to continue to both place themselves in a superior position vis-à-vis
African Americans, and to still see racial discrimination as a “Negro problem” when that was not
the case. Baldwin put it this way in March of 1963:
I am tired not only of being told to wait, but of people saying “What should I do?”
They mean “What should I do about the Negro problem; what should I do for you?”
There is nothing you can do for me. There is nothing you can do for Negroes. . . . One is
not attempting to save twenty-two million people. One is attempting to save an entire
country, and that means an entire civilization, and the price for that is high. The price for
that is to understand one’s self. 37
Baldwin was not only articulating his anger about many white liberals’ time-table for achieving
racial equality and an integrated society—which was apparently much slower than blacks’
own—but he was also shifting the responsibility for eradicating racial discrimination from blacks
to all people in order to redeem the entire nation. Baldwin’s remark also reiterates another
pervasive theme of black liberal leaders; that they believed the destinies and white and black
Americans were inextricably tied together and if racial discrimination were not stamped out, the
entire nation might cease to exist.
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Increasingly, many black liberal leaders did not believe that the civil rights movement
would follow a truly revolutionary course if it depended on the unwavering support of white
liberals. And in the mold of James Baldwin, they let their displeasure be known throughout the
rest of 1963, and beyond. The various splits between black liberals and white liberals between
1963 and 1965 would account for some of the most dramatic shifts in the direction of the black
freedom struggle in the decade to follow. But during the spring of their discontent, black liberal
leaders wanted to continue to “find some way of putting the present administration of the country
on the spot. One has got to force, somehow, from Washington, a moral commitment, not to the
Negro people, but to the life of this country.” 38 That “somehow” materialized in the revival of
an older idea . . . a march on Washington. The event would come to define the summer of 1963.
And although it was celebrated as an indelible historic moment then—and should still be—it was
not (and should not now be) lost on anyone that the conditions that necessitated a march on the
capital were not to be celebrated.

The Summer of Our Discontent

Among the most distressful of those conditions was the disproportionately high
unemployment rate among African American as compared to whites. The disparity was the
result of several factors. These included the trend toward automation in factory work that was
making for fewer jobs, a dearth of job training opportunities in black communities, seniority
rules that adversely affected black workers far more often than whites, as well as racial
discrimination on the part of employers. The result was that African Americans comprised more
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than twenty percent of the jobless in May of 1963 even though they made up only eleven percent
of the population. 39
In thinking about how to best dramatize the continued plight of African Americans trying
to play a larger role in America’s life, Randolph resurrected a much older idea of his: a march on
Washington. Randolph had ultimately aborted the idea in 1941 after Franklin Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 8802 into law. Now, twenty-two years later, as the liberal-led movement
achieved one of its most significant triumphs in Birmingham by ousting “Bull” Connor from
public office and compelling John F. Kennedy to address the nation regarding the need for racial
reconciliation, Randolph once again believed this moment was pregnant with possibilities.
Randolph had been concerned with issues related to black employment and economic life
ever since he began his career as an activist after migrating from Florida to New York City in
1911. The first incarnation of the March on Washington had also been intended to bring into
public view the prevalence of racially discriminatory practices in factories that received
government defense contracts, as well as the broader issue of disparate levels of unemployment
as opposed to whites. Randolph, even with the gains that had been secured since 1941 as a result
of grassroots protest, litigation, and federal mandate, saw that twenty-plus years later the
economic situation for the majority of African Americans was becoming more precarious rather
than more stable.
According to Randolph, if blacks were ultimately going to obtain all of the rights and
privileges of first-class citizens and become truly emancipated in 1963, it would be blacks that
would have to “strike the first blow” to free themselves. 40 As national president of the Negro
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American Labor Council (NALC), Randolph and the NALC proposed the plan for the
“Emancipation March for Jobs.” The NALC took the lead in beginning to organize this protest
because, as Randolph put it:
Obviously, if Negroes would be free they must free themselves, for it is the
verdict of history that the salvation of a people must come from within. This is a basic
reason for the Emancipation March on Washington for Jobs.
Verily, black Americans must bear their own cross of crucifixion!
It is only realistic to expect that Negroes should initiate, organize, conduct and
maintain demonstrations such as marches, sit-ins and boycotts against Jim Crow that are
certain to be resisted with attacks of police brutality, imprisonment and the danger to life
and limb by the Simon Legrees in the Egypt of southern racial bondage. 41
Black people had to be at the forefront of this struggle for their own “emancipation” and the
liberation of the nation, but the march did not need to exclude whites or those of other races.
Randolph asserted that blacks should both welcome and expect support from other marginalized
groups within American society; namely labor unions, Jews, and Catholics. 42
Randolph was affirming his beliefs in the partnership between organized labor and civil
rights organizations that he saw as critical for the survival and success of each movement, as
well as his belief in the efficacy of an interracial, interreligious movement for civil rights.
Randolph argued that in order for the most pressing problems confronting the nation to be
resolved, problems all inextricably connected to one another, that all of the various
constituencies comprising American society needed to struggle against them together. He could
not countenance the position of black nationalist leaders who would exclude whites from
participation in black civil rights organizations and protests simply because of their race. 43
Randolph had long believed that for the “civil rights revolution”—as he often referred to
the movement—to be successful, blacks and whites would need to prosecute the movement
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together. Although he had declared that the original March on Washington Movement
(MOWM) was to be an all-black movement, Randolph’s reasons in 1941 did not revolve around
a belief in the inherent nature of whites to co-opt civil rights groups. As historian Jervis
Anderson explains, “[t]he charge of black chauvinism overlooked or exploited Randolph’s rather
complex attitude toward the nature of the black struggle in American society.” 44 Randolph’s
reasons for excluding whites from the proposed march on Washington were in large part to
counteract the belief among racist whites that blacks could not build an organization on their
own, and also a way to exclude Communists from the march. 45 Randolph also received a good
deal of criticism for deciding to exclude whites from the MOWM. Surely, he did not want to
come up against those same criticisms again.
As Randolph commented in May of 1963, restating long-held beliefs of his, “Black
supremacy is as objectionable as white supremacy! Black racism is as dangerous as white
racism or anti-Semitism!” 46 He often critiqued black nationalism on the same grounds as black
liberals; that black nationalism merely inverted white supremacist beliefs and ascribed them to
black people. This thread of Randolph’s belief system goes back to his attacks on Marcus
Garvey in the 1920s.
Randolph’s objection to black nationalist ideology was one thing that made him more
palatable to liberal leaders. His staunch anticommunism, as well as his unshakable faith in the
fundamentally “American” values of freedom and democracy were surely other principles that
allowed for such a friendly working relationship between Randolph and liberal organizations.

44

Jervis Anderson, A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical Portrait (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,
1972), 253.
45
Anderson, A. Philip Randolph, 253-4.
46
A. Philip Randolph, “Why the Emancipation March on Washington for Jobs?” 2, May 15, 1963, Box 31,
Folder 9, Subject File, March on Washington, Speeches and Statements, 1963, BTR Papers, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

185

Randolph also shared the liberal belief that blacks had a responsibility to educate the United
States government about the necessity of obtaining racial equality in America. 47 Randolph’s
faith in, and willingness to work within, the organized labor movement was one of the major
ideological differences between he and liberal leaders such as Kenneth Clark and Roy Wilkins.
But this ideological difference was not sufficient to preclude individual and organizational
cooperation between Randolph’s NALC, Wilkins’ NAACP, and Whitney Young’s NUL in the
early 1960s.
Randolph was perhaps the most widely respected of the nationally recognized civil rights
leaders in 1963. His long and distinguished record of service to the cause of black economic and
social liberation preceded the seventy-four-year-old wherever he went. Randolph’s status as
elder-statesman of the civil rights movement leadership gave him the singular ability to bring
together, not only all of the major national black liberal civil rights groups (the NAACP, NUL,
CORE, SNCC, National Council of Negro Women, and his own NALC), but also corral the egos
of these organizations’ leaders and eventually bring white labor and religious groups into the fold
as well.
Randolph had a grand vision for this march to make known to the larger American public
the plight of African Americans all over the country who were more than twice as likely as
whites to be unemployed. And he knew just the man whom he wanted to execute his vision—
Bayard Rustin. Randolph’s ideological heir and acolyte, Rustin was a veteran activist in his own
right by 1963, having worked for the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Congress of Racial
Equality, Randolph’s March on Washington Movement, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, and the NAACP among other groups since the early 1940s. But from the early
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1950s on, much of Rustin’s activities with these organizations were necessarily out of the public
spotlight. Rustin was gay at a moment in American history when being gay was a punishable
offense; gay at a moment when homosexuality was commonly associated with Communism and
deviance as the most significant threats to American civilization; gay at a moment when liberal
civil rights leaders were working to avoid the taints of communism and disloyalty to country at
all costs; gay at a moment when civil rights leaders were not ready or able to be welcoming of
open homosexuals; and Rustin had, in fact, been convicted of a “morals” charge in California in
1952. Randolph still wanted Rustin to organize the march, nevertheless, because of his abilities
at coordinating large-scale events, and he ultimately got what he wanted over the objections of
Roy Wilkins and others.
Randolph, Rustin, and the NALC immediately got down to the business of planning “The
Emancipation March for Jobs.” It was already March and the event was scheduled for June 13
and 14, so there was clearly much that needed to be done. The NALC devised committees at the
local and national levels to register participants and collect donations for the march. On March
28, Randolph appointed Cleveland Robinson, who was on the executive committee of the NALC
to be chairman of the march committee, L. Joseph Overton who was national secretary of the
NALC as march director, and Richard Parrish who was treasurer of the NALC to be treasurer for
the march. 48
By April 10, Randolph had made attempts to expand the number of sponsoring
organizations for the march as he invited the NAACP, NUL, CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and the
NCNW to send representatives to that planning meeting. The NALC, NUL, and CORE did send
representatives to the meeting. The NAACP had indicated that a representative would be
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present, but none made it to the meeting. At that meeting Randolph made it plain that he hoped
all of these organizations could work together as equal partners in order to make the march a
success. Randolph proposed that the director of each sponsoring organization be on the national
coordinating committee for the march and that they each be permitted to appoint a co-chair if
they so chose. He then recommended that, in light of the “tremendous momentum” that planning
the march was gaining, June 13 and 14 would not allow enough time to pull off an effective
march. Those present at the meeting unanimously agreed to move the march back to October 4
and 5. After finally discussing issues of financing, deciding each organization would pledge at
least $10,000 for the march’s budget and that the organizations would split any additional
monies raised from the march equally, the meeting was adjourned. 49
As the mobilization effort for the Emancipation March continued throughout April and
May correspondences concerning the march listed four sponsoring organizations; the NALC,
SCLC, CORE, and SNCC. As Randolph requested permission from the Secretary of the Interior
to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Lincoln Memorial near the end of May, and as
Randolph appealed to black entertainers and public figures for support, the NAACP, NUL, and
NCNW were conspicuously absent from the list of sponsoring organizations even though they
were exerting influence over the planning of the march. 50
The NAACP, NUL, and NCNW were assisting the mobilization efforts behind the scenes
as the NALC, SCLC, CORE, and SNCC put their names out front. The civil rights struggle was
entering a critical moment in the spring of 1963 as events began to accelerate in Birmingham.
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As the situation in Birmingham more and more illustrated disorder and laid bare for the world
the naked brutality of Jim Crow, President Kennedy was not only compelled to address the
nation about the need for racial reconciliation, but also finally propose legislation to Congress to
ensure full civil rights for African Americans. And so out of a season of discontent now sprang
the possibility of securing another positive outcome: the passage of civil rights legislation;
further reaching than any since Reconstruction.
The introduction of a civil rights bill before Congress during the early summer of 1963
not only added another layer of significance to the march, but it also compelled the organizers to
move the date up to August 28. L. Joseph Overton explained to the national and local march
coordinators that the date had been moved by decision of the executive board—A. Philip
Randolph, Roy Wilkins, James Farmer, Martin Luther King, Jr., Whitney Young, and Dorothy
Height—due to the “rapid change in the civil rights revolution.” 51 This meant that the time
available to march organizers was now cut in half. By the time Overton sent his memorandum
on July 16, August 28 was only six weeks away. October 4 would have given organizers
roughly eleven weeks. Planning the Emancipation March for Jobs now became a virtual twentyfour hour per day operation for the next six weeks.
Soon after the date for the march had been moved up to August 28 the name for the name
for the event had also been changed to the “March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.” The
name change is significant for a couple of reasons. The addition of “freedom” to the name of the
march references the new political developments that were occurring during the summer and
demonstrates how the scope of the march was broadening as the summer progressed. The
removal of “emancipation” could also be seen as a way to dampen the radical implications of the
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march, taking place, as it was, during the centennial year of the Emancipation Proclamation, and
soften the criticism of the federal government, as the leaders intended for the march to illustrate
support for the pending civil rights legislation.
In preparation for the march the national logistics committee sent two different
“Organizing Manuals” to local committee chairs in order to clarify all aspects of how the “March
on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,” would be executed. Both manuals listed the
organizations sponsoring the march, the purposes and demands of the organizers and participants
in the march, as well as the responsibilities of the local committees, and the logistics of
transporting individuals into and out of Washington, D.C. What is interesting, however, is that
the second manual also reflects the considerable broadening in scope of the march, both
organizationally and rhetorically. The first manual stated that the objective of the march would
be to demonstrate the need for federal intervention “to deal with the national crisis of civil rights
and jobs that all of us, black and white are facing.” 52 The first manual also indicated there were
six sponsoring organizations for the march, all African American civil rights organizations
(NALC, CORE, SNCC, SCLC, NAACP, and the NUL).
By the time the second manual was distributed, however, several white organizations had
also joined the sponsoring ticket, including the National Catholic Conference for Interracial
Justice, the National Council of Churches in Christ in America, the American Jewish Congress,
and the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO. And the objectives of the march were
broadened to make more explicit the racism that blacks fell victim to. But Randolph also
included “Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and other minorities” as being negatively affected by
automation, and inequalities in education and apprenticeship training. Randolph also
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unequivocally connected the fate of the nation to the need of remedying economic inequality for
all Americans. And he referenced the proposed civil rights bill working its way through
Congress as a reason for marching. 53
This demonstrates the momentum the march was gathering during the summer of 1963.
Randolph had brought more organizations into the fold, which both gave the march a broader
appeal to attract participants and brought in more revenue in order to carry it out. The second
manual was bold enough to publish the number of participants expected to march at 100,000.
As the march drew nearer, Randolph and the march’s other organizers dealt with charges
that the march had been infiltrated by communists, an all-too-frequent and hollow refrain from
those—particularly in the South—who wanted to maintain segregation and the status quo.
Randolph responded to these charges on August 12, 1963, by immediately exposing the real
reason for these charges of communist permeation. He pointed out that before every major mass
action carried out by African Americans, these same charges were leveled. And in each instance
no evidence of communist infiltration was uncovered. He went on to argue that the fact that a
viable protest movement existed, that was articulating the demands of the masses, militated
against communist infestation, rather than encouraged it. Finally, Randolph argued that such
accusations insulted march organizers because they were leading national figures whose
reputations were above reproach, and whose ideologies were nothing but consistent with liberal
democracy. 54
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Charges of communist infiltration and attempts to try and exploit fears of possible
violence, aside, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom moved forward. 55 On August
28, 1963 Americans of every hue from every city and small hamlet descended on the nation’s
capital in order to express dissatisfaction with the current state of racial inequality in the United
States, their support for the pending civil rights bill, and their faith in liberal democracy. 56
Female participants carried signs demanding decent housing, jobs for all, fair pay, and equal
rights. These women were speaking as black women, who faced discrimination based on their
race, sex, and class status in America. Therefore, they spoke out against inequality on all three
fronts. 57
As buses, trains, planes, and automobiles arrived in Washington throughout the morning,
it would turn out that Randolph’s estimate of how many people they could bring to the capital
was far off. Rather than the 100,000 people that Randolph shot for, more than 250,000 people
filled the National Mall, eyes fixed on the rostrum perched on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.
Dozens of dignitaries filled the risers behind the podium including Ella Baker, renowned
entertainer Josephine Baker, Ralph Bunche, Myrlie Evers, James Forman, the Honorable
William H. Hastie, poet Langston Hughes, gospel singer Mahalia Jackson, Thurgood Marshall,
and Rosa Parks.
Malcolm X and perhaps hundreds of Nation of Islam members were also in the crowd
assembled on the National Mall. Malcolm had spent the previous couple of months criticizing
the premise of the march, the black liberal leaders who had orchestrated it particularly Martin
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Luther King, Jr., and the Kennedy administration for presumably co-opting the march once they
realized that the march would not be stopped. Malcolm was a constant thorn in the side of the
Kennedy administration during the summer of 1963 reminding listeners of his administration’s
timidity when it came to supporting civil rights legislation. 58 Malcolm was playing an important,
if peripheral role as a spur to the Kennedy administration, hoping to convince them that they
would still need to work for African American votes in the next election. He was followed by
reporters all over Washington and never backed away from his disapproval of the Kennedy
administration and the liberal method of nonviolent mass action. 59
Malcolm’s criticisms of the Kennedy administration spurred militant blacks that wanted
the march to lead to more confrontational actions, such as strikes and civil disobedience.
Malcolm’s criticisms of King and the liberal tenor of the march made certain that this would not
be the moment of rapprochement between he and King. But it also made Malcolm question the
Nation of Islam’s proscription against political involvement even more. Malcolm would leave
the march convinced that he would have to find ways to make the NOI more active in its
commitment to civil rights protest. 60
Malcolm listened from a distance to the speeches that simultaneously criticized those
politicians and others who obstructed civil rights advances, challenged all Americans to support
racial and economic equality for the benefit of the nation, and inspired those in attendance to
take the positive spirit of the day with them back home. Malcolm remained skeptical of the
march’s value but August 28 was an extraordinary day. “It was a very elemental afternoon. The
crowd wanted to hear what it knew; it wanted to be certain that everything was clear, that
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nothing was vague. Ends, means, grievances had to be made alive.” 61 John Lewis helped to do
that by criticizing the shortcomings of the pending civil rights bill and challenging Congress to
do better, imploring them to “wake up.” 62 Randolph began to sketch a plan in order to
implement the goals of the march, which were to ameliorate the economic disparities between
wealthy and poor Americans and get significant civil rights legislation passed. 63 And Martin
Luther King, Jr. inspired a nation by sharing his “dream” with them, helping more Americans to
make his dream theirs as well. As Ned O’Gorman described King’s oration:
. . . it was Martin Luther King who gave to the march its myth; its memory, its
historical power. He brought all the day in; he defined it, so that we should remember it,
so that this instant in time would be a source of immense intellectual and moral power to
our country. Dr. King spoke of America with prophetic grandeur. There was anger, love,
patience, poetry in his vision; his language had a thunderous brilliance that cut through
the crowd. He evoked the spirit of America as no one ever had in my generation. I do
not think it is possible for anyone who heard him ever to be quite the same again; the
spirit of King assaulted our spirits; we came away changed. There could be no question
of where our allegiances lay. 64
The demonstration carried on for longer than scheduled, but no one in attendance was
concerned. Everyone understood they were participating in something historic. King’s “I Have
a Dream” speech headlined national news programs and was reprinted in newspapers the
following day. The violence that some feared happening during the march never materialized as
250,000 people entered and left Washington, D.C. without incident.
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The spirit of unity and nonviolence that defined the demonstration in the capital was
marred, however, by violent attacks in the hours, days, and weeks following the march. The
most infamous episode of violence occurred at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham where several members of the Ku Klux Klan conspired to blow up the church
because of its importance to the black community as a meeting space. On September 15, a bomb
hidden in the building by Robert Chambliss detonated during the morning Sunday School class,
killing four young girls, ages 11 to 14, and wounding more than twenty others. 65 The attack
refocused the world’s outrage on Birmingham. It also frustrated African American leaders, and
intensified their sense of urgency to step back, assess the march’s effectiveness, and articulate
what they believed should be the next steps for the civil rights movement in light of the march’s
achievements and this latest tragedy.
The day after the Birmingham bombing James Baldwin issued a statement from New
York City about the catastrophe. He used the incident to frame resistance to racial equality in a
larger context. Baldwin characterized the bombing as “one of the American answers to the
March on Washington.” Baldwin pointedly criticized the Kennedy administration’s lack of
commitment to issues of civil rights, as well as the record of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover in
solving violent crimes against African Americans, citing the fact that as of September 19, 1963
there were 21 unsolved bombings in Alabama alone under FBI investigation. Baldwin used this
as evidence that the FBI was more sympathetic towards southern law officials than towards the
families of the African American crime victims. 66
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Baldwin further declared that it would take the actions of liberal and moderate whites in
Birmingham and elsewhere in order for bombings not to become the “definitive American
answer to the aspirations of the American Negro.” Apathy and inaction were the biggest threats
to achieving racial equality in America. If moderate whites did nothing, then those who wanted
to preserve white supremacy and racial segregation would continue to believe that they could
commit atrocities on African Americans with impunity. Baldwin warned that many cities had
the potential to explode the way Birmingham had, and that this could have been an incident that
precipitated the type of suppression of protest that occurred in Germany under Hitler’s rule. 67
He called for action on the part of all Americans, but not to maintain the status quo.
Rather, he urged people to think creatively to bring about more progressive political and social
alignments, citing the continuing segregation in New York City public schools as an example of
how conventional thinking had been ineffective at achieving integration. Baldwin recognized
that the problem in New York was deeper than segregated schools. The root cause of the school
segregation was residential segregation, but few were willing to go after the real estate boards
and banks that perpetuated segregated education. 68 Americans had to be willing to take a hard
look at, and change, the political institutions as well as the caliber of their elected officials in
order to effect substantive social change. 69
Bayard Rustin gave a similar analysis less than two weeks after Baldwin when he
delivered an address at Community Church in New York City on September 25 titled, “What
Follows the March?” But he framed his talk somewhat differently than Baldwin had. Rustin
also commented on the Birmingham bombing, characterizing the bombing and the deaths of the
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four girls as “inevitable” and predicting that more people were going to die in this struggle. 70
Rustin used the incident in Birmingham to affirm his belief in nonviolent direct action as an
infinitely more effective method of bringing about social change than any kind of violent
activity. He wanted to, as he put it, “take the offensive” in defending nonviolence. Rustin
defended nonviolence on practical grounds, arguing that advocates of violent protest never
articulate an effective plan for implementing genuine change, and that the use of violence by the
state will always be in defense of the status quo and never in the interests of social change. 71 He
argued that the only way to prevent the types of violent attacks that occurred in Birmingham was
for millions of individuals across the country to build an interracial, interreligious,
socioeconomically diverse, progressive coalition in order bring about racial integration and
social equality for all. 72
Rustin did comment on the March of Washington itself; its objectives and achievements.
He remarked that an important purpose of the march was to divert the attention of African
Americans from their poor economic circumstances and allow them to be occupied by
planning—and planning to attend—the march. 73 Rustin also argued that the march achieved
some important goals. Most important of which being that the march—and the civil rights
movement, more generally—began to attack what Rustin considered more fundamental problems
facing African Americans, namely, the disproportionate unemployment rate for blacks as
compared to whites and the unequal quality of education provided in racially segregated schools.
Both of these problems, in Rustin’s estimation, were getting worse rather than better. In the case
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of unemployment, Rustin cited the trend toward automation as being the primary factor because
higher-paying jobs were simply being eliminated. In the case of education, Rustin cited the
situation in New York City, as had Baldwin, in pointing out that schools were becoming more
segregated rather than less. 74
Rustin used these two examples in order to make the argument that the only way to
change the racial and economic situation in the United States was to disrupt the normal workings
of the society. Millions of Americans of all backgrounds would have to participate in this social
movement. The disruptions would need to be nonviolent, however, for the only effective
weapons people really possessed were their bodies and the ability to find ways to make the status
quo unworkable. If people were will to engage in these types of protest, then they could have
some success. 75
A few days after Rustin’s speech at Community Church the New York Times Magazine
published a follow up piece about the March on Washington. Before the march, the Times
Magazine asked five prominent black leaders, “What do the marchers really want?”76 After the
march, the magazine asked “what next?” Among the respondents were Kenneth Clark, A. Philip
Randolph, and Roy Wilkins.
Clark offered a multi-part strategy for what needed to occur in order to sustain the
momentum gained after the march, but he began with some concerns. He did not want the
apparent success of the march to obscure the fact that there were fundamental problems that still
needed to be dealt with. The march should not assuage anyone’s conscience or lead them to
believe that anything had been solved by the march alone. This was still the same nation that
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had allowed men who had committed 28 bombings in Birmingham to remain free and
unpunished, as well as numerous other perpetrators of violent crimes against African Americans
to remain free or be lightly punished. 77
Nevertheless, Clark saw the march as an opportunity for black civil rights organizations
and their white allies to develop “more effective techniques to deal directly with the areas of
resistance to racial injustice in America.” Among the things that needed to be done were
compelling Congress and local governments to be more responsive to the “present mood of
urgency,” engaging in negotiations with labor unions, only spending money in integrated
business establishments, protesting against real estate boards and banks that discriminated
against African Americans, curbing police brutality, accelerating the desegregation of schools,
and registering more southern blacks to vote. 78 Many of the issues that Clark highlighted were
of special interest to northern blacks where the civil rights movement had to be more concerned
with eliminating de facto rather than de jure segregation.
A. Philip Randolph emphasized that the objectives of the March on Washington were to
both provide support for the passage of the civil rights bill before Congress, and to challenge the
conscience of the nation to do what was morally right and support racial equality. Randolph
once again articulated his faith in the American creed and his desire for an interracial coalition
for civil rights. Randolph advocated the need to deepen the relationship among the diverse
coalition for social justice that emerged from the March on Washington. He also pushed the
need for more direct action techniques to press for more jobs for African Americans. Randolph
wanted the March to help unite black civil rights leaders with community leaders and religious
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leaders in order to foster a more tightly coordinated movement. And similar to Bayard Rustin,
even in the wake of the Birmingham bombing, Randolph maintained that nonviolent protest was
the only viable method of securing social change. 79
The successful execution of the March on Washington and the campaign in Birmingham
demonstrated the viability of nonviolent mass action to bring about significant social change.
The protesters had been able to prick the nation’s conscience in order for more Americans to
recognize the immorality of racial segregation. For black leaders, in the centennial of the
Emancipation Proclamation, they were going to continue to agitate for racial equality in order to
harness blacks’ discontent and transform it into a constructive movement for change.

The Fall and Winter of Our Discontent

It was no coincidence that both James Baldwin and Bayard Rustin both discussed the
state of educational segregation in New York City as they analyzed the effects of the March on
Washington and the church bombing in Birmingham. Both were making the points that the civil
rights movement was not only a southern phenomenon and that segregation was not only a
southern problem. Segregation was a seemingly intractable problem in northern cities as well.
New York City was very much a part of the civil rights struggle. Among the major issues that
plagued New York City was the continued racial segregation in the public schools.
In the months after the Brown decision the New York City Board of Education pledged to
comply with the spirit and letter of the Supreme Court mandate. But nearly a decade later,
Baldwin, Rustin, Clark, and Galamison all pointed out that the schools in New York City had
become more segregated rather than less. African American and Puerto Rican children were
79
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making up an increasing percentage of the public school population in the city. This was the
result of both growing black and Puerto Rican populations in New York City, as well as the
decline of white children in the public schools due to white families leaving the city and white
children being placed into private and parochial schools. Whereas black and Latino children
comprised 37 percent of the nearly one million pupils in public schools in 1960, they made up 43
percent of the student population by 1964. 80
But according to black leaders, the increasing segregation in New York City schools was
also the result of the Board of Education’s policies. Although the board had commissioned
numerous studies over the previous nine years from various groups, both internal and external;
had participated in and convened numerous conferences on how to achieve racially integrated
schools; and made sundry promises to African American leaders to devise and implement plans
for integration, little had been accomplished. The Board did not do much to implement the
recommendations of its own commission as far as rezoning its school districts or building
schools in racially mixed areas, and the plans that it did put into place were only done on a small
scale, so they did not affect enough students to bring about significant integration. 81
Milton Galamison had had numerous personal confrontations with the New York City
Board of Education, going back to his days as president of the Brooklyn NAACP in the late
1950s. He frequently expressed his dissatisfaction with the direction and pace of Board policies
regarding desegregation, as well as his distrust of school leaders. 82 As a result, by the beginning
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of 1963 he was beyond fed up with the inaction of the Board of Education and he openly
questioned the sincerity of the Board’s willingness to actually bring about racial integration. 83
Two occurrences that would have likely added to Galamison’s frustration during the
spring were an invitation to yet another conference to take place in May about how to bring
about integration in New York City’s schools, for he had said in no uncertain terms that the time
for conferences was passed. 84 The other, the release of a report by the City Commission on
Human Rights (CCHR) in April that further substantiated many of his criticisms of Board
policies. The report declared that racial segregation in New York City’s schools had indeed
increased in recent years and blamed the lack of a “firm and clearly defined commitment on the
part of policy makers and top administrators of the school system, to the vital necessity of
providing an integrated educational experience” for the regression. 85 The CCHR also
emphasized the need to rezone the city’s school districts and select school sites with integration
as the top priority, something that the Board had not done on a consistent basis and something
Galamison had also advocated for several years by 1963.
In addition to the report by the City Commission, only a couple of months later the
commissioner of the New York State Department of Education, James Allen, issued a directive
that all school boards throughout the state would have to develop and implement plans in order
to achieve racial balance in schools. All schools with more than 50 percent nonwhite students
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would be considered unbalanced and need to be brought into compliance. The mandate was
“drastic,” in the word of the Pittsburgh Courier, but also probably necessary to prod the city’s
Board of Education to act affirmatively to achieve racial integration. 86
Galamison and his grassroots organization, the Parents’ Workshop for Equality in New
York City Schools (PWE), as well as other civil rights organizations in the city were all
frustrated by the pattern of study, report, recommendation, and inaction exhibited by the Board
of Education over the last decade. In this year of growing militancy and mass actions, as
exhibited by the campaign in Birmingham and the March on Washington, and a rising tide of
discontent over the current state of education for black and Puerto Rican youth in New York,
organizations in the city were disposed to take a stronger stance against the Board. As a result of
the collective belief that more direct pressure needed to be put on school leaders in order to
compel action, numerous groups joined together to form the New York Citywide Committee for
Integrated Schools in the summer of 1963. The Citywide Committee consisted of the Parents’
Workshop; the Harlem Parents Committee (HPC), another grassroots group only recently
established that desired a more militant approach to attacking school segregation; six New York
chapters of the NAACP; several local chapters of CORE; and the Urban League of Greater New
York, which only participated in the decision-making of the committee, but not the protests. 87
Galamison was chosen to lead the new coalition and with the inclusion of groups such as
Brooklyn CORE—who threatened sit-ins against the Board of Education if city high schools
were not de-zoned and the proportions of black children in academic high schools were not
raised (among other demands)—and the HPC—who had broken from the local NAACP because
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of what they considered to be timidity—Galamison knew that he would enjoy support for mass
action tactics and a more confrontational attitude toward the Board. 88
Galamison’s loyalties were with the rank and file black and Puerto Rican parents who
were struggling against long odds to get the Board of Education to provide their children with the
same quality of education enjoyed by wealthier white children in other parts of the city. He was
willing to grind the entire school system to a halt, if necessary, in order to achieve the goal of
high quality education for all New York City children in an integrated setting. So, Galamison
issued an ultimatum to the Board of Education that it had until September 9 to come with a plan
and a timetable for integrating the schools, although he did not mention the consequences if the
deadline was not met. 89
As historian Clarence Taylor points out, however, Galamison must have been considering
launching a boycott against the Board of Education as early as June of 1963 as he urged the
members of the Parents’ Workshop to attend the group’s meetings in order to prepare for a “big
struggle” that was about to be waged. Galamison also was deflated by Commissioner Allen’s
reversal of his own characterization that 50 percent or more nonwhite students in a school made
it segregated. Allen’s about face was just the latest in a litany of examples of bad faith dealings
between school leaders and civil rights groups. 90
Meetings during the summer between the New York City Board of Education and the
Citywide Committee were not fruitful and the intransigence of the Board helped to unite the
organizations of the Committee in favor of a school boycott in September. 91 After deciding on a
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one-day action, Galamison worked to broaden the coalition of supporters by calling on his
ministerial network. 92 He also brought Bayard Rustin in to organize the boycott, knowing of his
success in organizing the March on Washington.
Realizing the seriousness of the Citywide Committee’s threat to boycott, the Board of
Education came to the negotiating table once again. The result of a more than four hour meeting,
a press release from the Citywide Committee on September 6 stated that in return for calling off
the planned boycott, the Board agreed to furnish a desegregation plan by February of 1964, to
include in its final plan a date for the completion of desegregation throughout the school system,
to include provisions for each school district in its final plan, and to continue to work with civil
rights groups on the final plan. 93
The more militant groups of the committee did not want the boycott to be called off
because they did not believe the Board’s was sincere in its promises. Brooklyn CORE and the
HPC thought the Board was merely stalling for additional time. More moderate elements within
the coalition, however, preferred to call off the boycott and the give the Board a chance to
remain true to its word. While the boycott was called off, Galamison also made it plain that if
the Board did not fulfill its end of the bargain by December 1, then the Committee would issue a
new date for the boycott. 94
As December 1 came and went, no plan came from the Board of Education. Later in the
month School Superintendent Calvin Gross issued a progress report stating that the Board should
continue the Open Enrollment program. The program, launched in 1960, allowed black parents
NAACP would launch a boycott, perhaps for September 9. This is virtually the same challenge issued by the
Citywide Committee.
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whose children were in schools of 85 percent or more black and Puerto Rican to transfer their
children into predominantly white schools. 95 Galamison considered this a “breach of faith” and
was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back in the always-tense relationship between the
Board of Education and the Citywide Committee. The boycott would be back on for February 3,
1964. 96
As the Citywide Committee prepared for its boycott, black leaders in other cities were
initiating their own actions to bring pressure to bear on their school boards. Leaders from civil
rights groups in Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, and Chester, Pennsylvania, met in New York City
in January of 1964 in attempt to try and coordinate their actions for racially integrated schools.
All of the delegates in attendance gave similar accounts of the patterns of school segregation in
their cities and states. Galamison hoped that the result of the meeting would be a multi-city
school boycott, and he was optimistic that one would occur. He even released a statement to the
press to this effect on January 14. 97 The accounts of the representatives from these cities
illustrated that school segregation was by no means just a southern problem, however. A multicity boycott might have been able to draw attention to the schooling inequities that persisted
outside of the South, as well. No concrete plans had been made for a multi-city boycott,
however, and none would be. 98
The preparations for a boycott in New York City continued unabated throughout the
month of January. The Citywide Committee was becoming increasingly cohesive as a result of
the Board of Education’s unwillingness to release a substantive program and timetable for
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integration, and Galamison went on the offensive to get publicity for the boycott. On Sunday,
January 19, Galamison appeared on the CBS program Newsmakers. On the program he situated
the impending boycott as part of the national civil rights struggle and justified the boycott as
necessary to bring to the public’s attention the “‘Negro’s resentment to segregation and inferior
schools.’” 99
While Galamison was increasingly confident about the chances for a successful boycott
in the coming weeks due to the unified stance of the organizations the were part of the Citywide
Committee, the Newsmakers appearance revealed that there were divisions between Galamison
and other liberal black leaders. Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young, leaders of the national
NAACP and Urban League, reiterated that they did not support the New York City boycott. Roy
Wilkins criticized the Committee’s tactic, saying that the NAACP was not committing itself to
the spread of boycotts nor should children be kept out of school. 100 Whitney Young’s critique
was more personally directed at Galamison, implying that he was using the issue of school
desegregation in New York in order to make himself a leader of national importance and that he
had not earned the notoriety he was receiving. 101 The stances of these national leaders perhaps
also pointed up continuing differences in the preferred approaches of many NAACP and Urban
League local branches—of which several had joined the Citywide Committee—and the national
headquarters. The nature of Young’s attack on Galamison and the history of conflict between
Galamison and Wilkins going back to the late 1950s made the personal dimension of their
criticisms of the boycott obvious. Soon afterwards Kenneth Clark would also come out against
the boycott. Despite also being an outspoken critic of the Board of Education, Clark rejected
Galamison’s tactic and instead called for school improvement as the best way to bring about
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integration. 102 In addition to whatever personal antagonisms existed among Wilkins, Young and
Clark towards Galamison, there were also ideological differences between the men that helped
create the tensions between them.
Galamison was someone who embraced grassroots mobilization. He looked to get
ordinary people as involved as possible in bringing about their own liberation. He had begun the
Schools Workshop as president of the NAACP in the late 1950s and the resistance to his tactics
from within the Brooklyn branch and the national headquarters led him to leave the organization
and establish the Parents’ Workshop as an independent group. As president of the Parents’
Workshop, and as the boycott was being organized, ordinary parents rose to leadership positions.
Racial liberal leaders such as Wilkins, Young, and Clark were not advocates of mass
action tactics, even though the NAACP and NUL did support or engage in them on occasion.
Generally speaking, they, and racial liberals more broadly, preferred for a leadership class to try
and orchestrate the direction of the civil rights movement. Liberal leaders preferred to engage in
negotiations with their adversaries in order to try and control the course of the movement. They
saw little role for the masses of ordinary citizens, who were extremely difficult (if not
impossible) to control in a demonstration situation, and whom they always feared would damage
the movement. Racial liberal leaders, typically, did not believe that people less educated than
they were capable of articulating their own demands for civil rights or being trained to lead their
own movement for emancipation. 103 Therefore, it was not surprising that Wilkins and Young,
especially, would disparage the actions of the Citywide Committee.
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Not only racial liberal leaders opposed the tactics and premises of the Galamison and the
Citywide Committee, however. Throughout the summer and fall of 1963, George Schuyler
editorialized that the strategy of the “professional weepers” was totally misguided. 104 Similar to
Kenneth Clark, Schuyler argued that black activists should be concerning themselves with trying
to improve predominantly black schools throughout the city. Schuyler misrepresented the
position of Galamison and the Citywide Committee, however, by asserting that they believed
black children merely needed to be sitting in the same classrooms as white children in order to
obtain a high quality education. Schuyler painted with quite a broad brush as he argued that
black leaders who advocated for racially integrated schools believed in the inherent superiority
of white children (He would have likely included Kenneth Clark in that group). He then spun
that straw argument to declare that the decision to pursue integration through boycotts and other
confrontational means sent the harmful message to black children that they were inferior to white
children. 105
Rather than continue engage in “warfare against white folks,” as he would term the
school boycott after the fact, Schuyler continued to press the ideas blacks would have to
recognize that they would only achieve integration at the pace that whites were comfortable with,
and that they needed to engage in “voluntary segregation.” Arguing that full racial integration
would not even be beneficial for African Americans at this historical moment because of their
educational and economic deficiencies, blacks needed to engage in economic “communalism”
for their mutual benefit. They needed to pool their money together and form all-black
institutions in order to circumvent the discrimination that they continue to endure from white
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institutions. 106 Schuyler had been advocating that blacks could not compel whites to embrace
integration and for communalism as the path to economic advancement since the mid-1930s.
These are examples of the influence of Booker T. Washington’s self-help philosophy on his
thinking.
Despite the criticisms from black liberals, conservatives, and the Board of Education, the
planning for the boycott would continue and as February 3 neared the logistics for the various
demonstrations around the city, as well as the operation of “Freedom Schools” to be staffed by
college professors, ministers, college students, and parents fell into place. A few days before the
boycott, on January 29, 1964, the Board of Education released its integration plan for city
schools. The plan offered nothing substantively different than what it had already done. The
Board also released a statement that implied that the supporters of the boycott were creating
harmful divisions among city residents and that there was only so much that the Board of
Education could do, as one institution, to remedy the problem of school segregation. The Board
continued to blame residential segregation for the monolithic school populations across the
city. 107
The next day Galamison and the Citywide Committee rejected the Board’s latest proposal
to integrate public schools by September of 1966. 108 Members called the plan “inadequate and
deceptive.” In a last ditch effort to try and avoid the boycott, school leaders invited delegates
from the Citywide Committee to meet on January 31 to discuss proposals for school integration,
but it was pretty clear from the point of view of Galamison and the Citywide Committee that
they would not be persuaded to call off the boycott. Although Galamison stated that he would
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meet with Board of Education members “in good faith,” he emphasized that the Board could
have met with members of the Citywide Committee at any time during the fall but had chosen
not to. He called the meeting what it was, “an 11th hour marathon session” in order to try and
forestall the boycott, and saw dim prospects for any breakthroughs. 109
Predictably, the meeting on January 31 was unproductive. The two sides could not even
agree on the purpose of the meeting. Both sides were speaking past one another and nothing
substantive was accomplished. The Board was not prepared to issue a new integration plan and
the Citywide Committee had no intention of calling off the boycott set for three days time. At
the end of the meeting Deputy School Superintendent Bernard Donovan declared that the Board
would no longer stand in the way of the boycott. 110 Nothing more could be done to stop it. The
only questions that remained was whether or not it would be successful at keeping children out
of school, getting parents and others to picket, and garnering the necessary publicity to compel
the Board to reconsider its proposals.
The answers would be delivered on February 3. The Board of Education estimated that
nearly 45 percent of school children did not attend classes that day, and neither did nearly 8
percent of teachers. The normal rate of absence among teachers was around 3 percent. There
was peaceful picketing at 300 schools across the city and about 3,500 demonstrators braved
frigid temperatures as they marched to the Board of Education for a noon rally. Nearly 100,000
children attended the various Freedom Schools that had been set up throughout the city,
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according to boycott leaders. That figure represented more than twenty percent of the children
who remained out of the public schools that day. 111
After learning of these figures, Bayard Rustin deemed the march a tremendous success,
declaring it to have been the largest civil rights demonstration in the nation’s history. 112 It
demonstrated that the Citywide Committee had the ability to coordinate a large-scale
demonstration that could unite African American and Puerto Rican residents, and that they might
potentially wield the type of power necessary to compel the Board to act in ways they favored.
Rustin told the press that “we are on the threshold of a new political movement” and the “the
winds of discontent are about to sweep over the city.” Rustin also warned reporters that “the
civil rights revolution has reached out of the South and is now knocking at our own door.” 113 Of
course, the “civil rights revolution” had been occurring simultaneously in the North and South
over the last decade, but Rustin was sensing the extent to which 1963 was a year of convergence.
Throughout the year, the discontent felt by African Americans across the country was
manifesting itself in larger and larger mass demonstrations and an unwillingness to countenance
any tactics that tried to delay the conferring of full equality. Blacks had wanted 1963 to be the
year in which their emancipation was finally completed. And they had decided that they had to
be the ones to accelerate that process.
The Board of Education, for their part, tried to downplay to impact of the boycott. Board
of Education president, James Donovan, called the boycott “lawless” and swore that he would
not “react one inch” to the demands of the protesters, asserting that boycott leaders had
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intimidated parents into keeping their children home by referring to the possibility of violence.
Donovan ultimately declared the boycott a “fizzle.” 114
But the numbers of children and teachers absent from the schools that day told a different
story. The Citywide Committee had pulled off this very large demonstration that had brought
together a broad coalition of supporters. And after hearing the continued resistance of the school
leadership, Galamison wanted to strike again while the iron was hot. Riding high after the
success of February 3, Galamison declared there would be another boycott on February 25
before he even spoke to the other members of the Citywide Committee. He was certain they
would back the idea. He would be incorrect as divisions among the various groups within the
coalition began to emerge within days after the boycott. 115
The Citywide Committee, as was the movement nationally, was at a crossroads.
Committee leaders were divided as to the future course the movement should take; whether
another boycott was wise and whether Galamison should remain president. The local chapters of
CORE and the NAACP would pull out of the Citywide Committee within weeks after the
boycott, and the withdrawal of other groups that followed tore the Citywide Committee apart at
the seams. Nationally, black leaders also considered the movement at a critical moment of
decision. How should the movement proceed in order to take fullest advantage of these seasons
of discontent would be the question to be debated throughout 1964 and 1965.
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Chapter 6
Crossroads: Where Do We Go From Here?

All civil rights organizations are committed to full inclusion
of the Negro in the economic and political life of America
without restrictions based on race or color. But each differs
from the other as to how this commitment can best be
fulfilled.
Kenneth Clark 1

As early as the summer of 1963, African American leaders were growing more concerned
about the current state—and future direction—of the civil rights movement. For the next several
years black leaders and activists from across the ideological spectrum would engage in
evaluating the present condition of the civil rights movement. Many concluded that the
movement, particularly the liberal-led movement as epitomized by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was reaching a “crisis” point. Perhaps ironically, it was the increasing momentum of the liberal
movement that caused some leaders to conclude that the movement was entering a state of crisis.
For the problems facing African Americans across the nation did not appear to be abating rapidly
enough—if at all—even after integrating Birmingham, carrying off the March on Washington,
and subsequently effectively bringing enough pressure to bear on the federal government to help
push the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through Congress.
The growing collective frustration among African Americans about the lack of qualitative
change in their economic, political, and social conditions by the end of 1965, and the resulting
ideological debates among black leaders fractured the civil rights movement in ways, and to a
degree, that could not be reconciled—or co-opted by racial liberals—as had been done earlier in
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the 1960s. After Birmingham and the March on Washington, and even more so after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act, black leaders were asking, “where do we go from here?” After assessing
the current strengths and perceived weaknesses of the civil rights movement, these leaders
offered different analyses of the direction in which the movement needed to go, and the
programs for achieving their objective: ameliorating the myriad problems that continued to
plague African Americans as a group.

Is This a Good or Bad Place?

There were measurable achievements between 1963 and 1965, indicating that the civil
rights movement was operating from a position of strength. The battle to desegregate
Birmingham had been a pivotal episode in the continuing struggle for equality. The confluence
of forces in that place in the spring of 1963 revitalized the liberal-led civil rights movement. The
courage of the black population, especially the youth, in enduring beatings and jailings for their
cause brought the cruelty of Eugene “Bull” Connor’s police department into even sharper relief
for the world to see on film and in print. Black and white Americans, and eventually the federal
government, were galvanized to stop the abuses.
The psychological, moral, physical, and tactical momentum derived from opening up “the
most segregated city in the South” carried over to the March on Washington. Only a few months
later Bayard Rustin orchestrated the largest public demonstration up until that time as 250,000
Americans, across races, converged on the nation's capital on August 28 to express their
dissatisfaction and disappointment with their country, as well as their hope and love for it, and
their desire for first-class citizenship for all Americans regardless of race, color, creed, or gender.
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The belief in the democratic creed of America was the message that resounded loudest in the
press after the march ended and the participants headed home. African American leaders gained
more leverage with political leaders as media coverage of the march was widely favorable. The
barbarity of Birmingham, the civility in the capital, and Lyndon Johnson’s political bargaining
with reluctant Senators helped to propel the passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964.
These positive events did not convince African American leaders that the fight for
equality was won, however. Not all were even convinced that the civil rights movement was
operating from a position of strength. George Schuyler, for example, had no tolerance for mass
action protests or civil disobedience techniques to gain civil rights. During the 1950s, Schuyler
wrote more for conservative publications including The Freeman, American Opinion, and
National Review. By the early 1960s, Schuyler was also becoming more involved in
organizations that “tried to bring attention to the Communist participation in anticolonial
movements.” 2
Throughout the 1960s he consistently derided civil rights leaders as “career agitators”
who manipulated a less intelligent black public and used them as “pawns” in order to advance
their own selfish, egomaniacal ambitions. 3 Schuyler’s views became increasingly strident over
the course of the decade. By the end of 1966 he was referring to the tactics of the liberal
movement since 1954 as “the more extreme campaign.” 4 In 1967, Schuyler even became a
member of the ultra-conservative John Birch Society, which vehemently opposed the civil rights
2
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movement. Until 1964, however, Schuyler’s commentary continued to be featured in the
Pittsburgh Courier even though his support base among African Americans declined during the
1950s and 1960s. 5
Schuyler was the most dismissive of the liberal civil rights movement of black
intellectuals at the time, but he was not alone in being very critical of liberal intellectuals.
Harold Cruse, for example, also penned biting criticisms of liberal intellectuals. Cruse argued in
his 1967 work, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, that “integrationist” black leadership—and
by “integrationist” he meant assimilationist—was ideologically bankrupt. As he put it, “They
have taken on a radical veneer without radical substance, yet have no comprehensive radical
philosophy to replace either the liberalism they denounce or the radicalism of the past that bred
them.” 6 For Cruse, the big problem was that African American intellectuals were not willing or
able to liberate themselves from the theoretical and aesthetic constructs derived by whites,
whether those whites were Marxists, communists, or liberals. As a result, as black thinkers
continued to apply these alien constructs to the African American condition in the United States
in the mid-twentieth century, they were continually frustrated by their inadequacy. 7 But Cruse
indicted black intellectuals for being complicit in their own subjugation and the relative failure of
the civil rights movement to be truly transformative of American society. 8 This was not a
viewpoint Cruse arrived at in 1967. He had expressed the idea that assimilationism was
defective back in the mid-1950s, speaking specifically in a cultural vein, due to his less than
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savory experience as a member of the Committee for Negroes in the Arts (CNA), an interracial
group of left-wing and liberal artists, playwrights, novelists, and actors founded in Harlem in
1947. 9
Criticisms of their ideological beliefs aside, black leaders were concerned about the
future of the movement. 10 All things were being reevaluated in 1964 and 1965: the goals of the
civil rights movement, the character of the movement, and its tactics. The movement’s
ostensible successes were changing many leaders’ perceptions of what the primary focus of the
movement should be. As a result, the ideological ground of the civil rights movement was
shifting under everyone’s proverbial feet. What had been the effect of the civil rights movement
on African Americans? On the larger society? What was the nature of the civil rights
movement? Had it changed? Did it now need to change? What were the roles of violence and
nonviolence in the movement? These were all very important and difficult questions that
appeared to plague leaders.

A Civil Rights Revolution?

Between 1954 and 1964 A. Philip Randolph consistently spoke of the civil rights
movement as a “revolution.” 11 There were two things that marked the civil rights movement as a

9

Harold Cruse, “A List of Particulars on Committee for the Negro in the Arts,” n.d., Box 2, Folder 6,
Correspondence, 1952-1959, Harold Cruse Papers, Archives of the Tamiment Library, Robert F. Wagner Archives,
New York University, New York. Will be referred to subsequently as the HC Papers; Cruse also discusses the CNA
in some depth in Crisis, 207-12, 214-20.
10
Kenneth Clark, for example, wrote in 1964 that, “There are many indications that the civil rights struggle can
be lost by negroes and by America.” Kenneth Clark, “Undercurrents of Negro Thought Today,” 1964, 8, Box 159,
Folder 4, Professional File, Speeches & Writings, Feb. 1962-Sept. 1965, KBC Papers, Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
11
A. Philip Randolph, “State of the Race Conference,” April 24, 1956, 1, Box 39, Folder 15, Speeches &
Writing File, Speeches, 1956, A. Philip Randolph Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.; A. Philip Randolph, “Statement to the National Negro Publishers Summit Meeting, May 12-13, 1958, 1, Box

218

revolution in Randolph’s estimation. One was that the movement was beyond the control of
sitting authorities, unabashed and unapologetic as it pushed for the privileges of first-class
citizenship for all Americans. 12 This theme was prevalent in the speeches Randolph gave during
the 1950s. The Brown decision and the resultant protests for school integration or access
(including Montgomery) reflected this quality of the struggle for equality. The second was the
effect the movement had on the consciousness of African Americans as a group. As he put it,
“the complete orientation of the Negro from an old slave psychology to that of a free man, and
that his status of the under-class or social, economic and political substratum of the American
society is not an inherent end and inevitable part of his human condition . . . and further, that it is
his responsibility to change it.” 13 The second theme becomes more fully developed in
Randolph’s speeches during the 1960s. This might have been a result of the campaign in
Birmingham and the March on Washington. Randolph’s assertion about a new psychology on
the part of African Americans also fit with Rustin’s assertions about the significance of
Birmingham, discussed in chapter 5. Additionally, the purpose of the movement was to
complete what had been left undone since the “Civil War Revolution” had been turned back in
1876. Over the course of the decade Randolph had at different times expressed doubt about the
ultimate outcome of the civil rights movement. He was uncertain if African Americans had the
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intestinal fortitude to see the movement through to the end. Yet he never appeared to doubt the
revolutionary character of the movement itself. 14
By the mid-1960s, however, the character of the civil rights movement was definitely
being debated. In his influential 1965 essay, “From Protest to Politics,” Bayard Rustin also
argued that the African American struggle for equality was “essentially revolutionary.” Rustin
argued that what made the movement revolutionary was its objective of qualitatively
transforming American economic and social institutions. 15 In fact, Rustin maintained that the
revolutionary character of the civil rights struggle was evidenced in what the movement had
done to democratize American life for whites, perhaps even more than for blacks. It had done so
by banishing the last vestiges of McCarthyism with the 1960 sit-ins; by attacking de facto school
segregation in cities; and by sparking the “resurgence of social conscience” that initiated Lyndon
Johnson’s call for a “war on poverty.” 16 Rustin saw the civil rights revolution occurring in class
terms as much as racial terms. And he continually argued that the ultimate success of the
revolution required the including of benefits to be both blacks and whites.
Kenneth Clark asked near the end of 1965, if the term “revolution obscure[d] more than it
clarifie[d]” about the “nature of the Negro protest movement.” 17 He argued that the civil rights
movement was only revolutionary in terms of the complete change in the psychology of African
Americans and the urgent demand for immediate changes to their racial status within American
society. But Clark would go no further. Neither Clark nor Rustin argued that the movement was
14
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revolutionary in the sense that leaders were calling for the violent overthrow of the government.
This type of strategy would have been doomed to fail due to blacks’ statistical minority in the
American population, according to Clark. 18 In fact, he remarked that the “Negro protest
movement, on the contrary, has been marked by an extreme form of self-discipline on the part of
the masses of Negroes and has accurately been described as ‘nonviolent.’” 19
In terms of how Rustin’s and Clark’s perspectives on the essential nature of the civil
rights movement affected their views on what should be the movement’s future direction, Rustin
advocated the reconstruction of American institutions so as to change the institutional structure
of American society, Clark wrote that, “the Negro protest movement extends—and does not
deny—the implications of the original American Revolution.” 20
This statement may sound somewhat vague, but it gets at the ideological differences
between Rustin and Clark, and thereby between liberals and socialists. Rustin and Clark both
believed that what African Americans ultimately wanted was to be fully integrated into
American society. They wanted to enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship afforded to
white Americans under the Constitution. Rustin, however, believed that not all whites currently
enjoyed first-class citizenship. Therefore, American society needed to be altered at a structural
level in order to even out the playing field for all Americans, regardless of race and class.
Although though he surely knew that class was an important factor in determining a person’s
quality of life, and knew that not all whites lived the same way, privileged racial identification
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over class affiliation in his analysis of the problems plaguing American society and the civil
rights movement. Consequently, he flattened notions of socioeconomic class among both blacks
and whites and did not advocate altering the economic structure of the country in the same ways
as Rustin.
Rustin and Clark were not the only leaders evaluating the character of the civil rights
movement. Harold Cruse asserted that whatever revolutionary potential existed within the
liberal civil rights movement was being “compromised not only by the hard barriers thrown up
by the [white] establishment but by a [black] leadership whose views about American realities
are extremely a-historical, limited and oversimplified.” 21 Never one to mince words, Cruse
believed the liberal movement lacked a revolutionary ideology and therefore could not be
revolutionary. 22 In his view, the liberal movement amounted to much sound and fury, signifying
little. For him, the question was even broader than the inadequacies of the liberal movement, for
Cruse saw a vacuum within “revolutionary politics,” which neither the civil rights movement nor
the “Marxist movement” was able to fill in the mid-1960s. 23
Malcolm X agreed with Cruse that the civil rights movement was not revolutionary. He
argued that true revolutionaries did not attempt to work within the structures that they deemed
oppressive. Rather, true revolutions were like “forest fires,” razing everything in their paths.
Malcolm, who, like Cruse, continually sought to internationalize the black freedom struggle,

21

Harold Cruse, “The Roots of Black Nationalism, Part 1,” Liberator, (March 1964), 4, Box 3, Folder 34, Book
Reviews by Cruse (Misc), n.d., 1950-1951, 1962, 1964, HC Papers, Archives of the Tamiment Library, Robert F.
Wagner Archives, New York University, New York.
22
Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, 201.
23
Harold Cruse, “Marxism and the Negro, Part 1,” Liberator, (May 1964), 8, Box 3, Folder 34, Book Reviews
by Cruse (Misc), n.d., 1950-1951, 1962, 1964, HC Papers, Archives of the Tamiment Library, Robert F. Wagner
Archives, New York University, New York.

222

believed that whites had co-opted the civil rights movement in order to disconnect from the
global anti-colonial movements occurring throughout Asia and Africa. 24
George Schuyler also did not regard the civil rights movement as revolutionary.
However, Schuyler’s reason was that he found the current tactics employed by the liberal
movement to be too radical. He viewed the civil rights movement as unnecessarily combative
and disruptive. Worse than much sound and fury, signifying nothing, the movement definitely
signified something: everything that was corrupt about African American leadership and devoid
of a “responsible,” viable, ideological grounding. Schuyler characteristically lumped all groups
to the left of himself (which was virtually everyone) into the same category and made no attempt
to acknowledge any ideological or programmatic differences among them. At the end of 1966,
he enthusiastically declared a “requiem” for the “revolution.”
So the so-called revolution is dead, as even dolts and morons could predict; and
the “educated” blacks and whites who promoted it with demonstrations and dollars are as
discredited as Benedict Arnold. After a half century of agitating the racial question, the
Socialists, Communists, Fabians and assorted Liberals now characteristically blame their
failure on “hatred”, “reaction” and the capitalist system which must, of course, be
overthrown to provide a vacuum for the welfare state. 25
He argued that the whole concept of a Negro Revolution was “fraudulent” because blacks did not
at the time—or ever before—want a revolution. As evidence, he derisively cited the fact that the
event put forth as the greatest demonstration of African Americans’ desire for democracy, the
1963 March of Washington, brought out only 200,000 people—half of them white—out of a
black population of more than five million within a 300-mile radius of the capital. 26 To
Schuyler, this illustrated not only that the majority of blacks were unsympathetic to the
24
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movement, but also that the March on Washington and the entire “extreme” civil rights
campaign was the work of professional agitators.

The Role of Nonviolence and Violence in the Civil Rights Movement

As demonstrated here, there were various stances among black leaders about the
character of the civil rights movement. Their different interpretations of the term “revolution”
led them to different conclusions about whether or not they saw the movement as
“revolutionary.” Their discussions also revealed important ideological differences among black
leaders. But the character of the civil rights struggle became an important issue in the mid 1960s
precisely because all of them were concerned with trying to plot the future direction of the
movement. Now, in 1964 and 1965, just as during the previous decade, various ideologies were
competing with one another for the soul of the movement. The African American struggle for
equality was at a crossroads and needed novel ideas to address the changing nature of the
problems facing African Americans. The problems included de jure segregation, poverty, rising
unemployment, and housing discrimination. All of these leaders were sensing (or asserting) that
using nonviolent direct action, as exemplified and implemented by Martin Luther King, to
combat brutality of all types was losing steam (or perhaps had run its course) by 1964.
Kenneth Clark had two major criticisms of the philosophy and tactic of nonviolent
resistance. One was that implementing the technique was incredibly demanding on the
participants, both physically and psychologically, and that the “deep commitment and power of
the human personality” required in order to sustain this mode of resistance was far from an
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inexhaustible resource. 27 Clark also thought that the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance was
too directly dependent upon “the ferocity of the resistance it meets.” 28 If whites restrained their
violent attacks—as in Albany, Georgia in 1962—, or demonstrated indifference to blacks’
protests, then nonviolent resistance lost the moral high ground it sought to claim in the public’s
consciousness and the force of the technique was blunted. 29
By the end of 1965 Clark acknowledged that many African Americans had lost patience
with nonviolent resistance. In a speech at Brandeis University in Massachusetts, Clark said:
“[i]ndeed, the masses of Negroes seemed more responsive to a Malcolm X type of verbal
defiance than to the Martin Luther King philosophy of love of the oppressor. As a matter of fact,
rage is a more prevalent feeling than love among oppressed Negroes. And psychologically, it is
the appropriate, even healthy response to racial hatred and injustice.” 30 This observation
reflected Clark’s loss of patience with King’s approach to activism. Although Clark was no
supporter of black nationalism, neither was he lamenting the shift away from the “love thy
oppressor” philosophy of Martin Luther King.
Kenneth Clark even sought to redefine the concept of violence in order to make it more
relevant to what he saw as the emerging battlegrounds for agitation. Clark urged those who
heard him speak during 1964 and 1965 to broaden their conception of violence beyond the naked
brutality as practiced in places like Birmingham. He challenged his listeners to look at urban
ghettoes, locales perhaps outside of the South and non-rural, as “chronic concentration camps”
27
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that “destroy” human beings. Clark called urban ghettoes “prisons” that were “inherent[ly]
dehumanizing and destructive,” and argued that forcing a particular racial group to reside in
these conditions was a form of violence. 31
Bayard Rustin also spoke of a “crisis of nonviolence” in the summer of 1964 and made
the argument that blacks were moving away from the “love white people” philosophy of King. 32
In an article titled “Nonviolence on Trial,” which appeared in Fellowship magazine in July of
1964, Rustin wrote,

[i]n the case for nonviolence, now I happen to believe . . . that the Negro
community is no longer taking Martin Luther King’s brand of nonviolence. . . . [N]o
Negro leader if he wants to be listened to is going to tell any Negroes that they should
love white people. Furthermore, I won’t do it because I won’t encourage that kind of
psychological dishonesty. They don’t love them, they have no need to love them, no
basis on which they can love them. Who can love people who do these things to
people? 33
Rustin did not object to nonviolence as a philosophy. In fact, he had taught King much of what
he knew about Gandhian nonviolent resistance. Rustin was, of course, a lifelong pacifist and
was of the view that violent action succeeded in doing nothing but “degrading” the participants
and inciting overreaction. 34
Later that summer after the Harlem Riot of 1964, in which looting and outbreaks of
violent clashes between black residents and police lasted for several days, Rustin wrote about his
experience walking Harlem’s streets during the days of the riot and used the piece to argue for
the continued relevance and necessity of nonviolence. Rustin felt the vandalism and attendant
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violence in Harlem was indicative of the “utter despair” that characterized the lives of Harlem’s
poorest residents, particularly the young adults. 35 He chose to see the 1964 Harlem Riot as a
microcosm of the collective frustrations that blacks in urban ghettoes were feeling throughout the
country. The riot was a desperate, inchoate attempt at getting the larger society to recognize
their humanity. An issue that Rustin did not deal with, however, was what the riot may have
signified about the relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction of civil rights efforts in New York City.
Granted, his point in the short article was to advocate nonviolence, but the riot could also be
interpreted as a response to local civil rights activity. The article can also be interpreted as
Rustin’s attempt to resuscitate the concept of nonviolence before too many urban black were
“lost” in efforts to violently retaliate against whites for their living conditions, as alluded to in
the rhetoric of Malcolm X.
There was much to be upset about in New York City during the summer of 1964. And
for many poor blacks in New York City, Malcolm had been the leader explaining their condition
most accurately. After the successful schools boycott in February, an attempt to stage a second
boycott on 16 March 1964, resulted in the fracturing of the citywide coalition of civil rights
organizations that had coordinated the first boycott. The participation of the second boycott was
estimated at 267,459 students, only half the number of the first boycott. As Clarence Taylor
notes, however, even though a significant number of children stayed away from school that day,
neither boycott resulted in significant policy changes on the part of the Board of Education. 36
Racial inequality in public education persisted.
Black New Yorkers also continued to live in substandard conditions throughout the city.
Harlem activist, Jesse Gray, and later the Brooklyn chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality
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(CORE), publicized their plight as they worked to enlist African American residents in Harlem
and Bedford-Stuyvesant to refuse paying rent until conditions in their buildings were improved.
The rent-strike movement gained momentum during the early months of 1964 as Brooklyn
CORE worked to mobilize residents to stand up to those criminally negligent landlords who
continued to charge exorbitant rents for apartments infested with rats and bugs, that were
firetraps due to faulty electrical wiring, and otherwise dangerous and unclean conditions due to
rotting floors, and maggot-filled bathtubs. 37
Rustin understood that the economic conditions of urban blacks contributed greatly to
their feelings of alienation from America. This feeling was not new to African Americans.
Rustin felt that the civil rights movement now had to go in a different direction away from
relying on protest tactics and toward more concerted political action. 38 He would not, however,
support the Nation of Islam’s and Malcolm X’s separatist rhetoric and their belief that American
civilization was to be brought to a fiery, violent end. Rustin did not miss an opportunity to
inveigh against Malcolm X and the NOI. Nevertheless, something was indeed missing from the
liberal approach to civil rights.
By asserting that the philosophy and tactic of nonviolence was “on trial” by 1964, Rustin
was alluding to an even larger debate that was occurring in the civil rights movement—and was
soon to be occurring within the nation. Liberal primacy in the civil rights movement was “on
trial” by 1964. It might be fair to say that liberalism, itself, was on trial. The ideological fissures
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among black leaders—always present and shifting—were growing rapidly during 1964 and
1965. As new and difficult questions arose for leaders as to how to continue to maintain the
relevance and effectiveness of the civil rights movement, racial liberals found themselves losing
ideological ground to socialists like Bayard Rustin and black nationalists such as Malcolm X and
Harold Cruse.
Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam (NOI) had been arguing that the philosophy of loving
one’s oppressor was not viable for many years by 1964. The Nation and Malcolm X, in his
capacity as national minister, consistently decried the integrationist impulse of the liberal-led
civil rights movement. And even after Malcolm split from the NOI in the spring of 1964 he
continued to disparage nonviolent direct action as “passé” and unintelligent because those who
participated were attempting to work within an immoral and corrupt system. 39
In a question and answer session after a speech in Paris, France, Malcolm even attributed
the conferral of the Nobel Peace Prize to King in November of 1964 as a “ploy by white
capitalists to keep African Americans from defending themselves against brutality.” He
contended that the recent Nobel Peace Prizes given to an African leader who advocated
nonviolence and to Martin Luther King, Jr. were given in order to slow down the realization
among blacks around the world that nonviolence does not work. He also put forth this theory in
order to make the point that despite the machinations of powerful whites, both in America and in
Europe, King’s philosophy—and by extension the liberal ideology—was losing its “grip” on
African Americans. 40 The struggle for self-determination, rights, and equality had extended to
Africa, Asia, and Latin America by the mid-1960s. Malcolm consistently discussed the black
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freedom struggle in global terms by 1964 and he argued that it could no longer be contained by
geographical boundaries or by attempts on the part of white liberals around the world to slow
down the tide of anticolonial movements initiated after World War II.
By 1964, cultural nationalist Harold Cruse also expressed that “the Negro movement
[was] also in a crisis despite its late achievements” and was trying to figure out how to enter its
next phase of development. 41 These leaders, having identified a problem—a rather serious one
in their estimations—were all asking how the civil rights movement needed to change in order to
continue to be constructive and remain relevant.
As leaders of local and national organizations, or as public intellectuals, black New York
intellectuals were helping to shape the contours of the civil rights movement, as it was to be
implemented by the memberships of their groups and be characterized by the larger society.
Many of these black intellectuals were speaking for organizations and for constituencies. The
questions that they struggled with affected organizational positions on various issues and
potential partnerships between organizations in the future.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The fact that African American leaders with such varied ways of looking at the problems
facing black people all declared that the movement was potentially at an impasse is significant.
But that does not mean that they shared the same ideas about how the movement should proceed.
Kenneth Clark, Bayard Rustin, Malcolm X, Harold Cruse, and George Schuyler all had different
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answers to that question. Their ideological proclivities should be considered one major factor in
shaping their differences.
The liberal-led movement had been successful in breaking down many of the legal
barriers to access. This had been the primary strategy of the NAACP since the 1930s and legal
segregation was an easier target to hit with regard to focusing the resources and commitment of a
community for demonstrations. The NAACP won decisions prohibiting segregation in interstate
travel in 1947 and a series of cases pertaining to equality of educational opportunity and access
beginning in the late 1930s and culminating with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. In
addition, the direct-action campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s galvanized many Americans and
prodded Congress to take substantive measures to ensure the civil rights of African Americans.
As the mid-1960s approached, however, even Roy Wilkins, executive director of the
NAACP, who struck a somewhat more optimistic tone than some of his counterparts in his
writings, felt that perhaps the focus of the movement needed to shift from the task of obtaining
legal equality toward trying to remedy the economic problems facing African Americans,
namely poverty and job discrimination. 42 These were issues that socialists such as Bayard
Rustin and A. Phillip Randolph, and black nationalists such as Malcolm X had been urging the
liberal movement to pay more attention to for some time. There were several ideological
obstacles, however, that prevented liberals, socialists, and black nationalists from seeing eye-toeye on how to best remedy economic inequality.
For one thing, economic inequality had never really been the top priority for liberal
leaders. This is partially a reflection of the middle-class socioeconomic standing of liberal
reformers during the Progressive Era when the first modern civil rights organizations were
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established. The lower priority given to economic matters was also reflected in the ideological
debate between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois at the turn of the twentieth century.
In critiquing Washington’s program for racial uplift, Du Bois focused more on pursuing political
and civic equality than economic parity because African Americans were facing
disfranchisement and the construction of the Jim Crow system throughout the South, while there
was little occupational diversity among African Americans. Therefore, for Du Bois and most
other liberals who were creating and expanding modern racial liberal ideology, protecting black
voting power and trying to dismantle legal segregation became their main focus. They believed
that being able to exercise the franchise would ultimately help the cause of increasing economic
opportunity.
When it came to economic issues, early liberal leaders were typically capitalist-oriented
and primarily concerned with job placement, in the vein of the National Urban League. The
Urban League focused on securing jobs for individual blacks by approaching particular
businesses, and also by trying to shape labor policy and the local, state, and national levels. 43
During the 1930s economic issues came to the fore due to the Great Depression, but the primacy
of group economic progress was temporary and receded after the Second World War.
Unlike liberals, socialists such as Randolph and Rustin were consistently trying to
integrate blacks into the broader labor movement and forge partnerships between organized labor
and civil rights organizations. 44 Randolph and Rustin wanted African Americans to unionize
because of the workplace protections that unions provided for their members, the increased
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wages they could bargain for, and because they believed that participation in the organized labor
movement could form the basis for a biracial working-class civil rights movement. 45
During the first half of the twentieth century, however, liberal leaders were generally
ambivalent, if not hostile, to the idea of encouraging blacks to unionize because of the long
history of racial discrimination that existed and continued to be perpetuated among most unions.
Roy Wilkins, for example, pointed to “an astonishing number of methods of discriminating
against Negro workers” still being “in vogue in the organized labor movement” in 1963. He
argued that unions, despite “spotty improvement,” still engaged in many tactics either to isolate
and under serve blacks within unions, or to exclude them from union membership entirely. 46
Kenneth Clark criticized labor unions for “reflecting, for the most part, a racial rigidity” that he
considered detrimental both to the nation and the future of organized labor. 47
Rustin and Randolph both acknowledged that the organized labor movement did have a
long history of racial exclusion and that there were still unions that discriminated against African
Americans. Yet they wanted it to be known that there had been significant progress made in
bringing organized labor into the civil rights struggle. Randolph had personally been responsible
for much of it. Rustin wrote in 1965: “The labor movement, despite its obvious faults, has been
the largest single organized force in this country pushing for progressive legislation.” 48
Beyond continuing to advocate a reciprocal relationship between the civil rights
movement and organized labor, Bayard Rustin began sketching a broader plan for the future
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direction of the civil rights movement in his February 1964 essay “From Protest to Politics.” In
it, Rustin argued that the movement needed to enter a new phase. The “protest” phase of the
struggle had reached the limits of its usefulness and effectiveness in terms of breaking down the
legal foundations of racial discrimination, but racism and the deleterious effects of racism were
far from being destroyed. 49 The movement needed to change its focus and tactics in order to
adapt to the problems that still plagued African Americans. Those problems were primarily
economic, and required economic and political action. This meant African Americans becoming
more involved in formal electoral processes and the federal government “refashioning” the
nation’s political economy. 50
Rustin continued to espouse the need for a “planned” economy throughout 1964 and
1965 as the most effective way to prepare American workers, black and white, for the changes
occurring due to automation and other technological advancements. He contended that “nobody
can tell you what to train people for unless it is done within a planned economy, in which you
know where automation is to take place, at what rate, and what industries it is going to touch.” 51
The changing nature of the American economy was perhaps the most important factor shaping
his vision for the future of the civil rights movement. Educational programs and job training
needed to be transformed and increased in light of these changes. As a Socialist, Rustin
supported changes in the structure of the American economy in order eradicate poverty. He
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articulated a primary role for the federal government in planning the economy in order to achieve
that goal.
Kenneth Clark also believed that the movement needed to develop a comprehensive plan
and strategy in order to achieve its goals “actually rather than merely symbolically.” Yet in line
with the capitalist orientation of most liberals, Clark argued that the solutions would come from
the increased cooperation of black civil rights organizations and the private sector. 52 The federal
government was not given much of a role in forwarding the next stage of activism, much less
promotion of a planned economy. This was particularly interesting considering that racial
liberals, from the 1930s up through the mid 1960s, had looked to the federal government for
assistance and protection against discrimination of all types. Clark continued the theme of the
need for greater action and cooperation among civil rights and social service organizations in
order to eradicate poverty in 1965. In an article on American race relations, Clark made the
claim that agencies had to move into impoverished areas if the ghettoes that blacks were
imprisoned in were ever to be eliminated. 53
Black leaders across the ideological spectrum agreed that the problems contributing to the
racial gap in opportunities to ascend the social ladder were among the most significant problems
facing African Americans by 1964 and 1965. They did not, however, propose the same solutions
to those issues. Rustin argued for an extensive federal outlay of resources in the billions of
dollars and a reorganization of educational and economic institutions in order to prepare poor,
black and white youth for a technologically advancing world. Clark, while agreeing with Rustin
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about the necessity of utilizing all of our human resources in an age of technological
advancement, did not propose of governmental solution to these problems. Rather, the private
sector needed to be convinced that they had a stake in helping to destroy African American
ghettoes by elevating this state of affairs to the level of jeopardizing national security. 54 As a
result, as typical of liberals, Clark’s proposals included appeals to moral conscience, both of
private interests and whites as a group.
Harold Cruse’s proposals included no such appeals to conscience. He did not place much
importance on moral suasion. Rather, he advocated a political solution for blacks. But instead
of mobilizing blacks for the existing political parties, as Rustin did for the Democrats, or
imploring Lyndon Johnson’s administration to pour money into urban centers, Cruse helped
establish an independent political party based in Harlem called the Freedom Now Party (FNP).
According to Cruse, the objective FNP was to achieve “independent black political power in the
U.S. through economic, cultural, and administrative approaches” and to align African Americans
with the global movements against colonialism. 55
Cruse wanted to internationalize the black freedom struggle in the United States. Cruse
saw the “Negro movement” as necessarily connected to the struggles of non-white people all
around the world. He argued that the non-whites of the world had become the “worldproletarians” and that, consequently, in order for any sense of global unity to ever be achieved, a
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“social consciousness” would need to be cultivated. 56 By social consciousness, Cruse meant that
a connection based on class, status, and color—across societies—would need to be established
with the intent of dismantling the global status quo that subordinated non-whites the world over.
Malcolm X also believed that the American black freedom struggle needed to be
broadened. Malcolm, particularly after separating from the Nation of Islam, argued that the civil
rights struggle needed to be thought of—and approached—as a fight for human rights. As a
result, African Americans would be able to compile and present a case to the United Nations that
the United States had violated, and continued to deny, the human rights of African Americans. 57
The organization Malcolm founded after splitting with the NOI, the Organization of AfroAmerican Unity (OAAU) was dedicated to internationalizing the black freedom struggle and
forging links between blacks in the United States and other non-white freedom movements
around the world.
As a leading minister of the NOI, and later, after his estrangement from the organization,
Malcolm argued that African Americans needed to concentrate on pooling their economic
resources in order to create communal institutions that they controlled, independent of the larger
white society. 58 This is a common theme among black nationalist leaders. Malcolm did not
assign any role at all for government assistance in attaining this goal, for he saw the federal
government only as obstructionist.
This philosophy of self-help was reminiscent of Booker T. Washington’s economic
ideology in many ways, although the religious component of Malcolm’s philosophy makes it
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distinctive. George Schuyler, for his part, argued that African Americans were starting to
recognize the virtues of the “much-maligned” Booker T. Washington’s philosophy by the middle
of the 1960s. 59 Schuyler saw the answer in the self-help philosophy of Washington that stressed
the actions of individuals to improve their condition over and instead of the actions of the state.
It is important to note, however, that Schuyler was no fan of Malcolm X, and that feeling would
likely have been mutual. The difference in their ideological perspective comes from the
nationalist emphasis on collective struggle for collective gain, as opposed to the conservative
emphasis on individual responsibility for individual gain. Though the distinctions were more
important, there were similarities in the nationalist and conservative approaches to achieving
black equality in America. Harold Cruse even makes the connection between black
conservatism and black nationalism in Crisis of the Negro Intellectual when he makes the claim
that Malcolm X broke away from Elijah Muhammad’s type of nationalism because of its
conservatism, which could be traced back to Booker T. Washington “by way of Marcus Garvey
who had ‘radicalized’ Washington’s economic philosophy.” 60 Cruse was highlighting the
interconnectedness of African American intellectual thought, both over time and across
ideological viewpoints.

How Do We Get There?

The ideas laid out by black leaders brought various issues to the forefront of the
discussion over the future direction of the civil rights movement; most of which were recurring,
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such as what should be the role of whites within the movement, and others that seemed to be
bubbling up in critical ways by 1964, such as what was the future fate of liberal ideology, both in
the civil rights movement and in the nation. Both of these issues very much interconnected.
As discussed in Chapter 3 in the wake of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in
1954, African American leaders were not of one mind regarding the integration of public
schools. The same diversity of opinion was evident on the question of what role whites should
play within the civil rights movement. By 1964 this issue was perhaps even more fraught as the
liberal movement struggled to find renewed focus and faced substantive ideological challenges
from the left and the right.
Kenneth Clark argued that the civil rights movement would need whites in order to be
successful as it moved forward. He wrote in the middle of 1965 that, “the next stage of the
protest movement, if it is to be any real progress for the Negro and for our nation, cannot be a
stage for Negroes; it must be one in which various types of whites are involved.” 61 In Clark’s
view whites of all classes would have to be convinced that they had a stake in improving the
living conditions of African Americans, particularly those he considered to the imprisoned in
urban ghettoes. This would need to be done through traditional liberal modes, such as calls to
conscience and educating the public, but also by appealing to the self-interest of whites. It had to
be put to white Americans that nothing short of American civilization, itself, hung in the balance
of the success of the civil rights movement. 62

61

Kenneth Clark, “Beyond Demonstrations: A New Phase in Civil Rights,” The Register-Leader of the
Unitarian Universalist Association, (Midsummer 1965), 5, Box 159, Folder 5, Professional File, Speeches &
Writings, Speeches, Feb. 1962-Sept. 1965, KBC Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
62
Kenneth Clark, “American Race Relations Today: A Role for Group Service Agencies,” (November 30,
1965), 5, Box 160, Folder 1, Professional File, Speeches & Writings, Oct. 1965-Nov. 1967, KBC Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

239

Even though Clark expressed the view that whites needed to be involved in the civil
rights movement going forward, he also reflected the growing frustration of many black liberals
with the actions of “moderate” or “liberal” whites within the movement to date. He argued that
moderate whites were the “major threat of the present civil rights thrust” and that whites needed
to deal with their own racial prejudice before they could be of help to the movement. 63 Clark
diagnosed that there existed an internal conflict within white liberals between their desire to keep
up their liberal self-image and their desire to remain accepted within their “in-group” (family,
friends, and social cliques), which may not have shared their liberal attitudes. Clark then
determined that, “in some [white liberals] this conflict is resolved by a self-protective rejection
of the Negro as ‘too impatient’ and by the conviction that the good of the total society requires a
more measured, gradual approach.” 64 The problem with this war within individual whites was
two-fold. Firstly, it was retarding the progress of the civil rights movement as it fed into the
“white backlash” that was growing in intensity by mid-decade. Secondly, this white
ambivalence, as Clark described it, was also damaging the reputation of liberalism among
African Americans. He argued that blacks were rejecting “the liberal label,” and thereby
liberalism as an ideology, because “‘liberal’ has come to mean white.” 65
Clark was writing vigorously in order to convince African Americans, and more
specifically black liberals, including James Baldwin, that the destiny of African Americans was
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inextricably tied to that of the United States. 66 African Americans could not afford to be
ambivalent about the success or failure of the civil rights movement, or about whether or not s/he
is an American, or about whether or not he wants to be integrated into American society, or
about liberalism. The movement had to succeed, they were Americans, they were a part of
American society and would need to agitate to be further integrated, and liberalism was the
ideology that would continue to serve them best. There was no viable alternative in Africa.
There was no other viable ideology that would bring about racial equality in the United States.
Remarking that “there’s no hiding place in Africa” was a swipe at black nationalists,
specifically the NOI and Malcolm X, who continued to advocate an independent black state,
either within the United States or Africa, in order to build a new civilization apart from white
America. For Clark, the NOI was not a viable movement for it propagated “the delusion of
violence, the myth that it was a force for violence. This belief, which many whites and Negroes
held about the Black Muslims, was almost as useful in arousing fear and awe among others as
the reality would have been and paradoxically accounted for much of its appeal and
attractiveness.” 67 Clark believed that the NOI had regressed into a cult, especially after Malcolm
X’s assassination, and had devastated whatever revolutionary potential had existed—although he
did not believe there had been much to begin with.
Kenneth Clark was not the only leader who questioned the revolutionary potential of the
NOI. Bayard Rustin argued that rather than being a radical, Malcolm X had been a
“conservative force in the Negro community” in many respects. In assessing the legacy of
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Malcolm X soon after his death, Rustin argued against the association of nonviolence with
cowardice and retaliatory violence with manhood and dignity, which he contended Malcolm
perpetuated. Malcolm’s commitment to violence was “purely verbal” and not at all radical, in
Rustin’s view. 68 It was, rather, a manifestation of what he called, the “no-win policy” creeping
into the civil rights movement. This approach was to try and induce white liberal support for the
civil rights movement by “shocking” them with examples of white liberal hypocrisy. For Rustin
this was empty militancy. 69
Sound and fury without substance did nothing to advance the movement. Only creating
an interracial, class-conscious, social movement to “reconstruct” America’s social, political, and
economic institutions would succeed at forming “a new psychology” in this country. 70 That
movement would necessarily include whites, for as Clark argued, African Americans were
struggling for the soul of America as well as fighting to improve their own condition. Also
speaking against the growing frustration of some liberals, Rustin directly attacked James
Baldwin’s assertion that the majority of blacks felt alienated in the United States. Rustin wrote,
“that is not true. Baldwin and a few others are alienated.” Rustin contended that the majority of
blacks wanted to be part of American society, warts and all, because they believed in the
American creed. 71 Basically, that in fact most African Americans believed in a version of
liberalism. Although Rustin believed in socialism in economic matters, Rustin had always
believed in a version of American liberalism as well. He argued in “Protest to Politics:”
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Neither that movement nor the country’s twenty million black people can win
political power alone. We need allies. The future of the Negro struggle depends on
whether the contradictions of this society can be resolved by a coalition of progressive
forces which becomes the effective political majority in the United States. I speak of the
coalition which staged the March on Washington, passed the Civil Rights Act, and laid
the basis for the Johnson landslide—Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious
groups. 72
Essentially, Rustin described the political coalition that was forged out of the Great Depression
of the 1930s and came together, particularly in the North, to pass the legislation of the New Deal.
The 1930s was the period in which occurred the most dramatic changes to the definition of
American liberalism since the nation’s founding. Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, it became
the government’s responsibility and even obligation to protect citizens from the harshest vagaries
of the economy. In the decades that followed the purview of the federal government only
increased and more groups were included among the list of those to be protected by the
government. Among them were African Americans by the 1950s and 1960s. Rustin wanted this
coalition to endure amidst signs that this three-decades-old coalition was fragmenting and
becoming increasingly unwieldy. It had to remain steadfast.
Rustin made clear his belief that white liberals were not the biggest threat to the black
freedom struggle. Rather, it was racist politicians like James Eastland from Mississippi and
Barry Goldwater from Arizona, and others who opposed civil rights legislation, Lyndon
Johnson’s war on poverty programs, and the social welfare state that deserved the ire of black
leaders. 73 Johnson’s Great Society programs were providing federal funding to inner city
communities and was having a positive affect on black poverty. To continue to criticize white
liberals for their lack of commitment to civil rights was to divert much-needed attention and
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resources from the more important political fight that had to be won. Rustin was sensing—
perhaps ahead of many—the massive political reorganization in the major political parties that
was about to come to full fruition within another generation. And he recognized the catalytic
role of the civil rights movement in fostering these changes. Rustin wanted this restructuring of
political life to have progressive rather than regressive consequences for the poor, for blacks, and
for the larger collective.
Both Rustin and Kenneth Clark expressed concerns about the role of white liberals within
the civil rights movement, but both also made clear that whites needed to be included within the
movement going forward if it was to be successful in its next incarnation. Harold Cruse,
however, expressed the view of many nationalists in identifying white liberals as a major
hindrance to true black liberation, not only freedom from discriminatory laws and customs but
also from White Anglo-Saxon Protestant standards of behavior, beauty, and civilization. But in
assigning blame to white liberals, Cruse also criticized black intellectuals more harshly for
allowing whites to control them. As Cruse put it in Crisis of the Negro Intellectual:

The Negro intellectual has been bereft of the means of solving his own problems
because his class has traditionally been maneuvered into the position where his problems
are solved by others. Instead of being able to essay his own solutions, the Negro
intellectual has been transformed into a problem by the white liberal, who prefers to keep
him in that position. The white liberal problem-solver has been institutionalized as an
organic part of the entire civil rights movement, and is the emasculator of the creative and
intellectual potential of the Negro intelligentsia. 74
From Cruse’s vantage point, the integrationist impulse of black leaders since the
NAACP’s founding has ultimately resulted in the inability of African Americans to create
cultural, economic, and political institutions of their own to win the rights they deserve. “The
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Negro intellectuals of today are the victims of the intellectual default of yesterday.” 75 Therefore,
Cruse believed that in the mid 1960s, blacks needed to build their own institutions and develop
their own aesthetic first before integrating into the larger society. Blacks had to be able to
interact with white Americans on their own terms, from a position of institutional and intellectual
strength, rather than what he considered to be the current situation, assimilation and the denial of
an authentic African American cultural aesthetic.
This led Cruse to disagree with liberals like Clark, and even socialists like Rustin on
issues such as ghettoization. Clark and Rustin viewed ghettoes as places of deprivation,
pathology, the result of restricted mobility, and, ultimately, a manifestation of the total denial of
one’s individual liberties guaranteed under the Constitution solely on the basis of color. Cruse
viewed “ghettoes,” like Harlem, much differently. He saw in Harlem, for example, the potential
flowering of black culture and political power. He felt that needed fostering, not destroying so
that blacks could be assimilated into white society. In Cruse’s view, liberals were afraid of just
that, the attainment and responsibility for exercising substantial group power emanating from
lower-class people. 76 This was why Cruse based the Freedom Now Party in Harlem. He hoped
that the party was radiate outward across the nation from there; a black community that would
produce and foster black leaders, and an authentic black ideology.
These divergent views of ghettoes points up an important ideological difference between
liberals and nationalists, as well as between Kenneth Clark and Harold Cruse. Liberals tended to
look at the civil rights movement as collective protest in order to obtain individual rights. They
wanted for African Americans to be included in the covenant that was the US Constitution, and
being able to live where one pleased, with whomever they wanted, as long as they could afford
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to, was an important part of their conception of being an American. Also, if you ascribe to
Cruse’s point of view, liberals were motivated by materialistic ends and, therefore, were only
capable of thinking about ghettoes in terms of material deprivation. Nationalists, by contrast,
tended to look at the civil rights movement as collective protest for “ethnic solvency.” They
wanted for African Americans to be able to extricate themselves from the larger society if they
chose, or to be able to engage with white America on their own terms. For Cruse, the need for
autonomy was most tangible at the level of culture. The other things necessary for building a
viable African American community—economic and political institution-building—would
follow the development of an independent black artistic, literary, and social criticism.
Malcolm X definitely subscribed to the nationalist credo that made ethnic solvency the
top priority of the black freedom struggle. This is one of the tenets that bind nationalists. But to
that Malcolm also added the desire for territorial independence that went back to the midnineteenth century, and more recently the Garvey-led Universal Negro Improvement Association
in the 1920s. And Cruse did not believe this was a viable option for African Americans. To
him, this idea, as well as some other strains of nationalist thought, were pessimistic. These views
were “based on the conviction that the Afro-American is doomed to genocide and destruction if
he remains in this country, therefore nothing matters but making plans to get out.” 77 Also, that
there was nothing worth fighting for here in the United States because America was “not worth
saving,” therefore, it was best to leave as soon as possible. But as far as Cruse was concerned,
these positions unnecessarily dichotomized the nationalist program and “indicate[d] something
deeply wrong with the Afro-American nationalist orientation.” 78 The crux of these differences
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among nationalists appeared to be economic orientation. While Malcolm X and the NOI were
thoroughly capitalistic, having been influenced by Garveyism and Booker T. Washington’s
philosophy of self-help, Cruse was essentially a Marxist (although one disgruntled about the state
of implementation of Marxism during the mid-1960s).
Conservatives, such as George Schuyler, imbibed the self-help philosophy of Washington
without any of the concern for ethnic solvency that captivated nationalists. Like liberals, they
looked at civil rights as a struggle for individual liberty, but they countenanced no role for the
federal government in “forcing” people to behave in a particular way. Racism, as far as they
were concerned, was an individual problem; to be eradicated, if ever, in the due time of those
who practiced it. And no sooner.

Events occurring in the streets of America’s urban centers during 1964 and 1965, as well
as the ideological debates amongst black leaders, indicated that the liberal ideology that had
guided the modern black civil rights movement in the main since the publication of An American
Dilemma was in the midst of its most significant ideological challenge since the 1930s. Riots,
grinding black poverty, job and housing discrimination, among numerous other problems, in
spite of sweeping congressional legislation, disillusioned many. They lost patience not only with
the nonviolent, mass action tactics advocated by liberals, but also with the entire liberal ideology,
which emphasized the eventual perfectibility of America through dogged perseverance because
of the moral righteousness of the country’s founding principles.
The crisis that black leaders had come to diagnose by the end of 1963 reflected, or
perhaps presaged, a much larger crisis within American liberalism. The search for answers to
the question of “where to go from here” fractured the movement in ways, and to a degree, that
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could not be reconciled or co-opted as had been done in 1960. In part, this was due, ironically,
to the success of the liberal movement in awakening the nation’s collective conscience and
pressuring the federal government to enact substantial legislation that would protect African
American’s constitutional rights. In part, this was because the problems that African Americans
faced were now moving targets as opposed to being fixed. De jure segregation was a fixed
target. Unjust laws could be struck down or rewritten, and by the end of 1965 many of the most
important ones were. De facto segregation, the type that was systemic and pervasive in the
culture, was adaptable, flexible, moving; it was not eradicable by legislation alone. As Bayard
Rustin pointed out, it would demand nothing less than the reconstruction of American politics
and society. And different leaders had conflicting ideas about how extensive that reconstruction
needed to be, as well as the best methods for accomplishing it.
The confluence of urban black frustrations about their condition as second-class citizens
and the trenchant analyses of the state of the civil rights movement coming from different
ideological perspectives resulted in the decline of the liberal orthodoxy in the civil rights
movement. Within a few short years, the New Deal liberalism that African Americans had
pushed to broaden would also be on its deathbed as Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda was
swallowed up by the escalating costs and death tolls exacted by American involvement in the
jungles of Southeast Asia, and a stagnating economy.
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Conclusion

So, what was the role of ideology in the civil rights movement? Racial liberalism,
conservatism, nationalism, and socialism/communism provided New York’s black intellectuals
with organizing principles for attempting to make sense of their current conditions and a basis
for developing strategies in order to improve it. These ideologies were in conversation,
cooperation, and conflict with one another during the 1950s and 1960s. Black intellectuals were
by no means merely engaged in intellectual exercises; rather, they were working to develop
effective strategies in order to help transform America into a just, egalitarian society.
Between 1954 and 1965 New York’s black intellectuals got involved in battles for civil
rights in New York City and around the country. In numerous ways, these activists and thinkers
tried to help ameliorate the problems African Americans faced. New York’s black intellectuals
called on a rich tradition of intellectual thought that provided useful templates for how to go
about building and sustaining a movement for freedom. Yet black intellectuals did not merely
copy what had been done by earlier generations of thinkers. Rather, they adapted and, therefore,
evolved these ideologies in order to deal with the circumstances that African Americans were
then facing more effectively. New York black intellectuals participated in boycotts, marches,
and even formed independent political parties between 1954 and 1965.
They did not approach the struggle for equality from a singular vantage point, however.
Black leaders applied multiple ideological approaches to the problem of how to obtain first-class
citizenship for African Americans. These ideologies have deep roots in African American
intellectual thought and developed in their twentieth century incarnations from the debates
between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois at the turn of twentieth century.
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Washington and Du Bois laid the foundations for the modern conservative and liberal
ideologies, adapting them to the conditions created by modern industrial capitalism, the
construction of Jim Crow America, and the Progressive reform impulses between 1890 and
1917. Succeeding generations of black activists and intellectuals, such as Marcus Garvey, A.
Philip Randolph, and Harold Cruse drew from, built on, and critiqued the doctrines of Du Bois
and Washington, drawing on a nationalist ideology that is nearly as old as the racial liberal
tradition, and adding a leftist framework to the discussions that were being used in order to
facilitate African American equality.
Much of this intellectual ferment that contributed to the evolution of the four major
ideologies occurred in New York City, and this was not accidental. Due to the rapidly growing
number of African Americans in Harlem, the relative absence of legal segregation, the formation
of civil rights groups, and the growth of the black press, African Americans were able to fashion
the legal, public, and private spaces necessary to create a significant movement for racial
equality over the course of the first half of the twentieth century.
New York City was also a place where diverse intellectual, cultural, and political
perspectives were able to flourish. From the NAACP and the Urban League, to the Liberty
League, African Blood Brotherhood, the UNIA, and the CPUSA, the variety of ideas that were
able to sink roots into the ideological landscape of New York City made it the cultural and
intellectual center of black America by 1920. This attracted many politically-inclined migrants
to the city. The number of intellectual activities available in the city enthralled and stimulated
new arrivals such as Bayard Rustin, Ella Baker, George Schuyler, and Harold Cruse. Many of
these figures also contributed to the perpetuation of intellectual inquiry and consciousnessraising during their time in New York City. Therefore New York’s black intellectuals grew up
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around diverse personal, political and intellectual traditions and these shaped how they would
approach the question of how best to bring equality in the United States.
The exposure to numerous ideologies helped New York’s black intellectuals conceive of
the problems facing African Americans in broader terms than just their personal experiences or
what was happening in their city. Even when these leaders focused on struggles in New York
City, they were quick to make connections to the movements for equality in other parts of the
country. New York’s black intellectuals understood that the civil right movement was never
confined to one region of the country or another. The movement was always truly national—if
not international—in scope. And the influence of many of New York’s black intellectuals went
far beyond the city. Kenneth Clark’s research for the Brown case, Ella Baker’s work
establishing the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Malcolm X’s invitations to
speak on college campuses and the growth of the Nation of Islam throughout the country during
his time in the organization are a few examples.
The Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 marked an important turning point in
the national civil rights movement and also in New York’s black intellectual community. The
decision overturned the doctrine of “separate but equal” as legal national policy with regard to
schools, but it was impossible to know exactly how things would be different in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s mandate. The ruling brought the issue of racial integration to the forefront of
American life in a more direct way than it had been since the Civil War ended. African
Americans did not react to the decision with a single voice. Brown elicited a range of responses
based on ideological proclivities. Racial liberals tended to hail the decision the loudest. For the
lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, for example, the Brown decision represented the
culmination of twenty years of legal battles to strike down racial segregation in public education.
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The decision, for many, also represented the dawning of a new era in race relations, the moment
when America became modern. Liberals saw the Brown decision as the first step toward a truly
integrated society and blacks achieving first-class citizenship.
Blacks who subscribed to different ideologies, such as nationalism or conservatism, were
more critical of Brown’s implications. Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam were critical of
Brown because of what it could potentially mean for further intermingling of the races. The
Nation of Islam taught its members that whites would never treat African Americans equally in
the United States, that American civilization was doomed to be wiped off the earth, and that
blacks needed to save themselves by disengaging from American society as completely and
quickly as possible. Integration into a racist, corrupt society was both futile and denigrating to
blacks who deserved to have a sovereign nation in their own right. On the other hand, black
conservatives criticized Brown because they believed the decision did little other than antagonize
the white South. For conservatives, harmonious race relations could only happen gradually and
were only facilitated by the absence of conflict. African Americans, according to conservatives,
need to be more concerned with improving their own behavior and closing the “cultural gap”
between themselves and whites rather than trying to force whites to accept them in places and
situations where they were not wanted. Once blacks demonstrated their individual fitness for
integration, conservatives believed that white society would accept them.
Over the course of the 1950s, however, the enthusiasm that the Brown decision generated
in many quarters of the black community began to fade as local school boards engaged in the
tactics of interminable delay and whites formed groups to resist racial integration. As the efforts
to desegregate schools produced fewer tangible results, black leaders became doubtful about the
efficacy of liberalism as the guiding ideology of the movement.

252

By the turn of the decade, militant activists were criticizing their older, more moderate
counterparts for not being forceful enough in their calls for racial equality. New organizations
such as SNCC and the Parents’ Workshop for Equality in Brooklyn not only critiqued less
confrontational approaches for achieving equality, they also brought different conceptions of
how to build a social movement with them that emphasized developing and maximizing the
leadership potential of ordinary people and local communities. The commitment that these
organizations demonstrated to the strategies of grassroots organization and direct-action protests
compelled the more established organizations like the NAACP to re-brand itself as an
organization that was in-touch with the new youthful militancy of the civil rights struggle and to
adapt racial liberalism to better encompass that militancy.
As racial liberals steadied themselves by 1963, the centennial of the Emancipation
Proclamation became the crucible of the civil rights movement. Critical campaigns in
Birmingham, Washington, D.C., and New York City illustrated that African Americans were
voicing their demands for equality even more forcefully than in years past. These campaigns
were all largely considered to be victories for the movement, but whatever successes they
facilitated, they also forced black intellectuals to ask very tough questions as the outcomes of
these campaigns posed new dilemmas for the movement. Resistance to civil rights efforts on the
part of ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, and political leaders continued into 1964, and even the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not eradicate the
problems of housing discrimination, employment discrimination, and grinding poverty in urban
cities.
How were these problems to be dealt with, and could the answers still be found within a
liberal framework? New York’s black intellectuals agreed that the civil rights movement had
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indeed reached a crossroads, but disagreed on the path toward a more just future. Some
continued to look to the federal government for assistance, even as they called for a complete
reorganization of that government’s spending priorities. Others looked to increased partnerships
between civil rights organizations and the private sector. Still others saw the answers in
autonomous political organization committed to addressing the needs of poor, urban blacks. And
finally, some called for increased personal responsibility for ameliorating the obstacles to
individual advancement. From this perspective, blacks, as a collective would only advance as far
as the moral fortitude and personal work ethic of each individual African American. All of these
ideas had merits and drawbacks, but as the recent legislative gains made the problems facing
blacks seem even more intractable, this conundrum opened sufficient space for Black Power
ideology to more to the fore of the black freedom struggle and for liberalism to recede.

So, what is the importance of looking at this period in terms of ideology? Besides
continuing to recover the early history of civil rights struggles beyond the South, this study helps
to give greater context for the rise of Black Power ideology during the mid-1960s and beyond.
Black Power did not spring from nowhere in 1966, nor did it represent the unmitigated decline of
the civil rights movement. Rather, Black Power had its roots in all of the ideologies of the
previous decade. It came to the fore when it did because of the new circumstances, new
questions, and the lack of effective answers to the question of how to achieve black freedom in
America. The shift toward Black Power after 1965 really should be viewed less as a distinctive
break with the movement of the previous decade and more as a shift within a continually
evolving intellectual and activist tradition in African American history.
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